Why We Fear General McChrystal's Counterinsurgency Plan May Be Doomed

American Gen. Stanley McChrystal, recently appointed military commander of allied forces in Afghanistan, contends that absent a significant change in strategy, the outcome of the counterinsurgency war against the Taliban and associated groups will result in a military defeat.  The critical question before President Obama and the allied nations engaged in the war in Afghanistan is whether a failed counterinsurgency  can be corrected and military victory achieved. In addressing this question the public debate often utilizes comparisons with a few familiar cases, such as Vietnam, to argue  that the current conflict in Afghanistan is unwinnable.  By drawing on history more generally, we argue that one can gain greater insight to the question of whether the current counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan can be turned around.

Examining counterinsurgencies throughout the twentieth century reveals a pattern of pronounced failures by foreign powers, highlighted by United States involvement in Vietnam.  Yet many cases of counterinsurgency that are cited today as notable success stories, such as the British experiences in Malaya (1948-60) and Kenya (1952-60), were failing initially as well. The British struggled early in Malaya and Kenya against insurgencies that were relatively isolated and received little or no external support. 

In Malaya, the British lacked a strategic plan, as well as a clearly defined leadership or organization, and relied heavily on large conventional army sweeps to engage the insurgents. In Kenya, the British lacked a cohesive strategy, relying on repression as the primary counterinsurgency instrument, a strategy that inflamed the conflict and increased support for the insurgents. Yet, in both cases the British ultimately vanquished the insurgency. What enabled this reversal of fortune by the British while the United States failed in Vietnam?

We attribute this success to the capacity of counterinsurgents to adapt their military strategies by altering their their operational and strategic focus. Embedded in these strategic changes is a realization by counterinsurgent armies that they lack reliable intelligence about the insurgents as well a clear endgame for the conflict.  A new, and ultimately successful, strategic approach will usually center around resolving these two issues. However, the ability to resolve the deficiencies of the counterinsurgency depends on how quickly counterinsurgent armies correct these deficiencies. For example, the British changed their counterinsurgency strategy within two years of each conflict, while the United States altered course in Vietnam after nine years of war. The longer that a counterinsurgency strategy is allowed to fail, the more limited the effectiveness of its strategic replacement.

The diminishing effect of a strategy change is due to two reasons. An ineffective counterinsurgency depletes local support, turning indifferent populations into ardent enemies of the foreign power. In turn, a renewed focus on gaining  popular favor with nation-building and the provision of security, as is proposed by Gen. McChrystal for Afghanistan, is made exponentially more difficult in the absence of local support. Additionally, the longer an ineffective counterinsurgency strategy is implemented, the greater the opportunity for insurgents to increase popular support, as well as to establish external sources of political and material support.

Whether the war in Afghanistan is winnable from a military perspective is front and center in the public debate over the course of the American effort. The current conflict in Afghanistan may seem unwinnable. However, the important question to ask is whether and how the shortcomings in the counterinsurgency, such as lack of intelligence, deterioration of popular support, and the capability of local military forces, can be reversed with a different strategy. The degree to which the these factors can change are a function of timing---early is good, later is bad. The renewed focus by Gen. McChrystal on the population and the government of Afghanistan is a major step toward correcting a failed counterinsurgency program, but one that is likely too late, given pattens of counterinsurgency in the twentieth century.