Joel Beinin: The Golden Age of the Israeli Military
Joel Beinin, in the Nation (May 13, 2004):
For the last three and a half years the Israeli army has deployed American-supplied F-16 fighter jets, Apache helicopters, armored Caterpillar bulldozers and Merkava tanks powered by engines made in the USA in an unsuccessful effort to suppress the second Palestinian uprising. According to both Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon, Israel is engaged in a war despite the spectacularly unequal military balance in the conflict. Moreover, Palestinian civilians and the infrastructure of Palestinian society have been its principal victims. Almost all of the 2,886 Palestinian fatalities since September 2000 have been civilians, about eighty of them "collateral damage" to 230 extrajudicial assassinations, which are themselves violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention. In the same period there have been 950 Israeli fatalities, 672 of them civilians.
The typical pattern for the first several weeks of the intifada was that Palestinian civilians engaged in peaceful protest marches. Toward the end of the protests, youths taunted and threw stones at Israeli troops. The soldiers fired on stone-throwers and non-stone-throwers alike, rapidly escalating their responses to all demonstrations against over thirty years of occupation in accord with previously devised plans. Palestinian police, fearing they would be discredited if they remained passive, eventually returned fire using the rifles they were issued in accordance with the Oslo agreements. Secular and Islamist Palestinian factions revitalized their military wings. As it became clear that they were hopelessly outmatched by Israel's military force, they resorted to the strategically and morally catastrophic deployment of suicide bombers, targeting civilians.
The conduct of the Israeli army in the second intifada, in sharp contrast to its prevailing image, has been singularly unheroic. Its tactics have been condemned by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and even the State Department's annual report on human rights. This less than admirable performance forms the context for a spate of new books celebrating a better era for Israel's armed forces, when victories were gained fighting armies, not a civilian population resisting occupation and seeking national self-determination.
First there was Michael Oren's Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of
the Modern Middle East, chronicling the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Though widely
acclaimed by mainstream reviewers as a definitive account of the war, Oren's
book was aptly described by the tireless Norman Finkelstein as "Abba Eban
with Footnotes"--a reference to Eban's eloquent but factually challenged
speech at the UN General Assembly justifying Israel's pre-emptive strike of
June 1967. While Oren's book is a serious work of scholarship, it essentially
restates the traditional Israeli account of the war as a defensive strike waged
against belligerent Arab states seeking to "throw Israel into the sea."
Oren does not adequately address three arguments that challenge this view. First,
according to interviews with former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan conducted in
1976 and 1977, which were kept secret for many years but published well before
Oren's book, Israel had been intentionally provoking Syria since 1948 in order
to establish sovereignty over the demilitarized zones on their common border.
Second, according to the evaluation of several different intelligence agencies
and the Israeli general staff, Israel did not face an existential danger in
1967 and could expect an easy victory. Third, Israel chose war because, as Shimon
Peres wrote in the pro- Labor Party daily, Davar, its leaders did not want to
negotiate over Israel's borders or the question of Palestinian refugees. The
second of these matters remains off the table as far as Israel is concerned....
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