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Can Obama Bring the Audacity of Hope to the Middle East?
On August 1, 2007, at the start of his campaign for President, Barack Obama made a speech to the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC where he laid out his plans for transforming American foreign policy to the Muslim world. “We are not at war with Islam... [and] we will stand with those who are willing to stand up for their future,” he declared to a crowd of foreign policy luminaries.

As President, the question before Barack Obama is whether he is prepared to act on those farsighted words.

Declaring his intention to speak at a “major Islamic forum” within his first 100 days in office, using his first morning as President to halt prosecutions at Guantanamo Bay, repeating his desire to “redefine our struggle” against Islamic extremism and “author our own story” about what America really stands for, all demonstrate that Obama understands the importance of changing the symbolic vocabulary governing how the United State talks about the Muslim world.

But symbols can be dangerous, especially when it comes to the Middle East. Not because the people of the region are too easily taken in by them, as Western Orientalists and viceroys have for two centuries claimed about the “Arab mind.” In fact, quite the opposite: The West, and the US in particular, has a habit of taking its symbols too seriously; of assuming that because our leaders claim that we stand for democracy, peace and development, the policies supporting these goals naturally flow from those words.

As many friends in the Muslim world have said to me, America needs to “walk the talk” of supporting democracy, freedom and development if it wants to begin a new chapter in its relations with the region. Doing so, however, will necessitate President Obama navigating a tightrope of competing agendas and hypocrisies, which have long been the stock and trade of foreign policy-making for great powers.

From “Hope” to Reality

Obama's Democratic predecessor, Bill Clinton, was also a “man from Hope,” promising to refocus American policy towards our highest ideals. Yet when it mattered, he caved in to powerful institutional interests--backing down from his pledge to push China on human rights, allowing Israel to greatly expand its settlements during the peace process he was supposed to shepherd, uttering nary a word as Pakistan built the Taliban into a formidable political and military force, and the region's autocratic leaders maintained their grip on power, many of them helped by continued US aid.

George W. Bush pushed his “freedom agenda” until his final days in office. But most people stopped listening years ago precisely because his policies so clearly vitiated his noble rhetoric.

And herein lies Obama's problem: His view that “America must show -- through deeds as well as words -- that we stand with those who seek a better life” flies in the face of half a century of American policy towards the Middle East. During this time the United States has most always stood not with the people, but with their leaders, regardless of how corrupt, repressive or autocratic they have been.

Americans might be, as Obama eloquently declared, “a compassionate nation that wants a better future for all people.” But like most wealthy countries, the US has rarely helped the world's poor and oppressed obtain a better future if doing so cost its corporations profits or interfered with its strategic interests.

Similarly, Obama's desire to focus US support on “helping nations build independent judicial systems and honest police forces” will quickly come up against the harsh reality that most of our allies in the Middle East and North Africa remain in power precisely through shackled judiciaries and corrupt and repressive police forces.

The President wants to open “America Houses” across the Muslim world to educate Muslims about the United States. But Muslims—particularly those with the education and language skills to visit such places—know our history as well as most Americans (a 2007 Newsweek poll concluded that when it came to history, America was a “dunce-cap nation”), certainly better than most when it comes to the history of US engagement in the Middle East.

Obama's Misreading of History is at the Root of His Policy Dilemmas

There is some evidence that the new President understands this dilemma. In his inaugural speech, Obama explained that “our nation is at war, against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred. Our economy is badly weakened, a consequence of greed and irresponsibility on the part of some, but also our collective failure to make hard choices and prepare the nation for a new age.”

A thoughtful, purposeful writer, one can imagine that Obama placed those sentences next to each other because he understands the link between our own greed, irresponsibility and collective failure to understand that an American way of life based on six percent of the world's population consuming 24 percent of its resources, is inevitably going to produce violence and hatred among those at at the wrong end of the remaining 94 percent. As the US Strategic Space Command (whose mission is to dominate space in order to “protect US interests and investment”) explained in 2000 in its Vision for 2020, globalization is producing a zero-sum game of winners and losers, in which American foreign policy must do whatever it takes to “win.”

In that context, does President Obama understand that Muslims have every right to “blame their society's ills on the West,” at least partly? Well over a century of occupation, imperialism, support for undemocratic leaders and control of local resources, have earned Western governments the opprobrium of the peoples of the Muslim world, and the developing world more broadly.

Indeed, In an inteview with the Dubai-based al-Arabiya network, President Obama argued that "America was not born as a colonial power, and that the same respect and partnership that America had with the Muslim world as recently as 20 or 30 years ago, there's no reason why we can't restore that."

The is a dangerous misreading of US-history, which began, after all, with the thirteen colonies. As most school children will confirm, the westward expansion of the United States could not have occurred without the genocidal confinement of Native Americans, and several wars that severed most of the American southwest, from Texas to California, from Mexico.

Certainly the President well knows these facts; that he cannot acknowledge them publicly does not augur well for the possibility of his administration pursuing an honest dialog with the Muslim world.

Similarly, the idea that the United States had "respect and partnership" with the Muslim world only a few decades ago is also inaccurate. The US government had "successful" (strategically and economically) relations with governments of various countries, almost all of whom were authoritarian and extremely corrupt. But the US government has never supported the rights of the peoples of the region to democratic government, freedom, and autonomous development. Quite the opposite.

If President Obama thinks that turning the clock back 20 or 30 years will improve America's standing with the masses of people in the Muslim world, he is in for a rude surprise.

A Welcome Focus on the Middle East, But Hard Choices Lie Ahead

It is clear that President Obama has made the Middle East and larger Muslim world the primary foreign policy issue for his first 100 days—the newly updated Whitehouse.gov website lists only Middle Eastern countries, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and Israel-Palestine, as his main objectives. And in his inaugural address, he exclaimed: “To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.”

The words are eloquent, but the reality beneath them will not be easily changed. Does President Obama really expect Hosni Mubarak willingly to take the hand that must usher him off the Egyptian stage if Egypt is to move towards democracy and sustainable development?

Will the leaders of most every other country in the Arab world, from Morocco to Iraq, really reverse their pattern of stifling dissent and hoarding wealth that has long ensured their hold on power, unless compelled to do so?

Judging by his initial conversations with the leaders of the region, the answer to these questions is likely no. According to the White House's first press release, the President “appreciated the spirit of partnership and warm nature” that characterized is calls to Mubarak, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Jordan's King Abdullah, and PA President Abbas.

The reality is that a Mideast policy based on the principles Obama outlined at his inauguration will find few partners or warm conversation among the leaders on the other end of the phone line. Indeed, Mubarak, Olmert and Abbas each would have likely hung up the phone cursing.

Sending Special Envoy George Mitchell to the region demonstrates engagement, but not the fundamental rethinking of American policy that is necessary for any change in its relations with the peoples of the Muslim world. Indeed, a look at the text of its Administration's first press release offers an unsettling glimpse at what the substance of Obama's policies toward the region might be.

First, there is not a hint of criticism of Israel's conduct in the war on Gaza (A week later, Secretary of State Clinton similarly refused to criticize Israel during first press conference). Obama “emphasized his determination to work to help consolidate the ceasefire,” but his sole focus will apparently be on stopping Hamas smuggling and supporting the corrupt and ineffective PA President Abbas.

If Obama's pre-inauguration silence about Israel's conduct of the Gaza war was troubling to the peoples of the Muslim world, his Administration's refusal upon taking office to offer any criticism of Israel's actions (particularly when many Israelis and American Jews are apoplectic at the government's actions), or to mention the problem of continued settlements, is deafening.

If this silence continues, it will drown out even the most sincere calls for reform, democratization, or moderation in the Muslim world by his Administration. Even the much-anticipated opening of low level discussions with Hamas will not change the dynamic.

Positive Changes Are Apparent, But Will have Limited Impact

More positively, the President's commitment to change the tenor of American policy towards the Muslim world was demonstrated by the issuing of executive orders that announced the closure of the Guantanamo Bay and other CIA-run prisons, as well as prohibiting the CIA from using coercive interrogation methods.

These measures are extremely important in their own right. But the reality is that they will effect only a few hundred prisoners at most. Far more impactful will be the substance of the Obama Administration's relations with key allies and adversaries in the region, which will impact hundreds of millions of people. Here the President's call for “direct and unconditional” negotiations with Iran is welcome, as is his commitment to focus more energy and money on building accountable political and social institutions in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

But moving beyond words to actions will require Obama make some very difficult choices. Despite its current economic problems, Iran is not a particularly poor country. Indeed, with its massive oil and gas reserves (both of which are likely the second largest in the world) it will not be bought off by offers of US aid or foreign investment, no matter how generous.

Iran will not foreswear its nuclear ambitions unless it can claim a prize equal to such a sacrifice. That prize will undoubtedly be a denuclearization of the region that would include Israel's relinquishing its nuclear weapons. The new Administration in fact is calling for a nuclear-weapon free world, and the Middle East is no doubt among the most important regions for such a process to begin.

But will Obama be willing to pressure Israel to give up its nuclear deterrent for the sake of greater regional, and global stability and security? If Israel's leaders balk, is he prepared to go over their heads to the Israeli people, and failing that, to place America's national security interest ahead of the strategic desire of “America's strongest alley” in the region to maintain its nuclear weapons stockpile?

Will Iraq Set the Pattern?

Obama's pledge to withdraw all US forces from Iraq was a centerpiece of his presidential campaign. Specifically, Obama's stated aim was to remove all troops from the country within sixteen months of taking office. The Status of Forces agreement signed between the US and Iraqi governments last November explicitly mandates a full American withdrawal by December 31, 2011.

