In 1904, geographer Sir Halford John Mackinder unveiled his famous thesis entitled the "Geographical Pivot of History," in which he argued there existed a pivotal area "in the closed heart-land of Euro-Asia" that was isolated from sea power, and thus immune from the influences of oceanic states. In Mackinder's famous three-point summation:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
Who rules the heartland commands the World Island;
Who rules the World Island commands the World.

Mackinder envisioned a struggle between Germany and Russia for the "heartland," essentially dismissing the effects of sea power, which already had been touted by the famous American theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (1890) influenced and altered the thinking in several nations about the role of "blue-water" navies. Mahan rejected the "heartland" thesis, instead claiming that naval power was decisive in recent world history.

It turns out both Mackinder and Mahan were wrong, at least in some important respects. The U.S./coalition victory in Iraq is forcing a re-evaluation of both concepts in light of a dramatic reordering of the Muslo-Arab world and the "heartland," the potential of which is nothing short of breathtaking. Look at what has occurred in the Middle East since 1991---deliberately or unintentionally.

• First, the Gulf War decimated Iraq's heavy armor, air force, and conventional forces. In the process, the U.S. gained its first thoroughly committed Arab ally, Kuwait. Recently, only Kuwait denounced Iraq, and stood by the United States, in the recent Arab League meetings. Nevertheless, the impact of the Gulf War was not lost on several other Muslim/Gulf states, including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, and, perhaps most importantly Qatar, These countries spoke through their actions by giving the U.S. access to air bases, ports, and supply routes,. Don't let geography or population numbers fool you. The support of these states is significant, and Qatar, despite having only 60,000 people, is strategically more important than, say Libya or Chad. In the Iraq war, despite the target being a "fellow Muslim," these allies proved more reliable than America's long-standing European "friends." A total of six Arab countries gave the U.S. support and/or practical help (and nine other Muslim countries offered overflight or other support) in the campaign against Iraq.

• Second, the 2002 Afghanistan campaign, officially launching the "war on terror," overthrew a brutal regime in a land-locked nation that seemed, at the time, formidable. Remember all the armchair doomsayers, conjuring up images of 19th century British armies, or a 20th century Soviet military machine, bested by the "tough" Afghan fighters? In fact, the Pentagon took a page out of American history---Jefferson's 1804 war on the Barbary pirates---and sent in small regular forces combined with special ops teams and properly motivated local tribesmen. The victory was astonishingly quick, despite claims that Americans couldn't "take the cold" or handle the terrain.
  
  
• In 2003, Iraq, for all intents and purposes, fell in about three weeks of actual fighting. In addition to the aforementioned Arab/Muslim states, a significant number of the "willing" were former Iron Curtain countries who have had a taste of freedom---Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and others. This is where both Mackinder and Mahan enter the picture.

Beginning with the rim Arab nations in the Gulf War, then adding Afghanistan as (ostensibly) a democracy, and now Iraq, the United States potentially (and anything can happen in politics) has a "heartland" alliance going, and a pretty impressive one at that. Only Turkey separates the new Arab allies with the former Iron Curtain allies; and to the east of Afghanistan is a reluctant---but ever helpful---Pakistan. These two states are separated by Iran, on the "axis of evil" hit list.

It is not surprising that there are new calls inside Iran for normalization of relations with the U.S., nor should it shock anyone that the Iranians sent their gunboats on at least one occasion to sink Iraqi suicide vessels headed for our ships. While it is not confirmed, the suspicion is that Iranian forces have sealed off their side of the northern Iraq border and are killing or imprisoning the rebels who managed to escape the Kurdish enema they were given. Iran sees the writing on the wall.

In just over a decade, then, the United States has completely reorganized the power relationships in the entire region. Should Turkey play ball, and if Iran has an internal "regime change," as many expect it to, the swath of the Muslo-European-American alliance would be wide, especially seeing as though still other nations, such as the Ukraine, were moderately supportive of the Iraq war. Such a geo-political shift would isolate the militant Arab states, and possibly open the door for genuine reform in Egypt, Syra, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, but it not, those nations would find themselves more marginalized than they already are. Indeed, a Muslo-East Euro-American alliance would send a strong symbolic message to Russia and China alike: the world's superpower just got a bunch of friends.

Nevertheless, even if such a "heartland" alliance comes about, it is far from a validation of the Mackinder thesis. Quite the contrary, so far the restructuring of the region has been achieved largely by a totally new war-fighting plan that called for unprecedented special operations forces; unparalleled precision air power; and application of a military force which has no equal in training in the modern world. These forces could be inserted (by historical standards) rapidly through sea and air power. But if Mackinder doesn't adequately explain the new geo-political arrangements, neither does Mahan. The saga of the 4th Infantry Division is a testimony to the fragility of sea lines of communication and unreliable allies. Indeed, if any single units (besides special ops) came out of this action with added luster, it is the 3rd Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. (And please, while we are at it, perhaps we can get the media to refrain from ever again using the word "elite" in front of any force except the U.S. Army and USMC!)

But neither are Mackinder and Mahan exactly discredited. Rather, they have been synthesized, then morphed still further by the "Rumsfeld doctrine" of rapid deployment, lighter armor, and heavy employment of intelligence, both electronic and "on the ground." One cannot minimize the profound geopolitical overtones of the new strategy and capabilities. George W. Bush has essentially reshaped not a couple of regimes, but an entire region by his willingness to use the military as an effective tool of foreign policy---to set goals, establish an agenda, then let the professional soldiers do the rest, all using a fairly radical form of warfare that experts universally talk about, but heretofore have never achieved.

The implications of this geo-political and military shift are monumental, and likely going to be missed by the mainstream media, the "Arab lobby" of academics in this country, and even some military analysts. But the writing is on the wall with at least three clear messages:

1. Bush meant what he said about being "with us, or with the terrorists." That yardstick---and not a specific violation of some UN sanction or possession or a particular weapon---is what has been, and will be used to judge the behavior of other states. Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon will soon be in the crosshairs. While this does not necessarily mean military action, those nations might want to ponder recent history, because regime by regime, the United States has skillfully separated the militant Muslims from the responsible Middle Easterners who want a peaceful, normal life. With each new pruning of the Islamic tree, more everyday Arab men and women will realize they have been lied to by Al-Jazeera, the PLO, and the anti-Semitic dictators who bash Israel and America to cover up their own greed and corruption.
   
   
2. The old, Cold-War alliances have lost their meaning. A new alliance less dependent on sheer geography and more centered on a world view oriented toward liberty has emerged. Its further expansion may condemn the militant Islamic states to the dustbin of history.
   
   
3. Geography is becoming less and less a barrier to effective conventional military action. Despite Turkey's last minute tango, several eastern European countries still managed to contribute units to the Iraq conflict; and most military analysts agree that the 4th Infantry Division likely would not have seen combat too much sooner than they already might even had the Turks approved staging areas. Thus, as Mackinder's "geographical dominance" model becomes irrelevant, so too the technology has outdated Mahan's argument. American sea power fights now from such long ranges, with such imposing standoff weapons, and usually with turbines powered by nuclear reactors, that the need for bases in close proximity to conflict zones diminishes.

Nothing is inevitable, but we are standing on the brink of a reordering of the political alignments of Europe and the Middle East, the likes of which go back to the 19th century. It is a transformation made possible only by radical advances in military technology and the willingness to use it for national security. In the process of doing so, the unintended consequence may be to force Islam into the 21st century or doom it to the 6th.