Chris writes in the comments: “because of all the internal contradictions of this system, we are obliged to be very careful in the kinds of actions we advocate. Yes, of course, ‘[t]he general population in Iraq and in Germany ... are just as entitled to freedom as we are.’ But how freedom comes to these general populations is a profoundly important strategic question. There are enormous differences between the current context of Iraq and the historical context of post-war Japan and Germany, both of which were utterly destroyed by total war, but which still retained a uniform culture, with some democratic antecedents.” I’m sure that’s true, and I agree that we need to be, as Chris puts it, careful, and also that the administration is not doing a bang-up job of doing so. To defend libertarian hawkishness is not to defend the current administration.
My colleague from downstairs emailed, in response to my claim that tyrannies have no right to exist:
“A regime which is rights-abusive loses some of its legitimacy, but it hardly is black-and-white. My government does many things that
Both my colleague downstairs and Wilkinson disagree with my claim that anyone may prosecute justice. In certain contexts, e.g., within a stable and legitimate society, we might say that we have delegated any purported natural right to prosecute justice to the agents of the state who are so charged. But even then, a duty to rescue may override. If I am witnessing Smith assault Jones, should my response be “well, it’s the job of the police to help out here, and since I have delegated my natural right to intervene to the state as part of joining civil society, I cannot help Jones”? Surely not. And on the global scale, the analogy holds even less well, since the US and Iraq aren’t both parts of a larger society (and if we say that the UN represents some analogue to civil society, we note also that Iraq was in violation of many UN-mandated conditions which enable the cease-fire from the previous war), so the idea that the power to interfere has been delegated away doesn’t apply anyway.
My colleague asks a series of slippery-slope questions: “But what if my neighbor were flushing unwanted pets down his toilet, could I shoot him then? What if he was striking his child, but not in a way likely to permanently injure said child? What if in the firefight I accidentally killed someone else in the house in the process of taking out the illegitimate, rights-abusive neighbor? What if he really did kill somebody in his house, but it was years ago, I was there at the time, was a friend of his, didn’t say anything about it then, but years later decided to shoot him? Any of these scenarios might fit the Iraqi situation as well as the one you consider.” I hardly think the mass graves and torture squads are analogous to flushing a pet down the toilet. Some of the other entries on this list are thought-provoking, but don’t, just by being asked, constitute a refutation of the principle. If Smith is assaulting Jones, Jones has the right to defend himself, and Smith has no right to assault Jones, so everyone has the right to help Jones defend himself. This doesn’t imply, however, that everyone has the obligation to help – it may be imprudent or unfeasible. That’s why this: “Considerations of natural rights might incline you to the view that the US would therefore be morally justified in invading, say, China, and I might agree, in the brief moment before deciding that your helpfulness in crafting a decent real world foreign policy was at an end” isn’t quite right – since China has intercontinental missiles with nuclear warheads, it wouldn’t be prudent to invade China. That doesn’t mean their regime has a right to exist which we’d be violating if we did invade. I am not in favor of invading China, but not because the regime there doesn’t deserve to be toppled.
Was it necessary to invade Iraq? Probably not necessary. Was it prudent? Not sure. It depends on how the administration wraps things up. If the conclusion is a relatively free and peaceful Iraq, that’ll be great. If they make a total botch job of it, and the theocrats take over, then it will have been imprudent. “In Iraq we have become part of the injustice we came to solve, and it was utterly predictable that that would be so.” It need not have been so. I agree though, that they’re handling this badly. Will Wilkinson writes on his blog that I’m wrong about the anyone-can-seek-justice thing because of the quantifiers. “If a regime like Iraq is illegitimate, then, perhaps, there is someone or other that is justified in overthrowing the illegitimate regime. But it doesn't follow that that somebody is us, or even any state.” That’s correct. That’s the point I made earlier, in reverse. To claim that the war is imprudent, or that we had no obligation to free the Iraqis, doesn’t mean that it wasn’t permissible. Wilkinson concedes that “Iraq, or the Baathist regime, would not be wronged if we invaded” but then says “But that doesn't entail that we, or anyone else in particular, may invade.” It does entail that we may invade. It doesn’t entail that we must invade. It’s true that “The state may be obligated to forebear for other reasons, namely, that the war is not in the interest of its citizens, and the actions of the state can only be justified in reference to the interests of its citizens.” If a freer and more peaceful Iraq has a stabilizing influence on the region, and represents an alternative to Islamism, it will be. “The citizens who pay the taxes are wronged, even if the Baathists aren't.” I already agreed to that, but qualified by observing that we’re not any more wronged by that wealth-transfer than by any other, and liberating a nation from a tyrant is, if anything, more justifiable than, say, steel tariffs. “For me, the whole argument comes down to this nuts and bolts empirical squabble: was Iraq a threat? The answer, as far as I can see is ‘No.’” I don’t know. Irfan did a nice job documenting some of this over the summer. In any case, I’ve been trying to say something about libertarianism and hawkishness generally, not necessarily about this war in particular. Do the anti-war libertarians, as a matter of principle, think it was immoral for the colonists to go to war against the British? That was consistent, I’d argue, with Lockean approaches to libertarianism.
