As I warned, RESPECT IS NOT WHAT CARTOON INTIFADA IS ELICITING. If Muslims care about their religion, it's time they stand up and do what Wafa dared do, defend it from those who are really hurting it - the violent Islamist.

EU: A Golden Anniversary -- and a Hard Reality for France
By Peter Zeihan

The European Union celebrated the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome on March 25. To mark the event, 27 heads of government gathered in Berlin, ostensibly to sign a declaration reaffirming the union's values and outlining future goals. Disputes over the document's text, however, proved so divisive that in order to avoid embarrassing refusals the leaders were not even asked to sign it. Meanwhile, the ceremonies were so dull that many officials wandered off into the streets of Berlin well before they concluded.

Europhobes point to such apathy as a perfect example of how Europe has failed. The union, they say, has no future if European presidents and prime ministers cannot even stay in a room long enough to commemorate the union's golden anniversary -- much less sign what in essence was a birthday card. Europhiles look at the same picture and turn it on its head. They argue that the union is so successful and its core features -- peace in Europe and a rich common market -- so entrenched that high-level attention is hardly needed.

Both are right, both are wrong -- and both are missing the point. The European Union has succeeded and failed, not by the standards of the pundits but by the criteria of its founder.

France created the European Union both to protect and assert itself in the geography of the Cold War -- and in that it was wildly successful. But that geography no longer exists, and the union now not only has grown beyond Paris' grasp, but also has fallen under the influence of a power that until recently France controlled.

A French Creation

Located as it is near the west end of the Eurasian landmass, France has always faced the same geopolitical dilemma: It is just large and strong enough to project influence, but not quite large and strong enough to secure its well-being alone. This reality forces France to be proactive in achieving its goals. During the Napoleonic Age, this meant acting aggressively to assert its order on a chaotic Europe and farther abroad. In the first half of the 20th century, it meant being equally aggressive in seeking allies against a region that was developing an order France could not control.

Throughout both periods, however, the French met with defeat after defeat. Napoleonic France was not strong enough to take on the rest of Europe and Russia, while France's Third Republic lacked the strength to defend itself against the other European powers without extensive outside help. Before World War II, France faced a melange of potentially hostile states -- the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, Italy and Russia being only the five most significant.

But in the early post-Cold War years, the very geography of Europe changed. As the dust from World War II settled, France saw a silver lining in the brewing clouds created by the U.S.-Soviet policy of Mutually Assured Destruction. Germany, Italy and Austria were occupied. Spain languished in isolation under Franco's dictatorship. The United Kingdom largely disengaged itself from continental affairs. And most important, the Soviet Union's Iron Curtain was explicitly designed to limit contact between East and West.

After a series of stinging national catastrophes beginning with Napoleon's disastrous retreat from Moscow and culminating with the march by German troops under the Arc de Triomphe, Paris in the late 1940s finally found itself with no rivals.

In such an environment, Paris set out to create an entity that would be large enough to allow France to project power globally, but small enough for it to control. In 1948, France spearheaded the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community. This created the framework for the founding of the European Economic Community in 1957 (the Treaty of Rome), which in turn evolved into the European Union.

French domination of this entire process proved considerably durable, with the first true cracks not appearing until the final days of the Cold War. This should come as no surprise. The European Community/Union was designed explicitly to take advantage of the political geography of the Cold War, so when the Cold War ended, the continent's geography changed. The pond in which France swam enlarged, and the Soviet Union's imperial debris has since proven to be more than Paris can manage.

Nowadays, there is no shortage of challenges to French dominance in Europe. The United Kingdom is a full EU member, the belt of former Warsaw Pact states does not recognize Paris' leading role and expansion into the Balkans has exposed the union to a raft of issues that are challenging to say the least. The greatest challenge to the French project, however, lies in the twin pillars of its foundation.

Germany and Gaullism

Cold War France needed two things to make the European project function: an ideology that bound Paris firmly to the leadership of Europe, and a platform on which it could stand to wield that leadership. France found its answers in war hero Charles de Gaulle and -- ironically -- in its World War II foe.