Yet almost since the moment the agreement was announced, there have been strong indications that American military leaders would do their best to ensure the timeline is not met. The main thrust of their strategy, which was communicated to Obama by Defense Secretary Gates in December, involves reclassifying tens of thousands of combat troops as “support troops,” tasked with continuing to train and support Iraqi forces and “fight al-Qa'eda” in Iraq.

Obama seems to have gotten the message, because the Administration's plan as described on the White House website states that the US will remove all “combat brigades,” admitting that a “residual force” would remain for an indeterminate period of time. Moreover, while the plan declares that the United States “will not build permanent bases in Iraq,” the reality is that the US doesn't need to build any permanent bases now because they were already constructed amidst the fog of the first years of the occupation.

In fact, already in 2003 Pentagon officials described the money being spent to build long-term bases as “staggering,” and by 2005 at least four “super bases,” housing upwards of 20,000 soldiers each, were in operation. The White House has said nothing about dismantling them, and if tens of thousands of ambiguously named “support troops” are to remain in Iraq, as the Los Angeles Times reported on Obama's first full day in office, there will be no reason for it to do so.

If the Obama Administration blinks on carrying out its signature foreign policy commitment, what are the chances that it will show more spine when taking on even more intractable issues, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the massive corruption in Afghanistan that has developed under US occupation and tutelage? And who will trust that the United States will keep its word to do so?

Indeed, Obama's challenge in Iraq points to the reality that the Administration cannot attempt merely to change Israeli, Egyptian, or Iranian policies. At the same time the President must begin a transformation in the very structure of political and economic power in the United States that will inevitably bring him into conflict with some of the most powerful forces in the country.

Israel and Egypt receive well over $5 billion dollars in US aid per year, much of it direct military transfers. This aid is the lynchpin of the larger system of military aid and sales that has been worth many tens of billions of dollars just in the last half decade (only last year, the US signed a $20 billion arms sales agreement with Saudi Arabia, which was promptly followed by a $30 billion agreement with Israel, while allies such as Egypt, Pakistan, and Jordan clamored successfully for increases in their military military assistance packages).

Such massive arms transfers make no sense in a region filled with democratic countries at peace with one another. Rather, they've always required a combination of autocratic or repressive governments, manageable levels of conflict with occasional spikes that help ensure sufficiently high oil prices to enable the cycling of petrodollars back and forth between the United State and the region.

In this context, taking on Mideast corruption and authoritarianism will necessitate Obama's taking on what is likely the most powerful industrial and political coalition in the United States. Israeli economists Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler have described this loose grouping as the “Arma-Core Petro-Core coalition,” and for half a century and through at least four wars, it has ensured that the financial and strategic interests of the arms and petroleum industries have profoundly shaped American foreign and security policy—culminating with a Bush-Cheney Administration that was cut whole cloth from these industries.

As the last eight years have shown, peace, democracy and sustainable growth cannot come to the Middle East in such a political-economic environment. But can Obama, or any American President, take on this coalition and win? And if he can't, what hope is there for substantive change in US policy towards the region?

Obama Must Take Control, Quickly

In her final weeks as Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice's predicted that the incoming administration's policies would show a marked continuity with those of President Bush. If Obama cannot take control of the competing Middle East agendas within the American foreign policy, military and security establishment, they will frustrate and even sabotage his core foreign policy goals.

To assert his leadership across the board, President Obama will have to put aside diplomatic pleasantries in future conversations with the region's leaders and lay out a clear and unambiguous set of guidelines for US policy. President Mubarak will have to be told in no uncertain terms that he must release political prisoners such as jailed Presidential candidate Ayman Nour and Muslim Brotherhood leaders, and allow a rapid transition to full democracy. Israeli Prime Minister Olmert or his successor must be told that no more US military aid will be forthcoming until Israel begins pulling out of West Bank settlements and commits itself firmly to the creation of a viable Palestinian state.

More broadly, leaders from Morocco to Pakistan, will have to be told that the US is adopting a new standard for judging its relations with the countries of the region. Those countries that fully democratize, put an end to censorship, political imprisonment, torture, and other draconian practices, and respect human, civil and political rights, and work to address growing inequality in their societies, will receive ample support of the United States. Those that don't, won't.

Whether its allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, or adversaries such as Iran or Syria, the message and policy has to be the same. If they don't like the terms, they are free to seek aid and support from China or Russia. Governments might find such allies attractive, but their peoples won't, putting the United States in precisely the position of moral authority that President Obama has said should be a major goal of US foreign policy.

At the same time, such a clear and balanced policy will also free Obama to focus on the all-important goals of addressing the challenges posed by global warming, water and food shortages, while beginning the long term process of transforming a global economic system that forces roughly half the world's population to live on $2 per day or less, into one that more equitably and sustainably distributes the world's natural and economic bounties.

Even here, however, the struggle will be far greater than it's being described now. If, as he pledged in his inaugural address, the President wants to work alongside the world's poor “to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow”—he will have to take on Archer Daniels Midland, Bechtel, Monsanto and a host of European, Japanese and Chinese competitors who, aided by US-run institutions like the World Bank and USAID, are gobbling up the world's supplies of fresh water and agricultural land for their own profit, regardless of the social, economic and environmental cost. But their political and financial power is inextricably tied to those supporting the status quo in the Middle East. To win either battle, the President will have to fight both simultaneously.

Obama's historic rise to the Presidency has demonstrated how the “audacity of hope” can spark profound social and political transformation. The President has the power to help spark a similar transformation in the Middle East. If he has the political courage to do so, he will find millions of people across the region willing to carry the flame. The real question is, will Americans push him--and themselves--to make the hard choices necessary to live up to the lofty ideals his election represents.


Whi is Levine?

For a bit of balance, see who this LeVine really is. Go here:
http://frontpagemag.com/2009/10/14/collaborators-in-the-campus-war-against-israel-and-the-jews-mark-levine-%E2%80%93-by-steven-plaut/?dsq=20190017#comment-20190017

Re: Obama and the Muslim World

The Shah, Savak, and the CIA created the Iranian revolution of 1979. Anything that Zbig and Carter did in 78-79 was an 11th hour attempt to mediate the inevitable end of a puppet. The Shah was not as effective a dictator as Saddam.

Re: Obama and the Muslim World

Yes, an Iranian airliner was shot down. But in 1978-1979, the Carter Administration, led by Zbig, was helping Khomeini take over Iran. So how do we explain all that?

Re: Obama and the Muslim World

As long as we're trying to keep track of America's dizzyingly dopey Middle Eastern, "policy". America accidentally shot down an Iranian airliner, 200+ civilian dead and deliberately shot up Iranian oil platforms and naval vessels, all by way of supporting that "madman" Saddam Hussein.

Re: error about the Oslo accords

by the way, a recent book has come out thoroughly considering in detail the international law status of Judea-Samaria and the Gaza Strip. The author is Howard Grief, an attorney in Jerusalem. The book was published by Mazo publishers in Jerusalem and is available on Amazon [at least the UK Amazon] and through other retailers.

Attorney Grief also wrote on this subject in, inter alia, "Legal Rights and Title of Sovereignty of the Jewish People to the Land of Israel ... under International Law," ACPR Pubs., April 2003. This is a booklet of ca. 30 pp available from the Ariel Center for Policy Research, POB 830, Shaarei Tikva 44810 Israel. It summarizes part of the argument of the book.

Returning to the notion of "occupation." It seems to mean the taking or capture of territory belonging to another state, whereas if a state recaptures territory legally belonging to it, then that would be called "liberation." Recall that if Britain had allowed Jewish migration into Israel [the JNH] during the Holocaust --as the UK was bound by its mandate obligation to do-- then there would have been a clear Jewish majority in the country before 1948.

Re: a very good discussion

Art, thank you for the discussion

a very good discussion

Yes, NF, I think that you, Fahrettin, and I have had a very good discussion here, enlightening.

Re: the turkish view

Dear NF,

Edward Spears was an Army officer seconded to coordinating actions with the French General Staff in case of war. In the first pp of his memoir "Liason 1914", he records the intense suspicion and hostility he encountered from his French colleagues, and his own deep embarrassment, when the British declaration of war was long delayed.


Re: the turkish view

Hi Art,

Thank you. I have definitely added some new information to my stock. This has been a delightful debate.

I am not sure that it tells us what the triumvirate in Istanbul knew about any of it. But, your information is interesting on its own.

I do recall that there were some resignations from the government. Tuchman notes that. However, that there was a serious chance of walking away from a treaty, that is news to me. Thank you for explaining this information carefully.

Re: the turkish view

Dear NF,

You can read about the indecision of the British govt in, e.g., Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (1998). At the cabinet meeting on July 31, 1914 only Grey and Churchill were definiely for declaring war on Germany. At least five others (Morley, Burns, Simon, Beauchamp and Hobhouse) were for an immediately declaration of neutrality. On July 30, a group of 22 Liberal members of the Foreign Affairs Committee had warned that any declaration of war would lead to their withdrawal of support from the Govt. Foreign Minister Grey only gained a cabinet commitment to support Belgium if Belgium was invaded by threatening to resign himself (July 31).

What tipped the balance was the invasion of Belgium, which gave Asquith a stronger moral argument. Even so there were some resignations (Morley and Burns; Beauchamp and Simon would have, but pulled back at the last minute).

