Is Privateering the Answer to Terrorism?
Given the limits on the time and resources of U.S. intelligence agencies, Congress should revisit the power granted to it by Article I, Section 8 of the U. S. Constitution to"grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water." In other words, it is time to consider reviving privateering - for 21st-century conditions.
Privateering arose in the Middle Ages as a form of"legalized revenge" whereby monarchs permitted merchants to recoup losses at the hands of enemy forces. It evolved into in a way for private companies to legally make war upon the enemies of the state. After paying a percentage of the spoils to the crown (anywhere from one-tenth to one-third of the goods seized), the remainder was divided among the owners, investors, and sailors. Because privateers had to be authorized by formal government decree (the so-called"letter of marque") and were bound by a code of conduct (subject to review by"prize courts" convened by maritime authorities), privateers were not freebooters but lawful combatants during time of war.
Privateering was a way for smaller, less wealthy nations to field effective naval forces against their enemies. This became apparent during the ongoing cold (and sometimes hot) war between the Spanish Empire, its rebel provinces in the Netherlands, and England. Queen Elizabeth found it quite useful to her government to unleash the"sea dogs"-of whom Sir Francis Drake (1540-1596) is the most famous-private citizens who used their own resources to outfit ships to plunder Spanish galleons, and, who in return for a legal license from the crown, turned over a percentage of their booty to the state.
Privateers were not bloodthirsty pirates but often patriotic businessmen who combined devotion to country with an eye to personal profit. Privateers enabled governments to seriously disrupt the trade of their foes without engaging in costly military buildups. The Founding Fathers viewed privateering as an honorable and effective way to provide for the national defense. Indeed, privately owned vessels, not ships of the U. S. Navy, were responsible for the vast majority of the ships captured or destroyed during the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812.
Moreover, sailors and soldiers often preferred to serve on a privateer-where the food and conditions were often superior to those found on state-run vessels-because in addition to their wages, they were often eligible for a share of the prize bounty.
By the mid-19th century, however, the rise of mass-conscript navies (and the corresponding development of a professional officer corps) led some European states to question the need for privateers. Governments wanted tighter control over their militaries, and, more importantly, they wanted to be able to coordinate assaults against their foes rather than have individual privateers choose targets at will. Indeed, Queen Elizabeth had discovered during the assault of the Spanish Armada that Francis Drake, a wily and cunning privateer, was not an effective fleet commander capable of coordinating a large-scale defense of the English homeland. The allure of privateering also began to diminish; not only could governments now pay their officers and soldiers good wages, the costs of outfitting modern warships capable of seizing enemy vessels on the high seas was becoming prohibitive. In the aftermath of the Crimean War, a number of European states decided to renounce privateering as an instrument of state policy (codified in the Declaration of Paris, adopted on April 15, 1856).
The United States, however, is not a signatory to this declaration, and the 1898 suspension of privateering (during the Spanish-American War) was a voluntary decision that can be revoked at any time by Congress. Indeed, legislation was introduced last fall to allow private entities to seize the assets of Osama Bin Laden.
Al-Qaeda functions as a multinational corporation, with subsidiaries in more than fifty countries holding a variety of assets-including real estate, weapons, communications equipment, and large amounts of cash and precious materials. Its front companies are involved in the import and export of a wide variety of goods from agricultural products to construction equipment. If private firms are willing to take the risk (in terms of investments and personnel) to try and disrupt Al-Qaeda, why shouldn't they have the opportunity to be licensed by the Congress and to be recompensed from the"spoils of war?"
There are many ways in which modern"privateers" could be utilized in the war against terrorism. Congress could authorize bounties for hackers who disrupt terrorist communication networks, uncover assets, or obtain intelligence on the movements of personnel and equipment. Licenses could be issued allowing private individuals to seize the goods of organizations-whether within the U.S. or overseas-that are designated as terrorist organizations by the State Department.
Moreover, just as bounty-hunters - private individuals authorized to apprehend fugitives and bail-jumpers - must be licensed and are subject to a code of conduct, Congress has the constitutional authority to determine the legal framework governing privateer operations-and who would be eligible to be licensed. Privateers would not have immunity to violate domestic or overseas law in pursuit of their objectives, and their actions-as well as all seizures-would be subject to review by duly constituted prize courts.
Modern privateering need not be conducted by basement-dwelling devotees of Soldier of Fortune magazine. There are a number of professional entities that market their expertise to governments and corporations alike (Military Professional Resources, Inc., a Washington-area firm, being one such example). These companies have at their disposal a whole host of resources that only a few scant years ago were the sole preserve of governments; Aerobureau (of McLean, VA) can offer clients a state-of-the-art aircraft equipped with data links, satellite connections, and the ability to deploy remote-controlled camera-equipped drones. In fact, a recent CIA test-exercise found that private"political risk consulting" firms were just as, if not in some cases even more capable, than its own analysts in providing up-to-date intelligence on the world's trouble spots.
America was successfully attacked last fall because conventional wisdom failed to anticipate the assault. Thinking unconventionally about prosecuting the war on terrorism is the key to success. Motivated both by patriotism and profit, privateers helped America win her independence. Twenty-first century privateers may help to safeguard it.
This piece was distributed for non-exclusive use by the History News Service, an informal syndicate of professional historians who seek to improve the public's understanding of current events by setting these events in their historical contexts. The article may be republished as long as both the author and the History News Service are clearly credited.