Although Iraqi citizens have now voted on a new constitution, the recent spike in violence in Iraq leads many Americans to wonder why victory remains elusive. Surely, they say, the world’s lone superpower can defeat the insurgents and the remnants of Saddam Hussein’s former armed forces. However, if Americans set aside their repugnance at the comparison, they will note that the Iraq War’s structural correlation of forces—not the methods or goals—resembles the American War of Independence (1775-1783). Although Britain enjoyed a huge economic and military advantage over the thirteen rebellious colonies, London saw its imperial power in North America destroyed by a rag-tag colonial army.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld sought to wage war in Iraq by keeping the number of U.S. combat troops to a minimum. This strategy has backfired. There are simply too few American forces in Iraq to patrol adequately a country roughly twice the size of California, to protect the Iraqi people from attack. Moreover, U.S. forces are also too small and widely-dispersed to protect Iraqi civilians and officials from insurgent attacks. At the beginning of the War for American Independence, Britain also hoped to triumph with minimal force, but the great geographical size of the thirteen colonies rendered this strategy impossible.

This imbalance between the size of the occupying army and geographic size of the theater of combat also has other effects. Throughout the Iraq War, U.S. officials have insisted that most Iraqi people support U.S. policy toward their country. Ironically, these officials have continually underestimated the strength and commitment of the insurgency, just as the British did over 200 years ago. Convinced the rebellion lacked popular support, Britain confidently predicted that its small commitment of forces would quickly and easily quash the rebellion. This confidence proved misplaced, as the small number of British forces was unable to protect Loyalists to the British Crown from the Patriot retaliation.

Global responsibilities also undermine a powerful nation’s ability to suppress an uprising. In 1778, Britain attempted to detach the South from the rebel cause by forming local Loyalist militia units to maintain control over areas taken by the British Army. The British regulars would then expand the areas under their control while denying them to the rebellion. The British intended this strategy to end the war without increasing significantly the numbers of troops in North America. This concern was important because Britain had military commitments elsewhere. Likewise, the U.S. cannot devote all of its resources to the Iraq War because the country continues to fight in Afghanistan.

The Bush administration has tried to walk a fine line in Iraq in dealing with leading insurgents. U.S. military commanders announced their intention to “capture or kill” the radical young Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr and destroy his militia. However, U.S. moves against al-Sadr simply increased his popularity among younger Iraqis. As with other insurgent leaders, U.S. policy has vacillated between opposition and appeasement. During the War for American Independence, the British also initially attempted to combine force and persuasion to crush the uprising in rebellious Massachusetts without estranging the other colonies. Like the current U.S. administration, the British government failed to adopt a strategy that achieved these conflicting goals.

The Bush administration has also tended to paint all Iraqis who oppose U.S. policy in Iraq as radicals, terrorists, and extremists. The administration has refused to deal with these individuals, citing their fiery rhetoric as proof of their malevolent intentions. The administration should remember, however, that the colonists also used uncompromising rhetoric, such as Virginia Governor Patrick Henry declaring “give me liberty or give me death!”

Outgunned Iraqi insurgents recognize the folly of directly challenging U.S. forces. Instead, they employ indirect methods of attack, such as ambushes, that do not leave them vulnerable to retaliation. At the outset of the War for American Independence, the amateurish Continental Army, led by George Washington, was no match for British regulars. Yet the Continental Army and the citizen militias adapted its strategy and tactics to their opponent. The Continentals avoided direct clashes with the British Army and became skilled at conducting purposeful retreats, while the Patriot militias sometimes engaged in hit-and-run attacks, as at the battles of Lexington and Concord in the North, or by the likes of Francis “Swamp Fox” Marion during battles in the South.

Despite substantial differences, other similarities exist between these two conflicts separated more than two centuries. The U.S. must project its power over an ocean just as Britain did during the War of American Independence. Fighting a war so far from home taxed the resources of the 21st century America as it did 18th century Britain despite their being the two most powerful countries of their respective eras. Public support of the war declined in Britain then and the United States now as the costs and casualties of the wars rose. According to a May 2005 CNN poll, 57 percent of those polled said they did not believe it was worth going to war, three times the percentage recorded shortly after the war began in 2003. Facing an increasingly unwinnable war, British public support declined after Britain’s defeat in the Battle of Yorktown (1781).

As the fate of Iraq hangs in the balance, U.S. officials could do worse than dust off their history books and open the chapter on the War for American Independence. In addition to the many differences between the two conflicts, they would learn that attempting to suppress a determined rebellion from a great distance requires clearly defined political goals with a military strategy appropriate to these objectives—not the other way around. Iraqi insurgents realize, as did the colonial rebels, that winning means not losing.