NF, you write:

"Third, is it not usually the case that there are serious discussion about whether to honor any war treaty, when push comes to shove? Which is to say, the fact that there were discussions does not automatically mean that they were held with an eye toward really not honoring a commitment made."

It is the first sentence that is operative, I think, not the second, and the discussion in 1914 was not pro forma.

The story of the maneuvers in the cabinet on July 30-Aug. 3 are fascinating and (knowing what we now know of the outcome) depressing reading. Niall F. thinks it was in fact not only near-run but the wrong decision; of that I have my doubts.

Re: the turkish view

Art,

You have me at a real disadvantage here. I am well aware that France was very concerned that unless France was playing defense, Britain would not necessarily stand with France in the war. Moreover, I recall reading that such was known by France to be extremely important to Britain - as justification to those who hoped to avoid war -, on top of the fact that such were the terms of the treaty.

Your contention, however, is that Britain seriously contemplated breaking the treaty even if France were not the aggressor. And, this by a Britain which, in the early days of the war, would kick up a ball before charging on the theory that such was the sporting thing to do.

First, why, in your estimate, did Britain decide to honor the treaty?

Second, how many voted against and how many voted for honoring the treaty?

Third, is it not usually the case that there are serious discussion about whether to honor any war treaty, when push comes to shove? Which is to say, the fact that there were discussions does not automatically mean that they were held with an eye toward really not honoring a commitment made.

Is this the version of events as told by either Ms. Tuchman or by John Keegan? Or, is this the construction made by Karsh and Karsh? I am not suggesting that you are wrong here. I am, however, curious because what you write does not jive with what I have read.

Re: the turkish view

NF, the Cabinet debates on Aug. 2-3 show there was a very real chance that Britain would not come in--despite the treaty.

But by the general "betrayal" of France I meant the Kitchener Plan to bleed the French against the Germans in 1914 and 1915 and then enter in 1916 with the huge Kitchener Armies which would decide the war and leave Britain with the "lion's share" of the say on its political outcome (vs. weakened Germany and France). Very nasty. I cited the 1986 book by D. M. French on this--and French is a very prominent scholar (esp. archival).

In any case, British Russophobia was very strong, almost as strong as Turkish Russophobia. The British govt had absolutely zero desire to see Russian power increased, and if Turkey had remained neutral I think things would have worked out well for Turkey--as Ataturk foresaw.

Re: the turkish view

Art,

You write: "NF, the alliance of Britain and Russia was extremely fragile: they had been enemies for a century."

Yet, there was a treaty. And, by my memory, the French did all they could to be sure that its terms would have to be fulfilled so that Britain would have to join in on France's side. Hence, France wanted Germany to attack first so as to implicate the treaty, which is, of course, how things played out.

Do you have information that Britain would have welshed on the treaty once it was clear that Germany attacked through Belgium? That is news to me.

Your comments regarding the great game are no doubt true. But, then again, Britain's policy regarding the Ottoman Empire was to attempt to control that empire, as it did in Egypt, etc.. That is something that Germany never did to the Ottoman Empire and it was, if we go by Dadrian's account, very important to the Ottoman Empire. So, I am not sure your view is quite well taken once you get past the generality.

Re: the turkish view

NF, the alliance of Britain and Russia was extremely fragile: they had been enemies for a century. Britain had protected Turkey from Russia (as much as it could do easily) through most of that century.

The famous Great Game, of course, was all about the British preventing Russian expansion southeast into the Muslim lands of central Asia, and thus threatening British India. The British saw the Russians as THE great threat to their control there, and control of India was central to their status economically and as a great power. They spent enormous funds in defending the Northwest Frontier against the Russian threat. This fear of Russia had seeped deep into British popular culture as well; just read Kipling's famous novel "Kim" (publ. 1901): the enemies are the Russians.

On all this, and the serious strategic weaknesses of Britain after 1890 re Russia as well as Germany, see Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905.
Note the subtitle after the colon.

Britain might have sacrified a neutral Ottoman empire to Russia; the British, after all, were prepared to betray even the French. But the British saw Russia as a major enemy, the alliance against Germany was an alliance of convenience, and it is more than equally likely that a triumphant Britain would not have allowed Russian assaults on a previously neutral (and well-armed) Turkey.

And about Turkish "weakness". Yes, Turkey was defeated in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. But this was because it was overwhelmed by surprise and by huge numbers, and at the end (as in the retaking of Edirne [Adrianople]) and the retaking of much of eastern Thrace, which had been lost in 1912), the fact was that it was fighting well. The war of 1913 ended with successful Turkish offensives. In fact, the war ended with Turkish forces only 25 miles from the Bulgarian capital of Sofia.

This is of a piece with the outstanding Turkish miliary performance against the British in 1915, and puts the latter--and Enver Pasha's dreams (as well as his fears)-- in context.

Re: the turkish view

I think you have succeeded in getting us to see the other side, Fahrettin.

But it is highly interesting that the Ataturk--as N.F. says, one of history's great figures--was for neutrality (and he was one of the Turkish commanders in the great victory over the British at Gallipoli). And it is interesting again that Ataturk-influenced history views Enver and his triumvirate of 1914 "as nuts". That was sort of my point: the Enver govt had a choice, they made a terrible mistake (and not just out of fear but out of dreams), and the entire Middle East is still paying for it.

I think that NF and I strongly agree that you have made your point, and have succeeded in getting us westerners to see the other side.

Re: the turkish view

Art,

You have raised a good point about the Hapsburg Empire. But, again, Russia was the main issue to the Ottoman Empire. It was enemy number one. And, imagining that Britain would restrain Russia, given the long history of double crosses all around, seems a bit rich. Few, after all, knew that WWI was to be a war like pretty much none before it. And, Germany, by contrast, was not going to side with Russia, given its clear alignments.

The point about the Ottoman Empire's military is an interesting one. It, however, has to be interpreted in light of the string of terrible defeats that occurred before WWI. Those, after all, were what had to be primarily in the mind of the Ottoman leaders, not the result of improvements which led to some victories during WWI. After all, humiliating defeat after defeat leads to the view that the same will occur in future circumstances. So, on that point, I disagree with you. I think they had no reason to think their military particularly capable - a mistake on their part but a reasonable one.

I do think it important that Attaturk would have been for neutrality. But, then again, he was a truly great man, the triumvirate were, if we go by the available information, not remotely of his caliber. And, they made some pretty bad mistakes, some pretty gruesome choices, etc., etc. They did not serve their empire well, as the historical record on hindsight shows.

Re: the turkish view

Nobody is proposing that Germany was any better than her enemies or that it would have been better not to be on the losing side. In fact modern Turkish history, influenced by Ataturk treats the unionists (the government party was called the party for union and progess) as nuts. Ataturk for one wanted Turkey to stay neutral. I was just trying to get you guys to understand that the other side also had justifiable reasons for their actions. But of course things are always more complicated than can be expressed in a blog.

Re: the turkish view

N.F., I think Fahrettin has some good points but it is more complicated than that. Germany backed the Habsburgs in the very actions in Bosnia which Fahrettin points to. So Enver need not have gone with Germany. See my comments just above.

Britain courted Turkey by offering the Enver govt the two most powerful battleships in the world. There were also implied threats. Things were complicated.

And given that the Turkish Army defeated--in fact humiliated--the British armed forces very seriously three times in 1915, I think that to say that Turkey was 'on the run" is exaggerated. Enver went with Germany not because the Germans offered mere survival but because they offered to back some Turkish revanchism and very large Turkish expansionism towards the East.

Things were complicated.

Re: the turkish view

Fahrettin, I was agreeing with you! That's why I wrote that "Fahrettin has a point".

The Entente offer, when looked at closely, while beneficial to the Ottoman empire, contained an implied threat to its existence--the threat you pointed to. That's what I said. This does not mean that Enver wasn't seriously courted by the Entente and offered advantages for staying neutral--he was. (But he was also implicity threatened.)

But you yourself said that the Enver triumvirate were thugs. I wasn't saying that Enver and his people were worse thugs than anyone else--I was just saying that they were thugs, not victims.

We can only speculate about what would have happened if Enver had accepted the Entente offer and had remained neutral. But it is hard to believe that things would have turned out WORSE for the Ottoman state if Turkey had remained neutral instead of the Enver government allying itself with Germany. I've given the balance-of-power reasons why I think this.

I should point out that Germany had close ties to anti-Ottoman Greece, and had cooperated with Britain in detaching Albania from the Ottoman realm--just to cite two aspects of the situation. So (like Britain herself with the two great battleships scheduled to go Istanbul), Germany played a double game in the Balkans. Also, like all the great European powers, Germany had good relations with governments that hated and feared each other. Germany wasn't purely pro-Turkish. After all, hadn't Germany backed Austria in the very crises in Bosnia in 1878 and in 1908 which eventually led to the terrible events both of 1914 and those which you describe in the 1990s?

Enver was pro-German from 1881, when he was the Ottoman military attache in Berlin--he was impressed with the German army and wanted one like it for himself. But he certainly could not have been happy about German actions supporting the Habsburgs in Bosnia!

Fahrettin, you provide reasons why the Enver govt preferred Germany to the Entente, going back to the Entente states' actions in the two Balkan Wars. Okay. But Enver nevertheless had a choice, and good government is about choices, and (as you said) Enver and his triumvirate were thugs.

Re: the turkish view

Fahrettin,

Some of what you write I agree with, although your characterization of the events as genocide and the numbers killed are not, so far as I know, correct. But, your main point that there is a tendency among Western educated people not to understand how the world looked from the viewpoint of Turks and Bosnian Muslims is, I think, very well taken. And, of course, the world is seen by people including their own misconceptions -- and not with a perfect understanding of facts, which I think counters Art's viewpoint rather effectively. So, I think your statements are rather important.

