Fear and Loathing in Erdogan's Turkey

September 12, 2010 saw the approval of a referendum to amend twenty-six articles of Turkey’s constitution.  Although these articles appear to ameliorate the undemocratic elements in the constitution, prepared by the military after a coup in 1980, the amendments caused considerable controversy in Turkey.  The decisive margin (58 percent to 42 percent) boosted the government’s confidence in dealing with the opposition; however, it also stoked secularist fears that the government and Islamic-minded citizens are poised to destroy the secular nature of the state. 

Before going any further, I must clarify one thing: we need to be careful when generalizing about this matter as purely a struggle between secularists and Islamists.  Those who voted for the amendments include some secular intellectuals, Kurds, leftists and ultra-nationalists.  Similarly, some pious and practicing Muslims voted no. It is only as a matter of practicality to define these divisions as such.  Nevertheless, what separates nay-sayers from the rest is the fear that the current government’s hidden agenda of Islamist regime chance has no legal or political obstacles left to overcome.  Does this fear have merit?  

The root of modern secularist concerns lies in the Ottoman period.  Although the Ottoman Empire was theoretically an “Islamic empire,” theory did not translate into practice.  The religious establishment (with some exceptions) was incorporated into the Ottoman administration as bureaucrats, lower-level administrators, and civil servants.  In other words, their interest and well-being were skillfully tied to the existence and the functioning of the state.  Their dependency to the state laid the very foundation of the secularist view of the Republic; secularism meant the subordination of religion to the state, not separation from it.  The ulama (religious functionaries) were advisors to the secular administrations.  They interacted with them and influenced them to a degree; and depending on the period their influence varied.  They were, however, still outsiders to the inner circle of power.   

The same political landscape remained intact in the Republic of Turkey, at least until the election of the Justice and Development Party in 2002.  The military and the secular establishment were dominated by those who felt that religion should be under tight control and subordinate to the state.  When the Erdogan government came to power the secularists, who always believed that Islam’s place in the private sphere was well-established and already digested by the people, experienced a rude awakening.  They immediately looked for a scapegoat.  Conspiracy theories circulated about how the West, particularly the United States, selected Turkey as the model for moderate (read: tamed) Islam.  The 2007 elections saw Justice and Development lose twenty-four MPs, but the party still holds 341 seats (of 550) in the Grand National Assembly.  This was an alarming development for secularists as the executive branch solidified its control on the legislature.  There was still the judicial branch and the military, however, to protect the secular nature of the state.

The latest referendum has dimmed, if not outright extinguished, secularists’ hopes.  Military intervention in the civil government is now unconstitutional, undermining the military’s effectiveness as a deterrent against dismantling secular structures.  The amendments also lay the groundwork for diminishing the judiciary, removing yet another secularist pillar.

Unlike in earlier periods, the religious establishment now has an Islamic party in government, making Islamists’ access to political power much easier than before.  Those Islamists who never accepted their political role in secularist Turkey now have the chance to gain legislative and bureaucratic power.  Secularists are convinced that Islamists have already infiltrated government, ranging from the smallest rural village to Ankara.  With such a mindset, we can see the rationale behind the angry rhetoric voiced by the secular establishment.  As the secularist worldview becomes defenseless, according to the opposition, it is only a matter of time before Justice and Development shows its true fundamentalist face. 

The real question before us is not “is this fear warranted.”  Perception is reality in politics, and secular fear has its merits. The real question is whether Justice and Development is trying to fundamentally (no pun intended) change the nature of the Turkish state.  Personally, I have not seen convincing evidence that the party is “systematically” undermining secular Turkey.  Secularists dispute this but only with speculations.  One can surely hear from statements by government officials, however, that they wish to re-define “secularism” in such a way that religion would no longer be subordinate to the state.  Islamists demand “equal” status with and within the state.  The problem is that such equality may not be desirable or even possible.  Since both Islam and the state compete for the loyalty of the same people, “equal status” might lead to an intense competition for power.  Therefore, bringing religion to the public sphere requires establishing a very delicate balance. The Erdogan government must be extremely careful not to antagonize secularists, whose membership is not much smaller than the Islamists.  At the same time, the secularist movement must find ways to constructively deal with its own Islamophobia, but that’s an issue for another column.