While de Gaulle did not become France's president until 1959 -- two years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome -- his role as commander of the Free French Forces granted him the gravitas to shape debate within French society in both the Fourth Republic, which he challenged and displaced, and the Fifth Republic, which he forged and led. It was de Gaulle who imprinted on the French mind the idea that France could and should take up a leadership position in Cold War Europe as a counterbalance to both the United States and the Soviet Union. This, in de Gaulle's mind, would provide the kernel from which a European alternative to either superpower could grow.

And he realized he could not do it alone.

Much has been made of the "Franco-German motor of European integration," and rightly so. Even in defeat, Germany remained the industrial powerhouse of Europe while nearly one-quarter of the French population remained in agriculture. Without harnessing Germany's economic muscle (and larger population), France could never have used Europe as a reliable platform.

De Gaulle's strategy, therefore, was simple: Take advantage of Germany's post-war guilt to sublimate German national ambitions completely within France's European project. Use German markets to fuel French industrial expansion. Use German finances to feed French agriculture. And integrate the two states with the other community members to serve French interests.

Despite a number of changes in membership and circumstance, French diplomacy consistently succeeded in convincing the Germans that what was good for Europe (and, by extension, good for France) was good for Germany. France provided the direction and Germany provided the industrial and financial backing; as a result, Europe deepened and broadened.

But after German reunification formally began in 1990, France began to lose its pre-eminent position in European affairs. Yes, Germany remained critical in French thinking regarding Europe; but unlike the heady days of the 1960s and 1970s, when Paris largely determined the German position, reunified Germany began to inject its own preferences -- very quietly -- into European processes. By the time German reunification was completed in 1999, the press began to refer regularly to the Franco-German partnership rather than the Franco-German motor. It was a subtle but critical difference.

No longer divided and occupied by the Cold War superpowers, Germany was again whole and deciding its own policies in its new/old capital of Berlin. The very geography of not only Cold War Europe but also Cold War Germany had changed -- and with that, French hopes for controlling the European agenda began to wane.

During this time, Franco-German relations remained cordial, but the European project began to take a new (German) direction:

Germany flexed its newly reunified muscles in the early 1990s and began meddling in what ultimately blossomed into the Yugoslav wars -- which a more circumspect France did not appreciate.

German diplomats took the lead in crafting the euro -- a currency governed by the same conservative policies used in German, not French, monetary management.

Germany stood to benefit the most, both economically and politically, from expanding the European Union eastward. France was justifiably nervous about such efforts, which limited its financial benefits from the union. It also diluted France's political control of the organization -- the original rationale for creating the union (in the French mind) in the first place.

Germany, not France, is the largest trading partner and political influence on all the states that have joined the union since 1990. Germany, not France, is the global economic powerhouse. And Germany, not France, is able to hold -- indeed, demand -- a robust discussion with any major power of the world on any topic. And all this became the state of affairs before the relatively pro-American Angela Merkel became German chancellor.

French unease with the ongoing evolution of the European Union is not difficult to unearth. President Jacques Chirac, himself a proud and committed Gaullist, has often used the European Union as a scapegoat for France's (or his own) problems. Such an attitude toward an organization that he used to firmly control certainly contributed to France's 2004 defeat of the European constitution (a document written, appropriately, by a Frenchman) in a popular referendum.

What has occurred since 1990 is a subconscious realization in France that the European Union no longer is its exclusive playground -- that the European Union is quite capable of going down paths that France once could have blocked. In fact, with the qualified majority voting structure, France can even be forced down those paths against its will. The organization that France formed to secure its interests is now, at times, perceived to be threatening them. And the country responsible is not one of Chirac's traditional bugaboos, the United Kingdom or the United States, but instead the power that the French leadership held firmly in hand for a half century: Germany.

It is not that the Germany of today holds nefarious intent toward France, simply that it now holds German interests pre-eminent in its policymaking. With Germany undoubtedly the most powerful entity in the union, having Europe's drum reverberating with a deep German bass is a serious problem for Paris.