As I understand what an elite in Turkey would have seen in the early 20th Century, the world looked a horrifying place, with the Ottoman Empire being sliced up and with the country itself having internal divisions that seemed to have no solution. So, the decisions made by the country have to be understood with that in mind.

Sympathy for the Ottoman point of view comes out most particularly in Bernard Lewis' writings about the demise of the Ottoman Empire, which are very understanding of how the Turks saw the world.

At the same time, Art has a good point that serious mistakes were made. After all, the decisions made to join Germany did lead to the demise of the Ottoman Empire. And, it turns out that the military had improved dramatically - enough to slice up the Brits. So, it is worth speculating whether remaining neutral would have been a better choice (while, the third alternative of joining on the British side seems, at least to me, to be far fetched). Of course, Attaturk might not have arisen as the leader of a new country. He, so far as I am concerned, is among history's great men. So, 20/20 hindsight is never an easy thing.

Anyway, I appreciated your comment.

Re: the turkish view

Art,

This is the point where I will get personal. I am not an american student who is discussing marx with the history professor but a member of the turkish upper class which has spent the last centuries running the empire. I am much closer to the people making those decisions you disagree with, than you understand. Enver’s daughter was my chemistry teacher, to name one. I qoute marx and trotsky not as primary resources but because their writings confirm what every turk knows, their writings available to you in languages you understand and they should be accepted as neutrals in the hate against the turk. Quoting our enemies’ books which are full of self praise do not change our perception of the threats these people were and remain. You have an ideological problem accepting that the Ottoman government were no worse thugs than their enemies and were reacting in an absolutely rational way to the threats you keep denying. It was all very bloody but there is no reason to presume that the alternative of not knocking out tsarist russia would have been less bloody. In all there were 1 million military dead, ca. 600 000 armenians, 300 000 Greeks and 2,5 million moslem civilian dead, the later never mentioned in western history books. 10 million moslems survived as they would not have if the tsarist empire had been allowed to win the war.
The critical events which led to the misery that aera was were the invasion of Bosnia 1878 and the balkan war 1912. WW1 broke out over the question of who gets to keep ottoman bosnia and would have been avoided if Bosnia had bet left to the Turks as its majority population definitely would have preferred. Turkey would have kept out of the war if the allies had not incited the balkan countries to commit genocide in the Balkan war. After that it was a no holds barred contest to survive. You critize neither event and concentrate on what the turk did wrong. This is an emotional and not scientific attitude.
To give you an example of how the West deals with Turks let us look at Bosnia in the 1990ies. When Bosnia became independant it hat 2,5 million moslems of slavic language and turkish culture, 44% of the population. There are a further 5 million Bosnian moslems living in Turkey where they escaped to save their lives from previous rounds of genocide. Presumably some of them would have returned to an independant Bosnia, turning the country into a second Turkey in Europe. This the west was determined to prevent. They let the serbians murder 250 000 bosnian moslems broke their back, and installed a colonial administration in bosnia. The event immediately disappeared from public attention, concentrating instead on what happened to the armenians in 1915. The serb leader Milosevic was later brought to court over Kosovo, where he had done no wrong because suing him over Bosnia would have meant that he said that he was only doing what western countries told him. Short time later he was murdered to make him shut up.
Instead of trying to talk me out of the turkish historic experience you should try to understand how we perceive the world.

Re: the turkish view

We disagree on the alleged over-generalities of IR theory, NF. In any case, IR theory distinguishes Hitler from Churchill very well: one is the leader of a unlimited-revisionist state (Hitler), one is the leader of a status quo state.

But let's not get into a private conversation on this.

Re: the turkish view: Fahrettin has a point

Having looked more closely, I now think that Fahrettin has a point:

The offer to Turkey from the Entente was that in exchange for firm neutrality in all its aspects, the Ottoman empire would receive a formal guarantee of complete territorial integrity, the end of the Capitulations, perhaps some of the Aegean islands--and of course those two very powerful battleships, whose possession in Turkish hands would have significantly shifted the balance of power in the Aegean, the eastern Med, and the Black Sea.

A good offer, which Turkey should have accepted.

Yet the first clause I cited, if you think about it, has its own sinister aspect to it, the aspect that Fahrettin pointed to. It carries an implied threat, and the statement about neutrality "in all its aspects" looks like a potential escape clause you could drive a freight-train through. If one were suspicious, here would be why.

Yet I think that the Entente was sincere, and that after 4 years Turkey would have been far too tough a nut to take on. Even as it was--and I cannot emphasize this enough--Turkey, far from being "the sick man of Europe"--defeated the British very severely three times in 1915-1916. It was already a tough nut. Given this, perhaps we can see why the Entente made the nice offer it did. It's not a matter of being nice--the British govt was thuggish even to the French, as I have pointed out--but of Turkish power.

If Turkey had sided with the Entente, there's no telling what territorial gains it might have (re)made.

As for the scholarship of the Karshes, I've looked carefully at the footnotes and their citations of British, French and German archival material is very substantial. Archival material is better than memoirs, even Morganthau's, because it is immediately contemporary and on-the-spot. They don't cite much Turkish archival material, but some of the British material is intercepts and some of the German material is reporting on-the-spot of immediate conversations with, e.g., Enver. It's not a perfect job because of the lack of Turkish archival material (though they cite scholars such as Ulrich Trumpener who did), but as a professional scholar I'd say it's good job if not perfect.

Re: the turkish view

Art,

The review was written by R. Stephen Humphreys, about whom I know rather little other than he likes Bernard Lewis, thinks Edward Said's Orientalism is not a great book of intellectual history and Daniel Pipes has quoted him.

What makes you think that Morgenthau's views are all from self-interested Ottoman diplomats? If his book is to be believed, he had a quite a lot of contact with the three rulers - being someone they respected. His book quotes conversations he had with them and time spent with them - which was pretty extensive. He also had contact with the Sultan. So, I think you are being unfair to him and his testimony.

Regarding the nature of things, there is certainly always thuggish behavior by leaders. But, there are degrees of being thuggish. That, you will note, is one of my criticisms of your theory, which does not have any means to distinguish degrees of thuggishness or anything else. Rather, it notes that governments do bad stuff and then, since the theory expects such to exist, it does not explore the matter too closely. Hence, all Europe's leaders in WWII could be called thuggish. But, Hitler and Stalin were in their own league, by an order of magnitude. Your theory has no way to distinguish them from Churchill.

In the case of the triumvirate, their thuggish behavior included carving up the country's civilian population - and that really was on an order of magnitude worse than anything the thuggish Europeans had done to their own. (Of course, the Belgians had carved up the people of the Congo.)

Re: the turkish view

CORRECTION:

Strike this sentence: "His account jives well with the extreme scholarly books I have read about the demise of the Ottoman Empire, including Professor Lewis' most famous of his famous books."

Substitute the following:

His account jives well with the other scholarly books I have read about the demise of the Ottoman Empire, including Professor Lewis' most famous of his famous books.

Re: the turkish view

CORRECTION:

Delete this sentence: "Lastly, following your theory of historical writing - about which, at this point, I have read quite a bit by you (SMILE) -, one looks at book systemic and unit aspects."

Substitute the following sentence:

Lastly, following your theory of historical writing - about which, at this point, I have read quite a bit by you (SMILE) -, one looks at both systemic and unit aspects.

Re: the turkish view

Art,

Maybe you are right. I have no idea.

Morgenthau seems to have had pretty good information about how things worked. His account jives well with the extreme scholarly books I have read about the demise of the Ottoman Empire, including Professor Lewis' most famous of his famous books. I should add that the Karsh book was trashed in the review that appeared in The New York Times.

According to the author of the review, the Karshes make little use of the Ottoman government records - which, if true, makes their telling of what the triumvirate intended into hearsay. As stated in the review:

A second problem lies in the sources used -- or not used -- by the authors. They have searched the Public Record Office in London quite effectively and even found some new veins of ore in that much-exploited mine. But they seem to use only published documents from the French and German archives. Most troubling, they make very little use of the Ottoman archives, which are relatively accessible for much of the period they cover. Surely the Ottomans ought to be allowed some voice of their own.

If the above is correct, what is their basis for knowing better than Morgenthau about what was occurring? And, by the way, Morgenthau describes the incident regarding the ships at great length. He sees it very differently than you do.

Lastly, following your theory of historical writing - about which, at this point, I have read quite a bit by you (SMILE) -, one looks at book systemic and unit aspects. One presumably must also consider the fact that knowledge of the world is not perfect for any actors, etc., etc. I would also think, following your approach, that one sees what well placed observers thought of events as they occurred - and note here your reliance in your book on Polybius and Thucydides.

So, I do not discount Morgenthau, notwithstanding whatever feelers Enver or Talaat may have sent out to all involved. They were - and this is directed specifically at your points above, which suggest they had greater sophistication than, if Morgenthau is correct, they had -, as Morgenthau notes, not well schooled in international affairs or in running an empire or much of anything else. They mad themselves the captives of their sponsors - and the Germans showed up at the right time, having placed themselves as champions of the Ottoman Empire from the latter half of the 19th Century on - as shown in Dadrian seminal work, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus.

So, I am not inclined, at least not yet, to agree with you.

Incidentally, you might take a look at Morgenthau's work, which you can now access online in its entirety. He may not be correct. But, I do not think his views can be so readily dismissed as you have done above. After all, he seems to have had rather good information - better than did many others - on what occurred to the country's Christian population.

