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Iraq Needs a Democratic Strongman

Thousands of Iraqi Shi'ites chanted "No to America, No to Saddam, Yes to Islam" a few days ago, during pilgrimage rites at the holy city of Karbala. Increasing numbers of Iraqis appear to agree with these sentiments. They have ominous implications for the coalition forces.

Gratitude for liberation usually has a short shelf life, and Iraq will be no exception. As a middle-aged factory manager put it, "Thank you, Americans. But now we don't need anybody to stay here anymore."

However delighted they are to be rid of the Saddamite nightmare, Iraqis mentally live in a world of conspiracy theories, causing many to harbor deep suspicions of coalition intentions.

"Yes to Islam" in effect means "Yes to Iranian-style militant Islam." The introduction of that failed system would be a disaster for Iraq and would revive the Khomeini message, which by now has lost nearly all appeal in Iran.

This state of affairs leaves coalition forces in a bind: As vanquisher of the Saddam Hussein regime, they aim to rehabilitate the country, which means sticking around. As liberator of the country, they must respond to Iraqi wishes, which means getting out fast.

What to do? If coalition forces leave Iraq precipitously, anarchy and extremism would result. Stay too long, they will face an anti-imperialist backlash of sabotage and terrorism. Hold elections too fast, the Khomeini-like mullahs will probably win. Keep the country under an occupation force, and an intifada would rear up.

The U.S. and U.K. governments need to square the circle - put the country to right while getting out of the way, and bring about democracy without letting the Iranians take over. I offer two pieces of advice:

Plan for the long haul. Building a full democracy (meaning, regularly voting the head of government out of office) takes time. From the Magna Carta in 1215 to the Reform Act of 1832, England needed six centuries. The United States needed over a century. Things have sped up and these days, but it still stakes twenty or more years to reach full democracy. That was the timetable in countries as varied as South Korea, Chile, Poland and Turkey.
Plan for a gradual transition. A population emerging from thirty years in the dungeon cannot cope with all the choices of full democracy, but must get there in steps. Democratically-minded autocrats can guide the country to full democracy better than snap elections.
Therefore: Iraq needs - and I write these words with some trepidation - a democratically-minded Iraqi strongman. This may sound like a contradiction, but it has happened elsewhere, for example by Atatürk in Turkey and Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan. Yes, it goes against every American instinct ("Democracy Now!" is the name of a national radio show) but that's not a reason to reject it.

Democracy is a learned habit, not instinct. The infrastructure of a civil society - such as freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, the rule of law, minority rights and an independent judiciary - needs to be established before holding elections. Deep attitudinal changes must take place as well: a culture of restraint, a commonality of values, a respect for differences of view and a sense of civic responsibility.

Such institutions and views will need years to grow in Iraq. In the meantime, elections should begin on the local level. The press should inch toward full freedom, political parties should grow organically, parliament should gain in authority. The Shi'ites can develop democratic ideas, uninfluenced by Khomeinism.

Who should fill the all-important role of strongman? The ideal candidate would be politically moderate but operationally tough; someone with an ambition to steer Iraq toward democracy and good neighborly relations.

As for the coalition forces, after installing a strongman they should phase out their visible role and pull back to a few military bases away from population centers. From these, they can quietly serve as the military partner of the new government, guaranteeing its ultimate security and serving as a constructive influence for the entire region.

The approach outlined here undercuts the rage of anti-imperialism, finesses the almost certain violence against coalition troops and prevents the Iranians from colonizing Iraq. But the window of opportunity is closing rapidly: Unless the coalition appoints a strongman very soon, it will not achieve its ambitious goals.