And it certainly is reflected in French domestic politics. The ideology of Gaullism -- like the organization of the European Union -- was crafted for a different geopolitical reality. With the Cold War dead and the Iron Curtain gone, the idea of French domination of Europe is simply a geographic impossibility. As such, it should come to no surprise that not one of the leading contenders for the French presidency is a Gaullist. The candidate closest to that stance is Nicolas Sarkozy, who while technically Chirac's successor is about as pro-American as a Frenchman can be.

So, with the French-German relationship as changed as the geography of Europe, what becomes of the union? The answer could be clearer than it seems.

French rationale for creating the European Union can ultimately be distilled down to three words: Guarantee French security. While the French effort has obviously made use of economic tools, the goal was political and military in nature. However, there is not a policymaker alive in Berlin who thinks a German bid for political and military dominance of Europe would be met with anything other than terror and rage. Until such anxieties cease to concern German decision-makers, Berlin's goals for the European Union will largely be limited to the economic sphere -- just as they have been since 1990. If Germany can make the union all about economic issues, then its position as Europe's largest economy will do the rest.

There is a reason why Merkel's first summit in her current role as EU president focused on energy security. There is a reason why Germany is the only major eurozone economy that has not called for more political oversight of the European Central Bank (ECB). There is a reason why it was a German who negotiated and wrote the Maastricht Treaty on monetary union. There is a reason why ECB policymakers look first and foremost at German economic data. And there is a reason why the ECB is located in Frankfurt.

So, when thinking of evolutions in the European Union, consider the implications of having the word "euro" replaced with "deutsche mark." For all practical purposes, that is what the euro is.

The problem with India's self-proclaimed (and wildly premature) declaration of superpower status is that it reflects a complacency about both its present which for many people is dire and its future, noted Fortune magazine. . . .

Go easy on the chatter about becoming the world's top three economies for the moment; first lets secure a place in the super eight.

Unfortunately, I must agree. The latest Indian budget was based on the assumption not only that the Indian economy has been successfully launched but that it needs no further help in the form of additional liberalization. Hence, efforts to grow the pie have been prematurely replaced with efforts to redivide it. Dangerous road especially when taken alongside of such a superior competitor as China.

To be honest, this is not new and it is not limited to the PA. Still, it is important to spell it all out in detail.

There are few points that have not already been made by those challenging his book’s willful thesis – that the Western radical left has so repelled Muslims with its secularity, impiety and license that it, rather than gruesome Islamist imperial ambition, is a primary cause of Muslim rage and terror against America. Nonetheless, here are two further considerations:

1. There is a “root causes” school that is endlessly fertile in identifying Western acts and faults which enrage Islamists and seeing to it that these operate as causes for their violence. Until now, this narcissistic preoccupation with personal political agendas has been largely a leftist monopoly, rounding up the usual suspects of Western oil greed, neo-liberal economics, neo-conservative muscle-flexing and of course support for Israel. (Some, like Democratic Senator, Patty Murray, as Jay Nordlinger helpfully pointed out in 2004, actually go one step further and appear to believe the Islamists have been nothing less than munificent philanthropists building day care centers for wretched Muslims). D’Souza has now produced the rightist version.

2. In his eagerness to indict the radical left, D’Souza recently wrote that

If traditional Muslims realized that there are millions of Americans who go to church, take care of their families and live by traditional values, they would be less likely to view us or our leaders as the Great Satan, and fewer of them will be tempted to join the camp of the Islamic radicals. Improving our moral reputation is not just a way to look better, it may also be the best long-term strategy to make our country safer.

In short, D’Souza thinks of Americans and Muslims as Jimmy Carter’s Secretary of State Cyrus Vance once did of the US and the Soviets, namely, that the two sides “have similar dreams and aspirations about the most fundamental issues.” D’Souza’s solution to Islamist aggression: self-improvement – this being incidentally a similar delusion, seductively holding out the prospect of control, to the one Israelis have indulged and for which the historian and psychiatrist Kenneth Levin has coined the term “Oslo Syndrome”.