Re: the turkish view

The Karshs' used a lot of archives (British, French, German)--which is better than using Marx or Trotsky (or what Morganthau remembers being told by self-interested Ottoman diplomats). If the Karshs' didn't use the Ottoman archives as well, that is a grave fault. On the other hand, some of their PRO material consists of intercepted Ottoman govt telegrams (e.g., p. 369 n. 5). Who wrote the review?

One looks both at systemic and unit aspects--exactly. The 1914 system was thuggish and every government in it were, individually, thugs. There was a synergy involved in that, but there are no innocent victims.

Re: the turkish view

See this from Ambassador Morgenthau - also quoted above:

Germany's war preparations had for years included the study of internal conditions in other countries; an indispensable part of the imperial programme had been to take advantage of such disorganizations as existed to push her schemes of penetration and conquest. What her emissaries have attempted in France, Italy, and even the United States is apparent, and their success in Russia has greatly changed the course of the war. Clearly such a situation as that which prevailed in Turkey in 1913 and 1914 provided an ideal opportunity for manipulations of this kind. And Germany had one great advantage in Turkey which was not so conspicuously an element in other countries. Talaat and his associates needed Germany almost as badly as Germany needed Talaat. They were altogether new to the business of managing an empire. Their finances were depleted, their army and navy almost in tatters, enemies were constantly attempting to undermine them at home, and the great powers regarded them as seedy adventurers whose career was destined to be brief. Without strong support from an outside source, it was a question how long the new regime could survive. Talaat and his Committee needed some foreign power to organize the army and navy, to finance the nation, to help them reconstruct their industrial system, and to protect them against the encroachments of the encircling nations. Ignorant as they were of foreign statecraft, they needed a skilful adviser to pilot them through all the channels of international intrigue. Where was such a protector to be obtained? Evidently only one of the great European powers could perform this office. Which one should it be? Ten years before Turkey would naturally have appealed to England. But now the Turks regarded England as merely the nation that had despoiled them of Egypt and that had failed to protect Turkey from dismemberment after the Balkan wars. Together with Russia, Great Britain now controlled Persia and thus constituted a constant threat---at least so the Turks believed---against their Asiatic dominions. England was gradually withdrawing her investments from Turkey, English statesmen believed that the task of driving the Turk from Europe was about complete, and the whole Near-Eastern policy of Great Britain hinged on maintaining the organization of the Balkans as it had been determined by the Treaty of Bucharest ---a treaty which Turkey refused to regard as binding and which she was determined to upset. Above all, the Turks feared Russia in 1914, just as they had feared her ever since the days of Peter the Great. Russia was the historic enemy, the nation which had given freedom to Bulgaria and Rumania, which had been most active in dismembering the Ottoman Empire, and which regarded herself as the power that was ultimately to possess Constantinople. This fear of Russia, I cannot too much insist, was the one factor which, above everything else, was forcing Turkey into the arms of Germany. For more than half a century Turkey had regarded England as her surest safeguard against Russian aggression, and now England had become Russia's virtual ally. There was even then a general belief, which the Turkish chieftains shared, that England was entirely willing that Russia should inherit Constantinople and the Dardanelles.

If Morgenthau is correct about the perception of things in Istanbul, then your theory is not correct. They believed in a connection between Britain and Russia.

Re: the turkish view

N.F., re Turkish relations with Britain, I stand by the facts of the battleships built for Turkey by Britain, vs. Morganthau's perceptions of what he was told by self-interested Turkish diplomats. According to Karsh and Karsh, Enver was not motivated by fear.

And Talaat Pasha's memoirs say that the Young Turks were pro-German from the beginning and that it was not 1912 that turned them from Britain and France. It also turns out that in 1914 Talaat made an offer of an alliance to Russia which the Russians actually enthusiastically pursued but they were then ignored by Enver. The Turkish govt had many choices in 1914 (every choice better for everyone than the one they made), and they were NOT being forced into a box.

I'm willing to pursue this but I think Fahrettin has already made the point that the Enver triumvirate were not victims but thugs. This was a succinct version of what I have been trying to say, and to which I then added that the French, Germans, British and Russians were thugs as well. NF, it's the point of my book, as you know.

Re: the turkish view

Farhettin, the British cheated the Turkish govt out of the two battleships. This had an impact in Istanbul, as did the Germans turning over the battlecruiser Goeben to Enver.

On the other hand the Reshidieh and her sister-ship Sultan Osman were so powerful and so fast that in the hands of an enemy state (which Turkey was clearly about to become for Britain) they would have changed the naval balance of power in the entire Mediterranean. The Royal Navy itself had nothing to match against them--nothing--except for the Queen Elizabeth-class battleships which would themselves not begin to be deployed until a full year later, in late 1915.

Again, one must ask why the British were building these ships for Turkey in the first place if the British were so in bed with the Russians. The Great Game is complex, and it is played all by thugs.

Re: the turkish view

Fahrettin,

I agree with you that history is written by people interested in advancing the view they espouse. And, surely Westerners have a difficulty getting into the heads of non-Westerners, just as non-Westerners have difficulty getting into the heads of Westerners.

Moreover, I agree with your assessment of the things here and, in many instances, elsewhere as they were likely seen before WWI by people in Turkey. It was clearly a country on the run, worried about being carved up. And, Russia was doing most of the carving and Britain could hardly have seemed to be such a fine alternative compared to the Germans.

So, I think you are on pretty solid ground.

Re: the turkish view

Art,

If siding with the Ottoman Turks would have placed Britain at odds with France, the world would be very different today.

The Ottoman Empire might, of course, have sat out the war. That was feasible. But, siding with Britain made no logical sense. On your theory, the Ottoman Empire would have to believe that Britain would really change policy on a dime - not an easy feat for any country.

I am thus not sanguine on your view about Britain and the Ottoman Turks teaming up. Britain was siding with all of the Ottoman Turk's enemies. Britain was insisting that the Ottoman Turks abide by the Bucharest Treaty. Britain held pieces of the Ottoman Empire. It could not have been an inviting picture for the Ottoman Turks, employing realpolitik or any other theory.

By contrast, the Germans were not the ally of their arch-enemy Russia and influential with enemy Persia. The Germans did not care what the Ottoman Turks did to solve their internal problems. The Germans controlled no part of the Ottoman Empire and there was no reason to expect such would occur. Hence, the Germans offered something that Britain did not: the potential to re-cast the Ottoman Empire.

So, 20/20 hindsight is wonderful, since it can ignore all the detriments that, at the time, seemed front and center. But, with their heads seeing the world with Germany as the most likely savior, Britain was not in the cards. As explained by Ambassador Morgenthau - who casts things a bit but not entirely different than I do:

Germany's war preparations had for years included the study of internal conditions in other countries; an indispensable part of the imperial programme had been to take advantage of such disorganizations as existed to push her schemes of penetration and conquest. What her emissaries have attempted in France, Italy, and even the United States is apparent, and their success in Russia has greatly changed the course of the war. Clearly such a situation as that which prevailed in Turkey in 1913 and 1914 provided an ideal opportunity for manipulations of this kind. And Germany had one great advantage in Turkey which was not so conspicuously an element in other countries. Talaat and his associates needed Germany almost as badly as Germany needed Talaat. They were altogether new to the business of managing an empire. Their finances were depleted, their army and navy almost in tatters, enemies were constantly attempting to undermine them at home, and the great powers regarded them as seedy adventurers whose career was destined to be brief. Without strong support from an outside source, it was a question how long the new regime could survive. Talaat and his Committee needed some foreign power to organize the army and navy, to finance the nation, to help them reconstruct their industrial system, and to protect them against the encroachments of the encircling nations. Ignorant as they were of foreign statecraft, they needed a skilful adviser to pilot them through all the channels of international intrigue. Where was such a protector to be obtained? Evidently only one of the great European powers could perform this office. Which one should it be? Ten years before Turkey would naturally have appealed to England. But now the Turks regarded England as merely the nation that had despoiled them of Egypt and that had failed to protect Turkey from dismemberment after the Balkan wars. Together with Russia, Great Britain now controlled Persia and thus constituted a constant threat---at least so the Turks believed---against their Asiatic dominions. England was gradually withdrawing her investments from Turkey, English statesmen believed that the task of driving the Turk from Europe was about complete, and the whole Near-Eastern policy of Great Britain hinged on maintaining the organization of the Balkans as it had been determined by the Treaty of Bucharest ---a treaty which Turkey refused to regard as binding and which she was determined to upset. Above all, the Turks feared Russia in 1914, just as they had feared her ever since the days of Peter the Great. Russia was the historic enemy, the nation which had given freedom to Bulgaria and Rumania, which had been most active in dismembering the Ottoman Empire, and which regarded herself as the power that was ultimately to possess Constantinople. This fear of Russia, I cannot too much insist, was the one factor which, above everything else, was forcing Turkey into the arms of Germany. For more than half a century Turkey had regarded England as her surest safeguard against Russian aggression, and now England had become Russia's virtual ally. There was even then a general belief, which the Turkish chieftains shared, that England was entirely willing that Russia should inherit Constantinople and the Dardanelles.

I have no reason to doubt Morgenthau's understanding of the mindset of the triumvirate and other elites. That mindset could not have accepted the British. So, I see a lot of idle speculation in your theory.

