This is a time to be grateful because by rejecting appeasement, the American people strengthened the forces of good and thereby enhanced the prospects of real peace which comes when red ink replaced red blood as a way to settle differences. Just read Irshad Manji's response to the murder of Theo Van Gogh.

"Tuesday's slaying of Theo van Gogh, a Dutch filmmaker who criticized Islamic practices, reminds all of a nagging truth: More than 15 years after the government of Iran issued a death warrant against novelist Salman Rushdie, challenging Muslims remains a risky business.

As a Muslim dissident, I speak from experience. My book,"The Trouble with Islam," has put me on the receiving end of anger, hatred and vitriol. That's because I'm asking questions that we Muslims can no longer hide from. Why, for example, are we squandering the talents of half of God's creation, women? What's with the stubborn streak of anti-Semitism in Islam today? Above all, how can even moderate Muslims view the Koran literally when it, like every holy text, abounds in contradictions and ambiguity? The trouble with Islam today is that literalism is going mainstream.

In the same French news broadcast in which it was reported that murderer was tied to the Casablanca bombings, it showed Chirac writing a long letter of congratulations to Bush. Apparently, he wanted the French to know that he sent such a letter. Moreover, EU leaders met to discuss ways to help Iraq and later met with Alawi on the same subject. Bush is a fact of life their analysts were saying and we will have to deal with him.

Putin understood perfectly. He may have been reading Sun Tzu -

Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Way (Tao) to survival or extinction. . . . .

The Tao causes the people to be fully in accord with the ruler. Thus they will die with him; they will live with him and not fear danger.

Bin Laden tried to convince the American to opt for truce and in the process he revealed to his followers both actual and potential that he was the weaker horse -

Progressive columnist Dr. Mamoun Fandy wrote an article in the Egyptian daily Al-Ahram titled 'Bin Laden Votes for John Kerry: A Tape of Admission, Voting and Capitulation.' He writes:

The tape is one of capitulation and bankruptcy, and not one of threat and warning, since bin Laden appears in regular robes and not in a military uniform with a rifle on his side. Bin Laden has relinquished his military [character] and his arms. This, of course, is intentional on the part of the public relations administration within Al-Qa'ida and outside it.

In addition, bin Laden does not refer at all to Jihad in this tape. There was no [mention] of Hadiths or of Koranic verses, and not even a mention of the month of Ramadan, which we [mark] today. The tape is devoid of religious manifestations and is devoid of any [mention] of the conflict between East and West, or [the war of] the Mujahideen against the infidel Crusaders, whether Christians or Jews.

Bin Laden's speech was restricted to technical issues of U.S. foreign policy and its relations with the Middle East. In addition, it was restricted to an attempt to influence the voters in every [U.S.] state, with [bin Laden] stating that [each] state is responsible for its own security by means of its vote – and bin Laden's lack of understanding of the internal situation in the U.S. is [yet another] issue, which I will not elaborate on here.

And as Bin Laden himself said, people like to follow the stronger horse. By making Bush the stronger horse, the American people diminished Al Qaeda recruiting.

This is also the opinion of Geroge Friedman, the founder of THE GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT who spells it out:

. With Bush's victory, one of the fundamental assumptions about the United States went out the window. In spite of casualties and grievous errors, not only was there no antiwar candidate (save Ralph Nader), but Bush actually won the election.

This puts in motion two processes in the world. First, there is a major rethinking of American staying power in the war going on. The assumption of a rapid conclusion of the Iraq campaign due to U.S. withdrawal is gone -- and it is surprising just how many non-Americans believed this to be a likely scenario. The reassessment of the United States is accompanied by the realization that the United States will not only maintain its pressure in Iraq, but on the region and the globe itself.

American pressure is not insubstantial. Virtually every country in the world wants something from the United States, from a trade agreement to support on a local conflict. They can do without an accommodation with the United States for months, but there is frequently serious pain associated with being at odds with the United States for years. Throughout the world, nations that have resisted U.S. actions in the war -- both within and outside of the region -- must now consider whether they can resist for years.

We can expect two things from Bush in general: relentlessness and linkage. Having won the election, Bush is not going to abandon his goal of crushing al Qaeda and pacifying Iraq and, indeed, the region. That is understood. Equally understood is that Bush will reward friends. Bush's test of friendship is simple: support for the United States and, in particular, support for the policies being pursued by his administration in the war. For Bush, active support for the war was a litmus test for good relations with the United States during the first term. The second term will make the first term look gentle.

Countries that made the decision not to support Bush did so with the assumption that they could absorb the cost for a while. They must now recalculate to see if they can absorb the cost for four more years -- and even beyond, if Bush's successor pursues his policies. For many countries, what was a temporary disagreement is about to turn into a strategic misalignment with the United States. Some countries will continue on their path, others will reconsider. There will be a reshuffling of the global deck in the coming months.

The same analysis being made in the world is also being made in Iraq. There are the guerrillas, most of whom are committed to fighting the United States to the death. But the guerrillas are not a massive force, and they depend for their survival and operational capabilities on a supportive population. In Iraq, support comes from the top down. It is the tribal elders, the senior clergy and the village leaders who make the crucial decisions. They are the ones who decide whether there will be popular support or not.

There has been an assumption in Iraq -- as there has in the world -- that as the pressure builds up in Iraq, the United States will move to abandon the war. Bush's re-election clearly indicates that the United States will not be abandoning the war. They are therefore recalculating their positions in the same way that the rest of the world is. Holding out against the Americans and allowing their populations to aid the guerrillas made a great deal of sense if the United States was about to retreat from Iraq. It is quite another matter if the United States is actually going to be increasing pressure.

It is no accident that as Election Day approached, U.S. forces very publicly -- and very slowly -- massed around Al Fallujah. Al Fallujah was the town in which the United States signed its first accord with the guerrillas. As the election approached, the town went out of control. Now the election is over, the town is surrounded and Bush is president. It is a time for recalculation in Al Fallujah as well, as there can be no doubt but that Bush is free to attack and might well do it.

Throughout the Sunni areas of Iraq -- as well as Shiite regions -- elders are considering their positions, caught between the United States and the guerrillas, in light of the new permanence of the Americans. The United States will be aggressive, but in an interesting way. It will be using the threat of American power as a lever to force the Sunni leadership into reducing support for the guerrillas. Coupled with the carrot of enormous bribes, the strategy could work. It might not eliminate the guerrilla war, but could reduce it to a nuisance level.

The basic reality thus creates the strategy. The re-election of Bush creates a new reality at all levels in the international system. His intransigence, coupled with American power, forces players to think about whether they can hold their positions for at least four years, or whether they must adjust their positions in some way. As the players -- from sheikhs to prime ministers -- reconsider their positions, U.S. power increases, trying to pry them loose. It opens the possibility of negotiations and settlements in unexpected places.

It also opens the door to potential disaster. The danger is that Bush will simultaneously overestimate his power and feel unbearable pressure to act quickly. This has led some previous presidents into massive errors of judgment. Put differently, the pressures and opportunities of the second term caused them to execute policies that appeared to be solutions but that blew up in their faces. None of them knew they would blow up, but in their circumstances, no one was sufficiently cautious.

It is precisely Bush's lack of caution that now becomes his greatest bargaining chip. But his greatest strength can also become his greatest weakness. The struggle between these two poles will mark the first part of his presidency. We will find out whether the second part will be the success of this strategy or his downfall. The book on George W. Bush will now be written.

As we say in Hebrew, Kol Hakavod! the the judgement of the American people(hats off?)