A columnist in the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) official television paper, Al-Hayat Al-Jadida , has admitted that it was Arab leaders who were responsible for the flight of Arabs from the new State of Israel in 1948. The columnist, Mahmud Al-Habbash, recently wrote that in 1948, Palestinian Arabs left their homes willingly under the instruction of their own Arab leaders and their false promises of a prompt return. “The leaders and the elites promised us at the beginning of the 'Catastrophe' [the establishment of Israel and the creation of refugee problem] in 1948, that the duration of the exile will not be long, and that it will not last more than a few days or months, and afterwards the refugees will return to their homes, which most of them did not leave only until they put their trust in those 'Arkuvian' ['Arkuvian,' after Arkuv -- a figure from Arab tradition -- who was known for breaking his promises and for his lies] promises made by the leaders and the political elites. Afterwards, days passed, months, years and decades, and the promises were lost with the strain of the succession of events” ( Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, December 13, 2006, courtesy of Palestinian Media Watch).

PA organs like Al-Hayat Al-Jadida generally demonize Israelis and are replete with viciously anti-Semitic articles. However, this is the most recent of a number of occasions in which the truth about the 1948 refugees, which is completely contrary to the official Palestinian version which holds that Israelis deliberately expelled peaceable Palestinians, has been admitted. Another recent example appeared in the newspaper, Al-Ayyam, in which Asmaa Jabir Balasimah Um Hasan, a Palestinian Arab women who fled Israel in 1948, stated, “We heard sounds of explosions and of gunfire at the beginning of the summer in the year of the 'Catastrophe' [the establishment of Israel and the expulsion from the land in 1948]. They told us: The Jews attacked our region and it is better to evacuate the village and return, after the battle is over. And indeed there were among us [who fled Israel] those who left a fire burning under the pot, those who left their flock [of sheep] and those who left their money and gold behind, based on the assumption that we would return after a few hours.” ( Al-Ayyam newspaper, May 16, 2006, courtesy of Palestinian Media Watch).

Ethiopia has however done this in the face of EU, Arab League and Organisation of the Islamic Conference condemnation.

Additionally - and for some, this factor will be damning - Ethiopia has been criticized editorially by the New York Times. On what ground? - Because it was a"unilateral pre-emptive attack" which"seldom solves anything" and because"Ethiopia's armed forces crossed an international border". Its advice? That"the Security Council must meet urgently to find ways to replace Ethiopian troops with a neutral international force and keep the violence from spreading to other countries."

It is true that violence could indeed spread and that action is needed. However, Ethiopia's"unilateral pre-emptive attack" comes after months of remorseless SCIC aggression against Somalia's lawful government, which has welcomed Ethiopia's help. In these circumstances, coming to the aid of a lawful government under internal assault can be called several things, but unilateral or pre-emptive are not among them. For the meantime, Ethiopia certainly seems to have"solved" something - preventing the imminent demise of Somalia's lawful government. And the proposal the New York Times advises the Security Council to adopt - inserting an international force - is probably a foredoomed idea whose possibility exists at all solely because of Ethiopia's"unilateral,""pre-emptive attack" and" crossing of an international border."

One suspects that the New York Times cannot welcome a non-Muslim victory over Muslim extremists and has plucked out its proposal of a"neutral force" (i.e., mainly Muslim) to preserve what Ethiopian arms alone achieved.

I know Holiday greetings is out of vogue, but I have been on the road and Internet deprived, so I have not been able to sent any Hanukkah or Christmas greetings. I am sending this note from a noisy Internet cafe - so do not be surprised if the number of the usual spelling and grammar mistakes will be large, even for me and do accept my heartfelt hopes for a good 2007.

It is an interesting experience to celebrate Hanukkah in India. They are so few Jews that getting hold of basic holiday paraphernalia is not easy. Actually, we spent a few days before Hanukkah in Cochin - The only place in India where there was a Jewish community large enough and entrenched enough to become part of the Indian caste system. Their Jewtown (it is the official name!) had three clearly defined groups:"Two of these have their own distinct communities and synagogues: the"Black Jews" are physically similar to the local Indian population and presumably descended from the earliest Jewish settlement; the"White Jews" (or Paradesi"foreigners") are a mixed community mostly of European and Middle Eastern origin. The third group is made up of the Meshuhrarim, freed slaves who had no synagogue of their own and distinct from other Jews by having, until the present century, no communal rights." Ouch!