Re: the turkish view

Art,

You are being unfair to me - and you are a friend. As a friend, please re-read what you have quoted. You have my statement wrong when you characterize that as stating: "NF, I think it is a great overstatement to say that the British dominated the Turkish govt for most of the 19th century!" I said before WWI. That did not mean forever before WWI. It did not mean for a century before WWI. It merely meant before WWI. In other words, it was indefinite. And, I should add that I mentioned French influence as well. So, I think you have stretched what I wrote.

In any event, I corrected the minor error in what I stated.

Re: the turkish view

Art,

The Ottomans might have sided with the British but, frankly, that would have done nothing about their concern about Russia, unless Britain was prepared to restrain Russia. I am not sure that would have worked.

Re: the turkish view

The British were prepared to constrain Russia; they had in the past. They had their own Great Game concerns about the Czar, you know.

The British were prepared to betray even their closer ally the French, too. The Kitchener Plan of 1914 was the create huge British armies which in summer 1916 would deliver the decisive blow against Germany, a purely British victory that would leave Britain to call all the shots in the post-war world (including regarding such French interests as the British were willing at that point to satisfy at no cost to themselves). Unfortunately, the French turned out to be bled far faster by Germany than Kitchener had calculated and troops were committed from late summer 1915. And of course Kitchener overestimated what the impact of the Kitchener Armies would be in any case (cf. the Somme in summer 1916, where they were destroyed). But that was the British plan. If the British were prepared to betray the French, they certainly were prepared to betray Russian interests if Turkey came over to them.

On all this see David M. French, British Strategy and War Aims, 1914-1916 (1986): quite shocking revelations from the archives.

The Enver govt, and the entire Middle East to this day, would have been better off choosing a different path than the aggressive one they chose. No one can know what would have happened. But as it turned out, by 1918, Turkey would have had a fresh and efficient and modern army facing exhausted Allies. As I said, those armed forces were powerful enough in 1915--even as things were--to (a) defeat a combined British-French fleet in the Dardaneles, (b) defeat totally a large British invasion of Gallipoli, and (c) defeat totally a large British force at Kut in Iraq.

And as for British policy, those two superbattleships being build for Turkey are a fact. They were almost complete in Sept. 1914. They would have changed the balance of power in Turkey's favor in the Black Sea, and the Aegean as well.

Re: thugs

Fahrettin,

The gang/thug thing was the assessment by the US Ambassador of the triumvirate rulers of the Ottoman Empire as they seized power before WWI. That is not an unusual description of people who seize power in a country, at least so far as I know. And, the violence they let loose within the country against the Christian population is consistent with that view of them.

The US was not trying to colonize Ottoman lands. The European powers were trying. The US, while it allied with Britain during WWI, neither declared war on the Ottoman Empire nor went to war against the Ottoman Empire.

I agree with you that the Ottoman Empire's aims in the war relate, in considerable part, to Russia. However, the Ottoman Empire would have been better off - looking back - having stayed out of the war, concentrating instead on solving the problems in the country including economic and political problems as earlier envisioned by the Young Turk revolution. As Enver Pasha declared in July of 1908: "To-day arbitrary government has disappeared. We are all brothers. There are no longer in Turkey Bulgarians, Greeks, Servians, Rumanians, Mussulmans, Jews. Under the same blue sky we are all proud to be Ottomans." (quoted from Ambassador Morgenthau's Story).

Instead, their government pursued a policy of war and which cost millions of lives including of more than a million Ottoman civilians accused of siding secretly with the Russians.

Re: the turkish view

NF, I think I quoted you pretty exactly about British alleged dominance of the Turkish govt in the 19th century:

Re: the turkish view (#131610)
by N. Friedman on January 31, 2009 at 9:43 AM
Art,

While the Karsh and Karsh are terrific scholars, I do note that at least one observer, US Ambassador Morgenthau, thought - if his book, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story, chronicling his time as ambassador is accurate - that the British dominated the governance of Ottoman Empire until the eve of WWI.

You weren't just quoting Morganthau, I think--you were accepting his judgment, yes?

I just wanted to correct the record, but this Turkey in 1914 stuff is all a minor dispute among friends, in which group I include both you and Fahrettin. Fahrettin said that the Enver triumvirate were thugs, and I responded that yes they were, and so were the British and the French. I think we are all agreed on this.

Re: the turkish view


Art,

Beginning with Napoleons invasion of Ottoman Egypt Turkey spent most of the 19th century dependant on Britain for survival especially through support against Russia. The price to be paid was an economic liberalism which prevented economic development. The embassadors of the major powers intervened in every decision the Ottoman government made. This ended at the beginning of WW 1 for the duration of the war. Turkish history does not record that the Brits disliked the young turks.
I was quoting Marx articles in the NY times during the Crimean war 1854, these are not ideological, he was trying to make money by selling articles to the US market. Trotsky was also working as a reporter, which was what I read. I shall quote Churchill (the world crisis 1911-1918 p 275) “The central point of all Pan-Turk schemes was the use of Germany to rid Turkey of the Russian danger...Turkey would secure in the moment of a German victory gains in territory and population in the Caucasus which would at least ward off the Russian danger for several generations.” So he accepts that Turkey was threatened, which is what every Turk would tell you anyway. And what Churchill describes as the Turkish war aims is exactly what happened.
I think you are making the mistake of seeing a Nazi Germany in everybody the US-British-French ever fought. I am afraid this was not so.
Of course one should be critical with ones own history. What I am telling you is historic revisionism, the official history dictated by Ataturk is extremely destuctive abou Ottoman policies which I think should be tretaed more mildly. The young Turks started as a very liberal movement. Preparing for WW 1 the British and the French dropped their support for Turkey, meaning the Turks would pay the price for Russian support of the allies. The consequence was the Balkan war of 1912 when territories which had been turkish populated since the 4th century and had a moslem majority were conquered by the Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians. Since these were claiming that they had “liberated their own occupied territories” the provisons of the 1907 Den Haag war convention did not apply, genocide against Turks was justified. Nobody opposed them. After what happened in the Balkan war in 1912 the young Tukrs most of whom were from the areas now lost, their relatives murdered, were desperate. All they did including war crimes was a consequence of this desperation. How about a critical look at western policies?
You must look at dreams of Turania from the view point that Turkey in 1914 alone was too weak to defend herself against Russia, but if Turkish speaking Asia would be added, the resulting state would be strong enough to continue to exist. Today we live on a different world, where the Europeans have stopped invading the rest of the world, such a state is not necessary for survival.
If the principle of Thucydides from 400 B.C.is that treaties are kept to only insofar as they express the current balance of power, how would the balance of power have been after the Russians won WW1? The British were building ships for Turkey in 1914 not our of friendship because that was how they made money.
Germany was not as good an ally of Turkey as you might think. The common German Turkish attempt to start a revolt against Britain in India collapsed because the Germany tried to dominate and the Turks would not accept this. After Russia collapsed the Gremans tried to keep all of Caucasia and a local war between Turkey and Germany erupted, where the British supported the Turks and this during WW1! It was not avery good time in history to live. It is also not true that there were no pro British voices in the government, finance minister Cavit (like nationalist theoretician Marcel Samuel Raphael Cohen, renamed Alp Tekin, one of the several very influential ethnic jews in the young turk movement who felt that only turkish nationalism would save the country they loved) resigned when Enver attacked Russia with German ships which replaced the Turkish boats paid for, which Britain kept, as a fait accompli and was convinced that he could not leave his responsibilities at such a critical time. Turkish nationalism was unlike German nationalism not an ethnic but political nationalism fighting for survival of the core coalition of the ottoman empire which redefined itself as Turkish.
What I wrote about the AKP is what the Turkish and German press write. Just acknowledge that a lot of people see it that way. The AKP is even more corrupt and incompetent as the secularists (ok, Turkey has a problem there) but economically and politically very succesful, the difference is western support. What I write is what the Turkish middle class thought at the time and think now. Enver was not reading Karsh to make his decisions. His view of the world was what I heard from my Grandfather who was a young lieutenant in WW1. Consider me as an original source.

thugs

ok the young turk triumvirate were thugs. what were the british french etc who had colonised the world and with the russians, greeks serbs bulgarians etc were trying to exterminate the turks?

Re: the turkish view

They are all thugs, Fahrettin--British, French, Russians, Turks. And none are victims. .

Enver had the choice of remaining a favored neutral, or else joining the Allies. Either would have been a far better choice for the Turkish government and its empire than joining Germany, and the British and French tried hard in autumn 1914 to make that happen. The reason Enver joined Germany is because he always favored the Germans from his time as military attache in Berlin, and because he believed German promises of a hugely-enhanced Ottoman power.

As for the British favoring Russia at Turkey's expense after 1910, I'll simply point out that the most obvious use for the two modern super-battleships which the British were building for Enver's govt in 1914 was to overawe the Russians in the Black Sea. These ships were hugely superior to anything the Russians would have had.

Re: the turkish view

Mr Friedman,

the young Turk government at first pursued a very liberal policy after 1908 but turned fascistic after the Balkan war 1912. 1912 is a key event without which Turkish policy after 1912 can not be understood. In 1912 the Britsh were making money by selling opium to China, a market they had forced by war to open. Would Mr Morgentau or any book in the english speaking world mention anything about the fact that the kaiser was fighting a war against a narco state? That is exactly the type of stuff which hits others.
The British decided to keep the warships before they knew that Turkey would side with the Germans, the Germans offered to compensate one of the reasons for Turkey joining them.
I remember reading in one of Churchills books that he felt it was Turkey's entrance in to WW1 which lengthened the war by 4 years and led to the Russian revolution. With other words, the war could have ended in 1915 and both sides might have made a compromise by which they partition Turkey among them.
There are in Turkey about 15 million people whose ancestors were from the Balkans, that was very painful. The loss of the Arab countries, basically because the British needed the oil, on the other side is not an emotional issue for Turks, more a good riddance feeling.