Leeds, UK 14.3.07.... On Wednesday morning March 14, just hours before an invited academic talk and two-day academic workshop series by SPME Board member, Matthias Kuentzel, German scholar, the University of Leeds canceled this invited, university- sponsored, two-day workshop on"Hitler's Legacy: Islamic Antisemitism in the Middle East."

Dr Kuentzel’s talk is part of a series of scholars’ and artists’ talks at the German Department. The series is supported by a grant form the School of Modern Languages, who did not raise any issues during the grant application process. The University cited security reasons for canceling the workshop based on threatening emails it received to the Office of Vice Chancellor.

Dr. Kuentzel is a research assistant of one the world's leading institute in the research of antisemitism, the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism (SICSA) at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a member of the board of directors of Scholars for Peace in the Middle East, an academic society with about 0ver 9000 faculty throughout the world. who is a Research Associate at the Vidal Sasson Institute on Anti-Semitism of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The series of events had been well publicized for several weeks.

Members of SPME and other academics of good will from around the world are being asked to immediately write to the Vice Chancellor’s Office at or e-mail m.j.p.arthur@adm.leeds.ac.uk to demand that this event be allowed to continue with appropriate security.

Last November, Dr Kuentzel gave a talk with the same title at Yale University as part of a series entitled ‘Antisemitism in Comparative Perspective’, which also featured talks by other internationally scholars such as Bassam Tibi, Wolfgang Benz, Jan Gross, Milton Shain, Ruth Wisse amongst others.

The PA emerges as the ultimate parasite entity. I do not know what else to call one which only supplies 10% of its need. No, I am not making it up. This is what their newly appointed finance minister said:

"How long can you survive if the sanctions continue? On our own, we bring in $15 to 20 million per month—compared to a need of $160 million per month. Survival depends on how successful we are in bridging the gap. Clearly, you can't go long with 10 percent of what you need. That's all we have control over—just 10 percent of our need. I'm a realist, and one cannot look at that as a sustainable situation.

No, he was not asked to explain the reason for this dismal state of affairs nor how he intends to combat it. I have recently highlighted the EU's admission that it directly supports 30% of the Palestinian population. The US, UN and Arab states support the rest.

He was asked how long the PA can survive without foreign fund transfusion.

Actually, he admitted that that transfusion never stopped. All that happened was that the money did not flow through the finance ministry. Brilliant. The Quartet made sure that its pressure is barely felt while further corrupting Palestinian institution and empowering unaccountable NGOs. With friends like that . . .

Food for thought - Palestinians outside the PA (including those in Israel and Jordan) have no difficulty earning their keep and more.

Now, in a 6 March report regarding a Vermont crank who walks door to door collecting signatures for an investigation of"unanswered questions" concerning 9/11, Reuters notes that 2,992 people were killed by the hijacked planes on 9/11 - a figure differing by 19 from the usual one of 2,973, for this reason: Reuters includes the mass murdering perpetrators as casualties of their own homicidal acts.

In December 2001, in respect of its misleading practice of including the large numbers of killed Palestinian combatants (a majority, in fact of Palestinian fatalities) within general Palestinian casualty figures, Reuters was asked (no doubt rhetorically) -"Would Reuters similarly include Mohammed Atta and his al-Qaeda colleagues in the World Trade Center casualty list?" Five years later, Reuters has indirectly given its answer.

Leading universities including Oxford and Cambridge have been targeted by Islamic extremists who remain widely active on campuses, a prominent academic is warning.

Up to 48 British universities have been infiltrated by fundamentalists and the threat posed by radical groups must be"urgently addressed", according to Prof Anthony Glees.

The claim calls into question the Government's attempted crackdown on Islamic extremism in universities and casts doubt on claims by Bill Rammell, the Higher Education Minister, that the problem is not widespread.

You may wish to read the rest. Why doesn't it surprise me? Because I remember the success the USSR had doing the same.