Why no more Jews in India? Well, the Portuguese brought the inquisition to India and the Muslims to the south of Cochin were no better (you can read all about it here.

The Cochin synagogue and Jewtown are today one of the city's must see attractions. There are no Jews there, but it does have an excellent book store. So, we bought books and a Chala cover produced by local tribes. I did not find Hanukkah candles for sale. After all, only 13 Cochin Jews remain in the city. The rest moved to Israel. Actually, that is what most of India's Jews did. Big synagogues do remain. I visited one in Mumbai where the Hindu care taker reprimanded on taking photos on the Sabbath. It is a beautiful building but there are only about 20 remaining members. Oh, yes, in a museum exhibit on the history of India's NY or Shanghai - Mumbai, we learned that India had it's Rothschild family. It is named Sassoon. They came from Iraq and the city enjoys their philanthropy - including a library.

Still, Hanukkah candles, we have not found. We were short of time and probably looking in the wrong place. In any case, it was the fourth night of Hanukkah when we finally got to light the candles. By that time we were in a Himalaya mountain retreat attending the Fulbright conference of India, Bangladesh and Nepal. There I ran into the daughter of an American diplomat attending the conference and discovered that she was foresighted enough to bring a small menorah and Hanukkah candles with her from the US. She invited me to join their private Hanukkah celebration but I was more ambitious.

So, that night we had a multi faith Hanukkah candle lightening. The head of the Fulbright office in Bangladesh represented the Muslims, an American Indian science professor, the Hindus, and English teacher the Christians and moi the Jews. It was a Hanukkah to remember though the candles shone bright for only a short time. We were dining outside and the wind had other ideas.

The next night we had an interfaith sing a long. We needed faith and song to forget the fact that we speeding down very poor twisting mountain roads in the dark of night. The next day, we discovered that but for the alertness of a cab driver, the bridge over the Tista we passed would have been blown up by terrorists. (Bengal-bound explosives seized The Statesman, India - Dec 20, 2006 20: It is all thanks to a level-headed taxi operator that the Singtam police could prevent the shipment of a big consignment of explosives to West Bengal. ...)

They were probably Maoist terrorists. They"sneer" at the Nepalese Maoists who cut a political deal which will probably turn the country over to them following the next elections. We had some Nepalese with us. My heart went out to them. They were trying to put on a brave face. Of course, those who are able, are leaving the country. The rest hope that they will no follow the"moderate" example of the Kmer Rouge.

I must compliment Fulbright India as they invited not only senior Fulbright professor but also student, teachers and former Indian Fulbrighters to America. Hence, instead of whining, the participants competed in putting forward their contribution to their host institutions and to improving US image in their host communities. A Muslim American student from California posted in Bangladesh led the way. He was less than pleased by inquiries assuming that Muslims have a tough time living in America and apparently, told them a thing or two. USEFI India is a real dynamic focused organization. Just the best.

They did, however, book us in a hotel in the center of Calcutta, right next to the famous India museum. The airport placards declared it the"City of Joy." I will never forget it. On the way to the hotel, we saw the poverty we dreaded but the worse was yet to come. We woke up to street noise. We thought it was a political demonstration. It was not. Outside we saw thousands of people five deep lining up for a free meal. Big guys controlled the lines. They did not want me to take a photo. I really did not want one. I will never forget the sight as long as I live. Oh, yes, Kolkata (such a rich place has nothing better to do with its money than spend it on changing the name of the city - shameless) has been ruled by Communists over thirty years. Now, even they see the light and try to industrialize, the reactionaries fight them tooth and nail. The moderate ones declare strikes, one lady a hunger strike and then they are the Maoist terrorists. Amartya Sen tried to convince them his fellow Bengalis that they should use the market and that would not mean being controlled by it. Bengalis consider themselves the intellectuals amongst the Indians and all they want is to keep control over the poor not to lift them out of poverty.

Christmas in Goa is party time. People go to midnight mass then dress to the nines and go to formal balls. School children in Santa Clauses outfits are caroling and fire works abound. India loves Christmas. Here the church has put the past behind it and promotes a smiling Jesus. It makes me think that being a minority can be an enlightening experience. Let's hope that the Muslim minorities will convince their correligionists to follow a similar path. Then the new year will be bring with it a new era of toleration. For guess what? Indian papers report that a study found that young Indians are more prosperous, more tolerant and crave fame.