Re: the turkish view

Art,

I was not making the Ottoman Empire into victim. My point was to show what its leaders may have been thinking and also to provide some context which the diplomatic history does not reveal.

As for British influence, I did not say that Britain dominated Ottoman governance throughout the 19th Century. I said that Britain and France interfered in the country a lot during that period.

By way of example, I note now that they interfered in the country by pressing extremely hard for the Tanzimet reforms, despised by much the country's ruling class, a number of the Sultans and most especially the military, on the country. While there were, as you note, those in the country which supported the reforms - as noted in Bernard Lewis' famous book, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, that was not something the ruling class generally or even mostly embraced. And, those reforms, in fact, did not do what they were supposed to do anyway. Instead, they eliminated the few existing checks on authoritarian control of the country, which led towards the country's disintegration, as Lewis shows.

My point about dominance of Britain related to the period before WWI. You may, however, be correct that Britain's influence was less than I indicated, since Britain had allied itself with the party seen by the Ottoman Empire as its main enemy, Russia and since the British had substantial influence in Persia. I have re-examined Ambassador Morgenthau's Story and cannot find the portion which led to my noted comment that British was effectively the power behind the throne - or at least I cannot find the passage which led to my earlier comment. Absent a complete re-read of the book, my comment appears to include a mistake. So, I offer what appears below as a correction.

Morgenthau describes a country in somewhat the condition - only far worse off, as he saw it - of the American South immediately following the Civil War.

Of very important concern to the triumvirate, Britain allied itself with Russia. And, Russia was the main enemy of the Ottoman Empire. And, further, Britain's policy was for the support of the Treaty of Bucharest, which the Ottoman Empire wanted to ignore. Britain's policy supported pushing the Ottoman Empire out of Europe. And, the various European powers - but not Germany - had taken slices of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, Germany was the likely ally of the Ottoman Empire, since Germany's goals were consistent with those of the Ottoman Empire.

He also described the fact that, of all the European powers, only Germany had not taken a slice of the Ottoman Empire, which made the Germans, in the mind of the triumvirate, particularly attractive.

He also notes - although this is an aside - that the three leaders were basically thuggish gang leaders, only infinitely worse. They were ruthless and took advantage of the ignorance of their countrymen to gain power by any and all means.

In any event, as he describes it, the country desperately needed help to re-build and to re-cast its military into an effective force - something the Germans were pleased to do, since they wanted an ally to block transportation between Russia and her allies.

As for the Tanzimet reforms vis a vis European powers, the European powers did push hard for the reforms. The reason - in addition to the belief that the Ottoman Empire was unjust to its Christians and Jews - was to gain power over the country. Again, the policy was called "humanitarian intervention." Such can be found in the archives of the British and French government, as shown in Dadrian's book.

Re: the turkish view

NF, I think it is a great overstatement to say that the British dominated the Turkish govt for most of the 19th century! Movements such as the Tanzimat and the Young Turks were homegrown, and the British and French didn't like the latter--so how come they were in power? How come they were being courted in 1914? How come the British were building modern battleships for them in 1914?

The issue in any case is what motivated Enver and his government to act in November 1914. It will not do to see them as somehow victims of western aggression. They had goals, expansionist goals (and they were larger than mere revanchist goals), and they were being courted (not threatened) by both sides--which makes perfect strategic sense. I don't condemn those goals--as you know, my view is that every government has such goals. But these WERE the goals which the Germans held out to Enver--not "we will help you survive against those bad Western aggressors" but "we will help restore not merely Ottoman greatness but--in the Caucasus and central Asia at Russian expense--an imperium beyond what the Ottomans achieved," They offered an enlarged and even Turanian empire, founded with German aid. Enver went with the Germans. There were practically no voices in his government in favor of Britain and France. It was a voluntary decision, and the Turkish govt didn't act defensively.

As I said, this is not in my view to condemn them, or anyone. It is the way the world works.

Re: the turkish view

CORRECTION:

Delete the sentence that reads: "And, Germany offered great promise in that regard, not only to get rid of the French but to force the Russians back as well, all without the price of German interference in the country's internal affairs - including even against Christians."

Substitute the following:

And, Germany offered great promise in that regard, not only to get rid of the British and the French but to force the Russians back as well, all without the price of German interference in the country's internal affairs - including even against Christians.

Re: the turkish view

Art,

I was not making the Ottoman Empire into victim. My point was to show what its leaders may have been thinking and also to provide some context which the diplomatic history does not reveal.

As for British influence, I did not say that Britain dominated Ottoman governance throughout the 19th Century. I said that Britain and France interfered in the country a lot during that period.

By way of example, I note now that they interfered in the country by pressing extremely hard for the Tanzimet reforms, despised by much the country's ruling class, a number of the Sultans and most especially the military, on the country. While there were, as you note, those in the country which supported the reforms - as noted in Bernard Lewis' famous book, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, that was not something the ruling class generally or even mostly embraced. And, those reforms, in fact, did not do what they were supposed to do anyway. Instead, they eliminated the few existing checks on authoritarian control of the country, which led towards the country's disintegration, as Lewis shows.

My point about dominance of Britain related to the period before WWI. You may, however, be correct that Britain's influence was less than I indicated, since Britain had allied itself with the party seen by the Ottoman Empire as its main enemy, Russia and since the British had substantial influence in Persia. I have re-examined Ambassador Morgenthau's Story and cannot find the portion which led to my noted comment that British was effectively the power behind the throne - or at least I cannot find the passage which led to my earlier comment. Absent a complete re-read of the book, my comment appears to include a mistake. So, I offer what appears below as a correction.

Morgenthau describes a country in somewhat the condition - only far worse off, as he saw it - of the American South immediately following the Civil War.

Of very important concern to the triumvirate, Britain allied itself with Russia. And, Russia was the main enemy of the Ottoman Empire. And, further, Britain's policy was for the support of the Treaty of Bucharest, which the Ottoman Empire wanted to ignore. Britain's policy supported pushing the Ottoman Empire out of Europe. And, the various European powers - but not Germany - had taken slices of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, Germany was the likely ally of the Ottoman Empire, since Germany's goals were consistent with those of the Ottoman Empire.

He also described the fact that, of all the European powers, only Germany had not taken a slice of the Ottoman Empire, which made the Germans, in the mind of the triumvirate, particularly attractive.

He also notes - although this is an aside - that the three leaders were basically thuggish gang leaders, only infinitely worse. They were ruthless and took advantage of the ignorance of their countrymen to gain power by any and all means.

In any event, as he describes it, the country desperately needed help to re-build and to re-cast its military into an effective force - something the Germans were pleased to do, since they wanted an ally to block transportation between Russia and her allies.

As for the Tanzimet reforms vis a vis European powers, the European powers did push hard for the reforms. The reason - in addition to the belief that the Ottoman Empire was unjust to its Christians and Jews - was to gain power over the country. Again, the policy was called "humanitarian intervention." Such can be found in the archives of the British and French government, as shown in Dadrian's book.

Re: the turkish view

Dear Fahrettin,

1. 1914

Neither Marx nor Trotsky could read Turkish, they had no access to the archives, and what they say is highly ideological (Marxist, needless to say). They are contemporary witnesses to what Marxists thought at the time (1880s or 1914), but so what? What Marxists thought is not necessarily what was occurring. And they are 100 years out of date in terms of actual scholarly research. Their opinions are very very weak reeds on which to build a case.

The modern scholarship is not "the victors congratulating themselves." If you look at th Karshs' footnotes in the chapters I cite you will see the archival research and vast modern scholarship they cite. In 1914 Enver didn't act out of fear, and Turkey wasn't a victim.

You cite specific examples of Europeans violating treaties with Turkey, including over Cyprus. That is impressive evidence of foul play and allows a reasonable suspicion of treaties with the West.

But what you are saying is the principle of Thucydides from 400 B.C.: that treaties are kept to only insofar as they express the current balance of power. Okay--and here, at the same time, you admit that the Entente would have given Turkey the earth and the moon to stay out of WWI. Fahrettin, such a situation of enormous concessions to Turkey (including no doubt huge financial subventions) would have greatly strengthened Turkey, the YT government, and esp. the Turkish armed forces (because that's where most of the Allied money would have gone). Meanwhile, the Turkish Army even as it existed was ALREADY strong and modern enough in 1915 to defeat very large British armies both in Gallipoli AND in Iraq, and Turkey's modern mines and artillery were ALREADY strong enough to defeat a combined British AND French fleet equipped with modern battleships at the Dardenelles (early 1915). How much stronger would these forces have been later, after years of Allied money and technical support? I think that is the answer to the fear of treaties being violated.

Neither the Germans, nor the Entente, is blameless in the tragedy created in the Middle East. Things might well have been better if everything had been left under Turkish hegemony. (The same is true regarding Habsburg hegemony in important parts of southeastern Europe.)

BUT, Fahrettin, Enver Pasha and the Young Turk govt made a disastrous mistake in siding with Germany in November 1914. And the fact must be faced that they made the choice VOLUNTARILY, at a time when they were courted--COURTED not THREATENED--by the Entente. Moreover, modern research shows that they acted not from anxiety or fear of the West, but out of expansionism. Enver in particular had huge dreams of a "Turania" not unlike Fettullah Gulen. Also, Enver had been military attache in Berlin and was always enamored of Germany and its army, which made the Entente task of keeping Turkey at least neutral very difficult.