I wasn’t entirely satisfied with the Borders piece, but neither was I satisfied with the Will Wilkinson piece David just mentioned, plus one of my colleagues here at BSC was on this subject today, so I guess I’ll have to reply to everyone all at once.
I’ve been known to express hawkish sentiments from time to time, but I would dissent from Borders’ analysis. My main disagreement with Borders is the insistence that rights are contractarian fictions, which is established partly by contrasting social-contract theory with a straw-man version of natural rights: “We get rights by virtue of some sort of social contract, not from our Creator….’rights’ as such, are not some Cartesian substance that animates the body in the manner of a soul.” Well, sure, if “natural rights” means that, I guess contractarianism looks pretty good. But this analysis ignores another approach to natural rights, the neo-Aristotelian. On that view, the “natural” in “natural rights” refers to human nature, the requirements of a human life and the necessary conditions of human flourishing. However, perhaps the argument for hawkishness doesn’t hinge on which strategy one employs to derive a theory of rights.
I’d also be a lot more comfortable if Borders would not be so fond of the definite article. Libertarian hawks aren’t one single thing with a monolithic view. “The libertarian hawk takes her cues from Hobbes, not Locke” Huh? I don’t. America’s most famous libertarian hawk, Thomas Jefferson, didn’t either. Jefferson’s arguments in the Declaration of Independence, and in his essay on“the Necessity of Taking Up Arms”, are wholly within the Lockean perspective. My long essay on this will appear in December or January, along with Roderick’s contrary piece, from the symposium I mentioned above, but the short version might go something like this: We have rights prior to any political structures. Political structures maintain power through force, which much be justified by consent. Consent can only be legitimately given if the power-structure which is being consented to protects rights. A regime which is rights-abusive has no legitimacy, which means that its use of force to protect itself is also illegitimate. That means that it may be overthrown, by force if necessary. That was the rationale for the use of force by the colonists against Great Britain, and that might also serve as a rationale for overthrowing any dictatorship. Wilkinson’s main objection (and this seems to be the view of some of my co-bloggers) seems to be that American taxpayers shouldn’t have to pony up the cash to pick up the tab for overthrowing someone else’s dictator. Well, that’s true – but then, from a radical libertarian perspective, American taxpayers shouldn’t have to pony up the cash to pick up the tab for anything if they don’t want to. Saying the overthrow of Saddam wasn’t obligatory doesn’t mean it was unjustified. (Deontic logic, people!) An act may be permissible but nonobligatory. A subcategory within that group is the supererogatory. Maybe the Iraq war was one of these. It didn’t violate the rights of American taxpayers any more than anything else they spend our money on. It certainly didn’t violate the rights of the Baathist regime there. Ditto terrorists: Wilkinson writes “the fact that there are terrorists, murderers, and illegitimate regimes out there who have forfeited some or all of their moral standing does not begin to imply that the United States of America may swoop in and see that justice is done.” Sure it does – anyone may. Whether it’s mandatory, or prudent, are separate questions. But libertarians who prefer the “letters of marque” approach need Wilkinson to be wrong here just as much as the Pentagon does.
My colleague here criticizes Borders for implying that “the new White Man’s Burden is to coax (with pre-emptive tough love where appropriate) those outside our charmed circle of civilization and contractual liberties into sharing our worldview.” But who’s being the neocolonialist here? A human rights view must by definition be a universalist view. If there’s any such thing as natural rights/human rights, then Iraqis have them too, which means they are just as entitled as the American colonists to be rid of a tyrant and to institute small-d, small-r democratic republics. One difference between the American colonists and the Iraqis under Saddam, though, was the whole extensive terror/secret police/disarmed populace/mass graves/poison gas thing, which King George hadn’t thought of. Under those conditions, it’s plausible that they might need help to be rid of the tyrant (as, to be honest, so did we).
My colleague further expresses skepticism about libertarian hawkishness on the grounds that it’s “freedom for me but not for thee.” But it doesn’t have to be that way. Were the Japanese more free in 1938, or in 1948? The Germans? It’s “freedom for me but not for thee” with respect to Baathists and Nazis, just like it’s “freedom for me but not for thee” for any criminal. The general population in Iraq and in Germany, though, are just as entitled to freedom as we are.
Is the current administration entirely committed to maximizing individual liberty? No. Is it actively subversive of liberty via the Patriot Act? Yes. Is it predominantly interested in maintaining and expanding its own power (as would be the opposition, if elected)? Yes. But it doesn’t follow from any of that that everything it does is illegitimate, broken clocks and all that.
Now let’s see whether this comments thread can break the record set by the sci-fi thread.
Why do they even have conventions, a friend of mine wrote to ask the other day. I said that they used to be for actual deliberation, and now it’s just a junket. (Just out of curiosity, do any of the historians here know when was the last time a nomination was sufficiently contested as to make the convention meaningful?).
So let’s see: neither Bush nor Kerry favors same-sex marriage, neither of them will make any steps whatsoever towards social-security reform nor significantly reform the tax code, neither will end ag or tobacco subsidies, both are trade protectionists, and they both favored the invasion of Iraq and the “Patriot Act.” Tell me again why it’s so important to vote?
