Indeed, in 1966-1967, a rogue group of leading military figures worked hand-in-glove with John Stennis’ Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee to pressure the Johnson administration to intensify the air war in North Vietnam (a policy that, among other things, would have risked an outright Chinese intervention in the war). The Stennis Subcommittee ultimately issued a report chastising the administration’s approach and holding that “logic and prudence” required endorsing whatever military tactics the JCS recommended. To Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, the affair challenged “one of the most fundamental principles of our constitutional structure—the civilian direction of the defense establishment.” The electorate clearly knew what Rumsfeld’s policies were when they re-elected Bush, and the precedent of a military pressure campaign against the civilian chief is a dangerous one: next time, who’s to say the result won’t be like the Stennis Subcommittee effort?
The CIA has fired a veteran agent who leaked the story about the agency’s secret prisons in Europe.
Lots of debate (both fromsupporters and those critical of the idea) on whether Juan Cole merits an appointment at Yale. Cole’s scholarly record hardly seems up to Yale’s standards, suggesting that the prominence he’s received as a “public intellectual” regarding the contemporary Middle East is helping his case. I’d be more persuaded about the merits of Yale’s proposed move if Cole’s commentary was of higher quality.
National Review’s Ramesh Ponnuru has an fine book on the politics of abortion, Ponnuru contends, quite convincingly, that pro-choice activists are deluding themselves if they believe that overturning Roe will necessarily benefit them politically.
Next week we move into the 1990s in my spring-term undergrad elective (US history since 1953); I wanted to track down some clips of Admiral Stockdale from the 1992 v-p debate, which remains for me the most bizarre debate performance in a national campaign. Managed to find a couple here, including his famous, “Who am I? Why am I here?” Not supplied, alas, was his performance when Gore or Quayle was speaking and Stockdale would occasionally be seen wandering the stage behind the speaker.


On the fired CIA agent
I'd vote for her. She uncovered criminal behavior.
Re: On the fired CIA agent
More Grist
Re: In defense of Admiral Stockdale
Re: In defense of Admiral Stockdale
Examples: Richard Clarke, Michael Scheuer, Robert Baer, Steven Simon, Daniel Benjamin, etc. etc. etc. are all former counter-terrorism people, and recently retired. All of them have written extensively in criticism of the Bush Administration in the past few years, and it's arguable that they've been part of a concerted campaign. Is that problematic, or a dangerous precedent?
It's worth remembering that counter-terrorism is now a quasi-military activity: counter-terrorist agencies engage in war-like action and are somewhat integrated with the military. So it can't be that retired generals are "military" whereas counter-terrorist officials are "civilian." In some ways, that is a merely nominal difference, not a substantive one.
Personally, I don't see the problem in either case--retired generals or retired intelligence officials. I guess I'm with Chris on this one.
Re: In defense of Admiral Stockdale
Anyway, it seems to me that the real line to draw is the line between generals and former generals. Didn't Eisenhower refuse even to vote, while in uniform? And then he took the uniform off, and ran for president. What's so different about taking the uniform off and then criticizing a president, or a secretary of defense? Retired generals are not generals; they command no force, and have only the authority of their experience. I can't regard that as a threat.
Re: In defense of Admiral Stockdale
Counter-terrorism experts rarely have the capability to mount a coup against a civilian government.
In defense of Admiral Stockdale
It's sad that people of Stockdale's seeming character and integrity find no place in our political system because they do badly at stage-managed debates--which are at best pseudo-events in Boorstin's sense of that term. I've seen other candidates do a better job in debates, but I haven't (to put it mildly) found a single one who worthy of admiration. Stockdale did a disasterous job in the debate, but has a track record, in word and deed, worthy of admiration. I think it's important not to lose sight of that.
Re: In defense of Admiral Stockdale
And isn't it interesting that we're talking about a retired admiral's political campaign, given the repeated depiction in the Washington Post this week of the long tradition in which retired military personnel always maintain a rigorous silence on matters of civilian politics?
Re: In defense of Admiral Stockdale
On the K'hammer column, it's not my sense that he's objecting to current or former military personnel choosing to enter politics and run for office. But that's not what's occurring here--nor in, say, the Stennis Subcommittee hearings, or the MacArthur-JCS controversy of the early 1950s (or Colin Powell's anti-gay campaign of 1992-93). Obviously, this sort of military activism has a long tradition in American history. But that doesn't mean it's a good thing.
In this case, we have a defense secretary who, at best, can be described as incompetent. But the basic nature of Rumsfeld's (to be charitable) incompetence was well known in 2004, and the people reelected Bush anyway.
Re: In defense of Admiral Stockdale
I think their critique is correct. And they obviously have the right to speak out. But I also think it's an extremely dangerous precedent, because it's just as easy to imagine a comparable situation in which the policy of the civilian leadership is the preferable one.
and other brand new behaviors
"We've always had discontented officers in every war and in every period of our history. But they rarely coalesce into factions...That kind of dissident party within the military is alien to America."
The first dissident coalition in the American military that I know of was the group behind the Newburgh conspiracy; in the contemporary U.S. Army, much of the officer corps defines itself by its reading of the novel Once an Eagle, which is is premised on a lifelong contest between the representatives of two radically different leadership factions. Plot those two points on a timeline, and you only have the history between 1783 and 2006 to show traditions of dissent and factionalism in the American military. For other points along teh way we might look at, for example, the controvsersy in the first Roosevelt administration over the report Gen. Nelson Miles submitted alleaging American brutality in the Philippines.
This "new precedent" stuff is a non-starter.
Re: and other brand new behaviors
Re: and other brand new behaviors
Re: and other brand new behaviors
And so on, and so on, and ceterae.
Re: and other brand new behaviors
the old priestly caste of apolitical generals
I wonder if Charles Krauthammer has ever heard of Curtis LeMay.