Joyous holidays to you and yours.

It does not seem so. After they legitimized the use of human shields in Lebanon and the PA, they are putting civilian lives in danger in Sri Lanka by urging its government to place civilian safety above defeating the inventors of suicide bombings - the Tamil Tigers. The UN and HRW urged the Sri Lankan to limit civilian casualties.

What do the Tigers do? They demolish civilian shelters to up the number of civilian casualties and GAIN INTERNATIONAL SYMPATHY!

Will they (the"human rights community") ever learn? The terrorist have.

Happy tidings:

LUCKNOW: In a blow to UP's Haj and minority welfare minister Haji Yaqoob Qureshi, speaker Mata Prasad Pandey has found him guilty of violating his constitutional position by issuing a fatwa against a Danish cartoonist.

Yaqoob had on February 18 called for beheading of the cartoonist, who had made a caricature of the Prophet and announced that he would give the avenger Rs 51 crore and weigh him against gold.

So, maybe we can worry a bit less about these irascible Danish cartoonists. At least we can hope that pocking fun at Ahmadinejad is still safe.

Well, once again it supposedly politically incorrect language becomes a reason for violence:

An article by Jean-François Mattei, entitled “Violences urbaines, crescendo dans la barbarie” (”Urban violence, crescendo in cruelty”) blames the French state for mishandling the riots and notes “banalisation de la violence” (”vulgarization of violence”) and the “trahison de la langue” (”treason of the language”) used by Sarkozy.

But Mattei states that Sarkozy used the words “delinquents” (”delinquents”), “provocateurs” (”agitators”), and “racaille” (”rabble”). More specifically, “racaille” translates as riffraff – a “mauvaise personne” (”bad person”).

The Danes declated zero tolerance for rioting. In the meantime, the subject of Islamists terror feature significantly in the elections for the mayor of Copenhagen.

The Report has been expertly dissected by others and the effort will not be rehearsed here. Instead, one point of interest - the reaction in the Arab world:

The Syrian Foreign Ministry at last finds something out of America to like - the contention that the absence of an Arab-Israeli peace lies at the root of the region's problem. According to Mustafa Bakri , the editor of the Egyptian daily Al-Osboa, the Report foreshadows"the end of America" and urges Arab countries to" capture the moment as America now is in its weakest period." The opposition paper in the same American ally, Al-Wafd, deduces from the Report that Bush has conceded"defeat in Iraq." Abdel Moneim Said of Cairo's Al Ahram Center reminds people that this Report, hailed by the New York Times as a piece of prudent and wise counsel, will mean that"America will highly suffer the loss of its reputation and credibility in the region." Across the porous Egypt/Palestinian Authority border at Gaza, Abu Ayman, a senior leader of the terrorist group, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, opines that"the Report proves that this is the era of Islam and of jihad."

At least some Middle Easterners understand the true import of the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group Report. Does President Bush?

Under this deal, Saudi Arabia agreed in 1985 to buy from BAE Systems, Britain's biggest military contractor, 72 Tornados and 30 Hawk fighter aircraft, plus a further 48 Tornados in 1993. This year Saudi Arabia agreed to pay £10 billion for 72 aircraft, part of a package that was expected to grow. The agreement has kept BAE in business for 20 years.

However, Saudi displeasure and British loss of nerve has resulted in a spectacular climb-down: following a Saudi threatened rupture of ties and loss of future contracts (worth £2.5 annually), the Attorney-General, Lord Goldsmith, has announced the suspension of the SFO's investigation. The SFO says it called off its investigation after representations made"both to the Attorney General and the Director [of the SFO] concerning the need to safeguard national and international security … It has been necessary to balance the need to maintain the rule of law against the wider public interest."

That is a statement of forensic significance. The rule of law is the special achievement of democratic society and its purpose, among other things, has always been the protection of what the SFO calls"the wider public interest." How is it possible, then, that protection of the"wider public interest" is now deemed to lie in the suspension of the rule of law under foreign pressure?

More detail of this disquieting episode is available on Pryce-Jones' blog.