(I just added $0.02 about anti-semitism.)
1. Blade Runner
2. 2001: A Space Odyssey
3. Star Wars+ The Empire Strikes Back
4. Alien
5. Solaris (1972 version)
6. The Terminator+T2:Judgement Day
7. The Day The Earth Stood Still
8. War of the Worlds
9. The Matrix
10. CE3K
I guess the group of scientists didn’t include any mathematicians, since that’s 12, not 10. But this list is seriously flawed in more significant ways. (I will not comment at all on #5, since I confess I’ve never seen that one –the others I’ve all seen multiple times.) First of all, can we please stop using the expression “science fiction” as a synonym for “has laser battles in space”? I was under the impression that, as a genre-defining term, science fiction was that branch of literature (and by extension films) which dealt with the effects of science or technology on the human condition, or which explores the human condition via science. I’m willing to interpret that pretty generously and include looks at future societies and so on. But much as I loved the original Star Wars, that’s clearly not science fiction – it’s a fantasy film with an interplanetary setting. Ok, that’s one. Next, as to the low position of The Day the Earth Stood Still: if you’re going to tell me that The Empire Strikes Back is better science fiction than Day, I’m going to have to ask you to step outside. Day (with hardly any laser battles, or FX of any kind) has so much more to say about people, society, the ethical ramifications of technology, etc. than most FX blockbusters that it really ought to rank higher. War of the Worlds, on the other hand, which I like very much, really doesn’t. (The screenplay bears almost no resemblance to Wells’ novel, which does.) It’s got many virtues, including the 50s Hollywood “scientists,” but as far as talking about anything serious via science/technology? No [Spoilers follow]: the Martians come, we can’t do anything about it, they virtually annihilate us, but they get sick from our microbes and all die, ergo God is great for creating microbes. That’s it?? Please. Here are some candidates the scientists probably ought to have included instead:
Forbidden Planet
Frankenstein (1931 version mostly, but I won’t quibble)
Things to Come (1936)
3 or 4 episodes of “The Outer Limits”, esp. Expanding Human, Demon with a Glass Hand, Soldier, The Inheritors, maybe one or two more. I’m sure there are other great films which are slipping my mind this moment, but the main point here is that there are at least a half-dozen better selections than 4 or 5 of the scientists’ top-10. By the way, I realize that I probably have violated some blogger ettiqute by not making hyperlinks to every title mentioned above. But look, you can go to IMDB as easily as I can.
Ah, the “different form of writing” line. Holy Ebonics Debate, Batman! But note the false dichotomy there – content not grammar. If the grammar is bad, the content is obscured. Good writing needs to be good in more than one sense. As George Orwell noted long ago, sloppy writing breeds sloppy thinking, and vice versa.
But that’s not an objection to any particular medium in which the writing takes place. I’m sure one can also use classblogs to encourage and develop more careful writing and thinking. Bottom line:"If it gets kids excited about learning," [Assistant Principal] Mrs. Contner said,"we might as well try it."
After the Athenian forces defeated the Persian land force, the rest of the Persian fleet sailed around with the intent of attacking Athens. The entire Athenian army then hightailed it back to Athens, beating the Persian fleet by an hour or so. The sight of this made the Persians retreat, and made pro-Persian Athenians unwilling to betray their city. The Pheippides story does indeed seem to be myth, but there's an apparently true story which is actually even better. BTW, they ran 24 miles, not 26 - the discrepancy has to do with whether you measure from the modern-day town of Marathona versus the ancient battle site. Still pretty cool though.
Why does the false legend have such persistence when the truth is so much better?
It’s interesting that this blog is hosted by “History News Network,” yet as far as I can tell, at least 10 of the L&P bloggers are non-historians. Including me: I’m a philosophy professor. (While we’re doing numbers, six of the other bloggers are people I’ve met personally (ten counting the contributing editors list), four are people I’ve corresponded with or spoken to on the phone, but never F2F, and the rest I’ve never met, but in most cases have read their work somewhere other than L&P.) As Chris implies, I’m from NYC, but now I live in Massachusetts, teaching at Bridgewater State. I do political philosophy, moral philosophy, phil of law, and then there’s the popular culture writings. So, I’ll mostly be blogging on those areas, but might occasionally have something to say about other fields, if I know anything about them.
Couple confusing things – 1, my first name is pronounced as “Ian.” 2, tenure and promotion are separate here, so while I’ve just been granted tenure, I won’t be promoted to associate til the spring (assuming I get promoted, of course).
During most of vacation, I had no internet access (the horror!), and I see to my great dismay that I missed some fascinating threads on libertarianism and foreign policy/war both here and at Volokh. Curses! It would be overly obsessive to go back over the archives of the last 6 weeks and chime in late, so I won’t. But next time! While I was disconnected, though, I finally had a chance to read Neal Stephenson’s Cryptonomicon, and it’s as good as I had heard.
Anyway, happy to be here. Next, I attempt to do some work.