Like the British, the French, and the Israelis, the Turks need to acknowledge and take responsibility for their own catastrophic mistakes. In this way are lessons learned. There's enough blame to go around, but serious thinkers do not always seek to shift the blame elsewhere.

2. Regarding Iran, there is not the slightest evidence that the CIA secretly supported Khomeini, as you imply. On the contrary: all the evidence--and the terrible criticism that has been made in the U.S. for the past 30 years--is that the CIA blindly supported the SHAH, kept reporting to Carter that everything was okay, couldn't believe that a revolution was occurring.

3. Regarding the AKP, I'd like to see the evidence that the AKP was offering concessions to the West on the Aegean, on Kurdish autonomy, and Cyprus, and that these concessions were taken so seriously in Western foreign ministries that they decided to act, AND that the result was overt (or covert but detectable) Western interference in Turkish politics of such an extent that this interference swung the elections. Isn't it really the case that the secularists losts because (as you yourself admit) they were incompetent and corrupt? Isn't that a simpler explanation?

best,

Art

Re: the turkish view

Art,

1914

Marx and Trotsky are witnesses for what they aera was thinking, they give the information available at that point to the decision makers of the ottoman empire. Marx is objective and Trotsky, although he hated the tsars, shares their hate for the Turks, this is the point to be seen in what he wrote.

I have no doubt the British would have offered Enver the moon and the stars to keep Turkey out of WWI. The history of 19th century is a chronicle of treaties which held only until the next genocidal war against Turkey. The Istanbul treaty of 1898 regulating the status of Crete held until 1912. The London and Zurich treaties signed by Turkey, Greece and Britain of 1960 and 1961 regulating the status of Cyprus held until 1963. In 2004 Cyprus was admitted into the European Union although these treaties ban Cyprus from entering any international organisation where Turkey and Greece ar no members. Any treaty signed in 1914 would have held until the end of the war, where the victors would have partitioned Turkey. Enver would have been an idiot to trust the British. Russia was hated because the Russians had been working on the extermination of the Turkish people since 1774.

Egypt was Ottoman territory occupied against the wishes of her population by the British. What you call Turania are Turkish speaking countries which at that point had a common written language, until Stalin made local dialects like Tatar and Uzbek to written languages. Liberating them was no less a legitimate target than uniting the Italian, German, Greek and Slavonic speaking countries or the Jews in a common state. Because it did not work countless millions of these people were killed by the Soviets. China continues her brutal occupation of East Turkestan to today. Fethullah Gulens project is not bad because it wants to unite the Turks but because FG and his comrades are dangerous people for the rest of mankind.

What you call modern scholarship is the victors glorifying themselves, or have you seen a single book describing what the Christians of Europe have done to the Moslems of Europe? I have ordered the book you recommend.

US

We have different perceptions of the US. For you it is basically wise country acting rationally and trying to do good. For me the US culture works on quarterly targets, dealing with long range issues this creates when they arise, not very wise. This is how they bankrupted the world and produced all those nasty islamist movements. The policies of the cold war was an exception, from which we all benefitted.

The AKP offered the West concessions on subjects like Cyprus, the Eagean Sea conflict with Greece, Kurdish autonomy in Turkey and Armenian demands on Turkey as well as the prospect of moderate Islam taking taking control of the Middle East, preventing Iranian influence and ending the nuts’ fight against the West. The show Mr Erdogan made in Davos could be a part of this strategy or he could be pouring gas into the fire. No Turkish secularist will trust these people and possibly we know why. Of course the Turks voted for him, but it should be kept in mind that enormous sums fo money was and is mobilized by Arab countries and the West (by opening their markets, enabling economic growth) and this influences the voters. The war of the PKK which was financed by the West against secularist governments on the other hand practically bankrupted Turkey.

If the West is going to try to mend her relationship they will have to take the European moslems, which the Turkish secularists are more seriously. If they can’t even agree with us they will never reach anything with the asiatic polities like Iran.

Iran

The question is not whether Carter wanted the Ayatollahs but the extent to which he actually controlled what US governemt organisations were doing.

Re: the turkish view

Art,

While the Karsh and Karsh are terrific scholars, I do note that at least one observer, US Ambassador Morgenthau, thought - if his book, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story, chronicling his time as ambassador is accurate - that the British dominated the governance of Ottoman Empire until the eve of WWI, at which point the British were tossed out. Moreover, the Germans had, as Vahakn Dadrian has shown, supported Ottoman aims secretly over the course of many decades - going back even towards the middle of the 19th Century.

So, on throwing the UK out - who had meddled in the Ottoman affairs incessantly - it was not at all unnatural or, without the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, unreasonable for the Ottoman Empire to ally themselves with those who supported them and who had not, up to that point anyway, projected power against Ottoman internal aims or, for the most part, external aims.

Recall that the British and the French treated the Ottoman Empire as they treat Israel today - both badmouthing the country's governance while seeking to undermine the country by championing the rights of various Christian groups. The goal was to gain dominant influence in the region by means of the policy formula of "humanitarian intervention." And, Britain and France were rather successful in its policy. This policy, no doubt, was resented bitterly by the Ottoman government - whether under the Sultans or under the triumvirate rulers during WWI.

You will also recall that Germans put a lot of energy into supporting the Sultan. In fact, the Kaiser was enamored of the Ottoman political system, which gave the Sultan a rather strong hand in the country - given that he was both political and religious leader. The Kaiser thought that such a system would be great for his country (and him) as well.

So, while the Karsh and Karsh's book no doubt accurately reflects the diplomacy, the Ottoman Empire was being pushed, by means of overbearing British and French behavior, toward attempting to counter such influences. And, Germany offered great promise in that regard, not only to get rid of the French but to force the Russians back as well, all without the price of German interference in the country's internal affairs - including even against Christians. And, on top of that, the Germans did not oppose aims to unite Turkish speaking peoples - one of the long standing ideas floating in the Ottoman Empire for re-establishing the empire given its ongoing losses of territory in Europe - in that the Germans were not allied with the Russians.

While I think that there was really very good reason to object strongly to the governance of the Ottoman Empire, whether under the Sultans or after the Young Turk revolution, most particularly for its behavior towards non-Muslims, wanting to be rid of Britain seems a logical place to turn for the Ottoman Empire.

I might also note that, as Ambassador Morgenthau mentions in his book, there was a sense of achieving the desired freedom in the early portion of the war.

I also do not discount Fahrettin's point - although I would not agree with all of his facts - that, from the perspective of the Ottoman Empire, they were in a losing fight for physical survival, having lost war after war in what they perceived to be core Ottoman territory, not to mention all the losses in Russian territory, with the result that millions and millions of people became refugees and very large numbers of people were dying in losing battles.

Re: the turkish view

Fahrettin:

1. 1914

The problem with depending on Marx and Trotsky for your understanding of the wars of the 1880s or the crisis of 1914 is that they are fully 100 years out of date, and very biased. Trotsky, for instance, hated the Czarist regime, and all capitalist states anyway. They did not have access to the Turkish govt archives.

You need to read Chapters 7 and 8 of Efraim and Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923 (Harvard University Press, 1999). There you will find, on the basis of archival evidence, that Enver Pasha in 1914 rejected many French and English offers to stay out of WWI, and concluded a wartime treaty of alliance with Germany which was extraordinarily favorable to Turkey, foreseeing the return of Turkish dominance in southeast Europe, the destruction of Enver's hated Russia, and the extension of Turkish control throughout "Turania" . Uppermost in Enver's plans was an expedition to reconquer Egypt with German help. Enver's actions "were motivated not by a sense of anxiety and fear but by pure expansionism."

You have got to catch up with modern scholarship on this no doubt painful subject.

The conclusion of mdoern scholarship is that the irresponsible actions of the Turkish govt resulted in catastrophe not just for Turkey but for the entire Middle East. If Turkey had stayed out of WWI, or had sided with the Allies, they would have paid much money to modernize the Turkish armed forces and there is no reason to suppose a Turkish Empire on the victorious side (or even as a powerful neutral) would have suffered in the aftermath.

2. The U.S. did not want the Shah overthrown. The Carter administration did not support the Shah as much as it should have, but it was taken by surprise by events (in the U.S., this is one of the most notorious CIA failures in history), and it was at the beginning naive about Khomeini. Carter was weak, a terrible President. But he was not in favor of Khomeini's revolution.

3. As with N.F., I am skeptical of the idea that the Bush administration welcomed (let alone helped engineer) the rise of the AKP. The Bush administration was fighting a worldwide war against Islamism, of which the AKP is an example. If their plan was to allow the AKP to come to power and expand into "Turania" as Fethullah Gulen wishes (see Enver Pasha's dreams above), and then attempt to crush it, this was indeed (as N.F. says) extraordinarily stupid.

But all you have about U.S. being behind the AKP is "circumstantial evidence" (as you admit), and it is of a very vague sort (so it seems to me). I could be wrong, but I doubt that the Bush Admin was much involved in the rise of the AKP. Once more, it seems to me, the Turkish situation is primarily caused by the Turks, by developments within Turkish society and politics, not by. outsiders.

I admit I could be wrong. To argue that anything was "too stupid" for the Bush Administration to have done is, well, not a strong argument. But I would need much more evidence on this. On the moment I am doubtful of your hypothesis, Fahrettin, but I assure you that I can be convinced.