"Military Lessons Learned in Iraq and Strategic Implications" By George Friedman

Among the things that emerge from every war, won or lost, are"lessons learned." Each war teaches the military on both sides strategic, operational, tactical and technical lessons that apply in future wars. Many of these lessons are useful. Some can be devastating. The old adage that"generals are always fighting the last war" derives from the failure to learn appropriate lessons or the failure to apply lessons properly. For example, the lessons learned from the First World War, applied to the Second, led to the Maginot Line. They also led to the blitzkrieg."Lessons learned" cuts both ways.

Sometimes lessons must be learned in the middle of a war. During World War II, for example, the United States learned and applied lessons concerning the use of aircraft carriers, the proper employment of armor and the execution of amphibious operations. The Germans, when put on the defensive, did not rapidly learn the lessons of defensive warfare on a strategic level. The Allies won. The Germans lost. There were certainly other factors at work in that war, but the speed at which lessons are assimilated and applied is a critical factor in determining the outcomes of wars. It has been said that success in war is rooted in the element of surprise; it follows that overcoming surprise is the corollary of this principle.

Lessons are learned and applied most quickly at the tactical level. Squads, platoons and companies, which are most closely in contact with the enemy and have the most immediate thing at stake -- their very lives -- tend to learn and adapt the most quickly. One measure of morale is the speed at which troops in contact with the enemy learn and change. One measure of command flexibility is the extent to which these changes are incorporated into doctrine. In addition, a measure of command effectiveness is the speed at which the operational and strategic lessons are learned and implemented. It usually takes longer for generals to understand what they are doing than it does sergeants. But in the end, the sergeants cannot compensate for the generals, or the politicians.

In the Iraq war, both sides have experienced pleasant and unpleasant surprises. For instance, the Americans were pleasantly surprised when their worst-case scenario did not materialize: The Iraqi army did not attempt to make a stand in Baghdad, forcing the U.S. military into urban attritional warfare. And the Iraqi insurgents were pleasantly surprised at the length of time it took the Americans to realize that they were facing guerrilla warfare, and the resulting slowness with which the U.S. military responded to the attacks.

On the other hand, the Americans were surprised by the tenacity of the insurgency -- both the guerrillas' ability to absorb casualties and the diffusion of their command structure, which provided autonomy to small units yet at the same time gave the guerrillas the ability to surge attacks at politically sensitive points. And the insurgents had to have been surprised by the rapid tactical learning curve that took place on the U.S. side, imposing a high cost on guerrilla operations, as well as the political acumen that allowed the Americans and others to contain the insurgency to the Sunni regions.

In a strategic sense, the Iraqi insurgents had the simpler battle problem. Insurgency has fewer options. An insurgency must:

1. Maintain relations with a host population that permits for regrouping, recruitment and re-supply. While this can be coerced, the primary problem is political, in the need to align the insurgency with the interests of local leaders.

2. Deny intelligence to the enemy by using the general population to camouflage its operations -- thus forcing the enemy to mount operations that simultaneously fail to make contact with insurgents and also alienate the general populace. Alternatively, if the enemy refuses to attack the population, this must be used to improve the insurgents' security position.

3. Use the target-rich environment of enemy deployments and administrative centers to execute unpredictable attacks, thereby increasing the enemy's insecurity and striking at his morale.

The guerrillas' purpose is to engender a sense of psychological helplessness in their conventional enemy, with the goal of forcing that enemy to abandon the fight or else to engage in negotiations as a means of defense.

The guerrilla does not have to win militarily. His goal is not to lose. The essence of asymmetric warfare is not merely the different means used to fight the war, but the different interests in waging the war. In Vietnam, the fundamental difference between the two sides was this: The North Vietnamese had a transcendent interest in the outcome of the war -- nothing mattered more than winning -- whereas for the Americans, Vietnam was simply one interest among a range of interests; it was not of transcendent importance. Thus, the North Vietnamese could lose more forces without losing their psychological balance. The Americans, faced with much lower losses but a greater sense of helplessness and uncertainty, sought an exit from a war that the North Vietnamese had neither an interest nor a means of exiting.

Now, Vietnam was more of a conventional war than people think. The first principle of insurgency -- drawing sustenance and cover from a local population -- was a major factor before the intervention of main-line North Vietnamese units. After that, these units relied more on the Ho Chi Minh Trail than on the local populace for supplies, and on terrain and vegetation more than on the public for cover. It was at times less a guerrilla war than a conventional war waged on discontinuous fronts. Nevertheless, the principle of asymmetric interest still governed absolutely: The North Vietnamese were prepared to pay a higher price than the Americans in waging the war, since they had greater interests at stake.

The United States fought a counterinsurgency in Vietnam. It should have tried to reformulate the conflict as a conventional war. First, the Ho Chi Minh Trail was the strategic center of gravity of the war, and cutting that line would have been a conventional move. Second, operating in a counterinsurgency mode almost guaranteed defeat. Some have argued that the U.S. difficulty with counterinsurgency warfare is its unwillingness to be utterly ruthless. That is not a tenable explanation. Neither the Nazis nor the Soviets could be faulted with insufficient ruthlessness; nevertheless, the Yugoslav Partisan detachments drained the Nazis throughout their occupation, and the Afghan guerrillas did the same to the Soviets. Counterinsurgency warfare is strategically and tactically difficult.

The problem for occupying forces is that -- unlike the insurgents, who merely must not lose -- the counterinsurgents must win. And because of asymmetric interests, time is never on their side. The single most important strategic error the Americans made in Vietnam was in assuming that since they could not be defeated militarily, they might not win the war, but it was impossible that they could lose it. They failed to understand the principle of asymmetry: Unless the United States won the war in a reasonable period of time, continuing to wage the war would become irrational. Time is on the side of guerrillas who have a sustainable force.

The United States did not expect a guerrilla war in Iraq. It was not part of the war plan. When the guerrilla war began, it took U.S. leaders months to understand what was happening. When they did understand what was happening, they assumed that time was at the very least a neutral issue. Having launched the war in the context of the Sept. 11 attacks, the Americans assumed that they had interests in Iraq that were as great as those of the insurgents.

But as in other guerrilla wars, the occupying power has shown itself to have less interest in occupying the country than the resistance has in resisting. It is not the absolute cost in casualties, but rather the perception of helplessness and frustration the insurgent creates, that eats away at both the occupying force and the public of the occupying country. By not losing -- by demonstrating that he will survive intense counterinsurgency operations without his offensive capabilities being diminished -- the insurgent forces the occupier to consider the war in the context of broader strategic interests.

One of two things happens here: The occupier can launch more intense military operations, further alienating the general populace while increasing cover for the insurgents -- or, alternatively, attempt to create a native force to wage the war."Vietnamization" was an attempt by the United States to shift the burden of the war to the Vietnamese, under the assumption that defeating the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong was more in the interests of the South Vietnamese than in the interests of the Americans. In Iraq, the Americans are training the Iraqi army.

The U.S. option in Vietnam was to impose a conventional model of warfare -- much as the United States did in Korea, when it ignored the guerrillas and forced the war into a battle of conventional forces. It is even more difficult to impose a conventional war in Iraq than it might have been in Vietnam under an alternative American strategy. Here, attacking the insurgents' line of supply is a tenuous strategy -- not because the line does not exist, but because the dependency on it is less. The insurgents in Iraq operate at lower levels of intensity than did the Vietnamese. The ratio of supplies they need to bring into their battle box, relative to the supplies they can procure within their battle box, is low. They can live off the Sunni community for extended periods of time. They can survive -- and therefore, in the classic formulation, win -- even if lines of supply are cut.

The Sunni guerrillas in Iraq have all of the classic advantages that apply to insurgency, save one: There are indigenous forces in Iraq that are prepared to move against them and that can be effective. The Shiite and Kurdish forces are relatively well-trained (in the Iraqi context) and are highly motivated. They are not occupiers of Iraq, but co-inhabitants. Unlike the Americans, they are not going anywhere. They have as much stake in the outcome of the war and the future of their country as the guerrillas. That changes the equation radically.

All wars end either in the annihilation of the enemy force or in a negotiated settlement. World War II was a case of annihilation. Most other wars are negotiated. For the United States, Vietnam was a defeat under cover of negotiation. That is usually the case where insurgencies are waged: By the time the occupation force moves to negotiations, it is too late. Iraq has this difference, and it is massive: Other parties are present who are capable and motivated -- parties other than the main adversaries.

The logic here, therefore, runs to a negotiated settlement. The Bush administration has stated that these negotiations are under way. The key to the negotiations is the threat of civil war -- the potential that the Shia, the main component of a native Iraqi force, will crush the minority Sunnis. There is more to this, of course: The very perception of this possibility has driven a number of Sunnis to cooperate in efforts to put down the insurgency, looking to secure their future in a post-occupation Iraq. But it is the volatility of relations between the ethnic groups underlying the negotiations that can shift the outcome in this case for the United States.

All war is political in nature. It is shaped by politics and has a political end. In World War II, the nature of the combatants and the rapid learning curve of the Allies allowed for a rare victory, in which the outcome was the absolute capitulation of the enemy. In Vietnam, the nature of the war and the failure of the American side to learn and evolve strategy led to a political process that culminated in North Vietnam achieving its political goals. In Iraq, the question is whether, given the combatants, the complete defeat of either side appears likely. Even if the United States withdraws, a civil war could continue. Therefore, the issue is whether the conflict has matured sufficiently to permit a political resolution that is acceptable to both sides. As each learns the capabilities of the other and assimilates their own lessons of the war, we suspect that a political settlement will be the most likely outcome."

My response:

The valid comparison is between the two world wars and the Cold War. The valid comparison is between Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq as both were mere battles in a larger world war. It is true that the US lost interest in Vietnam but it started to do so in 1966 after the coup in Indonesia. It lost even more interest after the Cultural Revolution increasingly alienated the Second and Third world Communist elites from the Chinese model. Finally, the deal with China moved the containment border thousands of miles northward. Hence, objectively, the Vietnamese battlefront has lost its basic strategic value. Still, the price of withdrawal was very high even if it was paid mainly by Cambodians, Africans, Israelis and Iranians. For, when all said and done, the lesson was that insurgency works. It is still the lesson. The US failed its mission as a counter insurgency guarantor. (You may wish to look at my book, Vietnam, Jews and the Middle East).

Iraq is also a battlefront in the war on Islamism. The insurgency is not all bad. Indeed, its spread to the neighboring countries is helpful because it is beginning to mobilize counter forces in the Muslim world. For example, the Islamists have suffered electoral set backs in Malaysia. An American retreat i.e., an Islamist victory will reverse this trend. The consequences will be devastating. Already, the Taliban are showing signs of life in Afghanistan. In other words, the strategic facts on the global ground have not shifted enough to permit an American retreat from the Iraqi battlefront.

Mark Safranski not only linked this blog to Zen pundit , but added some pertinent comments:

As conservatives have lectured liberals, Iraq is part of the larger war on terror and not the war itself or a compartmentalized event disconnected from a larger strategic reality. We have other things to do of considerable importance besides pursuing elusive maximal goals in Iraq, for which the ship has sailed in any event. A result now that keeps the democratic central government in Baghdad alive, peels away nationalist insurgent Sunnis from the takfiri lunatics and frees up our military resources is a" win". While we should go for the best result we can in Iraq, confusing utopia with reality or Iraq with the war itself would be a serious strategic error.

When the global strategic balance shifts more in our favor because we are pressing the Islamists hard elsewhere, it will suck"oxygen" away from the insurgency in Iraq. The resources of the global jihadi network are focused on Iraq both in terms of money to indigenous groups and foreign volunteers - a level of support they cannot sustain in ten countries at once if we help all other nations battling Islamist insurgencies press a simultaneous offensive. By that I mean a full-spectrum push with intelligence, police, diplomacy, political message, financial crackdown and a military response where insurgencies are already active. An effort that so far has been desultory, spotty and piecemeal. The United States needs to fight this war in a way that maximizes the advantages of being a sovereign state rather than in a way that minimizes them.

Excellent points. You may wish to follow some of the debate on his site.

This morning Bruce Kesler threw invaluable op-eds by Rice and Kissinger to the pot. One emphasized democracy and the other multilateralism.

I would like to add that if we remember that our war is against Islamism, we should realize that we are not fighting alone. No, I am not referring to our allies in the Iraqi or Afghani battlefields (and this is what we should call them). There are crucial battles being waged in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Nigeria and the Somali coast which do not get the attention they deserve. Some are full blown insurgencies, other are safe havens and, yet others, a mixture of the two with occasional blow ups. Too little attention is given to the European front and most particularly to the Al Qaeda sanctuary in Bosnia.

We do have allies in this war and, though we are the 800 pound gorilla, our ultimate success or failure is tied to theirs and theirs to ours. It's time to use wider analytic lenses which take in the entire picture.