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Howard,

It might help if you read more carefully the position I asserted. The notion that Islam is properly the property of all of mankind that ought be spread, as a communal - and I used the word communal intentionally - activity, is not a recent view. It is the mainstream view and has been for more than a millennium.

What follows is the formulation as set forth by, among others, famed Islamicist Ignaz Goldhizer(d. 1921):

In addition to the religious duties imposed upon each individual professing Islam, the collective duty of the "jihad" (= "fighting against infidels") is imposed on the community, as represented by the commander of the faithful. Mohammed claimed for his religion that it was to be the common property of all mankind, just as he himself, who at first appeared as a prophet of the Arabs, ended by proclaiming himself the prophet of a universal religion, the messenger of God to all humanity, or, as tradition has it, "ila al-aḥmar wal-aswad" (to the red and the black). For this reason unbelief must be fought with the force of weapons, in order that "God's word may be raised to the highest place." Through the refusal to accept Islam, idolaters have forfeited their lives. Those "who possess Scriptures" ("ahl al-kitab"), in which category are included Jews, Christians, Magians, and Sabians, may be tolerated on their paying tribute ("jizyah") and recognizing the political supremacy of Islam (sura ix. 29). The state law of Islam has accordingly divided the world into two categories: the territory of Islam ("dar al-Islam") and the territory of war. ("dar al-ḥarb"), i.e., territory against which it is the duty of the commander of the faithful ("amir al-mu'minin") to lead the community in the jihad.

Are you really saying that Goldhizer is wrong? Note, that he is as close to being an apologist for Islam while being honest as anyone who ever lived. And, he is surely one of the greatest scholars of Islam who ever lived.

Maybe, you do not believe him. I, for one, do, having studied Islam's theology and having found it fascinating. I might recommend that you pick up a book of the writings of Muslim theologians on Jihad. If you did, you would not write what you wrote.

As for your comment that bringing religion into this is pointless, my view is that careful description of phenomena is important. In this case, understanding that we are dealing with people drunk on religion is not just a fact, it is likely the most important fact about the dispute.

Addressing the point you mistakenly associated with my analysis - i.e. Qutbism -, while the view that individual Jihad is contrary to Islam has a theological basis, history tells a very, very different story. In this regard, you might read Patricia Crone's book Gods Rule: Government and Islam. She notes Jihadis living on the border of Islamic territory and conducting regular raids into non-Muslim - most especially Christian ruled - territory. Such was not limited to a few years but went on over the course of centuries at a time.

Such razzia, in fact, often occurred against the wishes of the Caliph. Other writers have noted such razzia including, rather regularly, from Andalusia into France.

In my view, the non-Muslim regions, in fact, face people employing tactics rather similar to razzia. And, the razzia traces all the way back to the time of the Prophet.

It might help my being more responsive if you were to speak not so much from your own knowledge of my reading -- of which you have none -- but from your own experience and interpretation. Do not assume that I necessarily will agree with you, or believe you paid attention to what I said. Nevertheless, paying respect is an excellent starting point for discussion.

In point of fact, I have read quite a bit of Muslim theology about both the lesser and greater jihad. You yourself cite razzia as actions not approved by Sunni leadership. In point of fact, no, I do not accept Goldhizer as definitive. His particular interpretation of jihad is consistent with Mahdist or Qutbist views, among others, but is by no means universal. I do not disagree that the idea of inclusion of all within the dar il Islam is theologically desirable; I do disagree that it is mainstream Islam, even within Sunni'a, that the conversion must be forced. You yourself cite raids as opposed to actions of a civilization (i.e., war).

My comment about religion was that Islam is not unique in having branches that support violent conversion.

Under the Caliphate, how is something mainstream that was disapproved? Is this your form of ijtihad?

It might help my being more responsive if you were to speak not so much from your own knowledge of my reading -- of which you have none -- but from your own experience and interpretation. Do not assume that I necessarily will agree with you, or believe you paid attention to what I said. Nevertheless, paying respect is an excellent starting point for discussion.

In point of fact, I have read quite a bit of Muslim theology about both the lesser and greater jihad. You yourself cite razzia as actions not approved by Sunni leadership. In point of fact, no, I do not accept Goldhizer as definitive. His particular interpretation of jihad is consistent with Mahdist or Qutbist views, among others, but is by no means universal. I do not disagree that the idea of inclusion of all within the dar il Islam is theologically desirable; I do disagree that it is mainstream Islam, even within Sunni'a, that the conversion must be forced. You yourself cite raids as opposed to actions of a civilization (i.e., war).

My comment about religion was that Islam is not unique in having branches that support violent conversion.

Under the Caliphate, how is something mainstream that was disapproved? Is this your form of ijtihad?

Howard,

You write: "In point of fact, no, I do not accept Goldhizer as definitive. His particular interpretation of jihad is consistent with Mahdist or Qutbist views, among others, but is by no means universal."

Well, Goldhizer died in 1921 long before Qutb wrote his rants. Goldhizer's view has exactly nothing to do with Qutb - if you have actually read Goldhizer. You might consider examining Goldhizer's well known book Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law. As William Montgomery Watt, also considered, until his recent death, rather enamored of Islam, notes in his book Islamic Philosophy and Theology: An Extended Survey, that the breadth of Goldhizer's scholarship is boundless.

Moreover, Goldhizer considered himself a champion of Islam, having been the first non-Muslim ever to have permitted to study at Al-Azhar. More than that, he was known to pray with Muslims, notwithstanding the fact that he never converted.

As for Mahdism and Goldhizer, you are mistaken. Consider that the famed historian and sociologist Ibn Khaldun wrote tracts in opposition to Mahdism (See Timothy Furnish's recent book Holiest Wars: Islamic Mahdis, their Jihads and Osama bin Laden) - and, in fact, Khaldun's arguments are still asserted today by Sunnis who oppose Mahdism - yet, at the same time, he had this to say about spreading Islam:

In the Muslim community, holy war is a religious duty, because of the universalism of the (Muslim) mission and (the obligation to) convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force. Therefore, caliphate and royal authority are united (in Islam), so that the person in charge can devote the available strength to both of them (religion and politics) at the same time.

Khaldun, a non-Mahdist of great brilliance and fame - to say the least -, evidently agrees more with Goldhizer than with you. Bernard Lewis, in his masterful work The Muslim Discovery of Europe, also agrees with the more apologetic Goldhizer. Explaining the basic Islamic conception, Lewis writes:

"In the Muslim world view the basic division of mankind is into the House of Islam (Dār al-Islām) and the House of War (Dar al-Harb). The one consists of all those countries where the law of Islam prevails, that is to say, broadly, the Muslim Empire; the latter is the rest of the world. Just as there is only one God in heaven, so there can be only one sovereign and one law on earth. Ideally, the House of Islam is conceived as a single community, governed by a single state, headed by a single sovereign. This state must tolerate and protect those unbelievers who are brought by conquest under its rule, provided, of course, that they are not polytheists but followers of one of the permitted religions. The logic of Islamic law, however, does not recognized the permanent existence of any other polity outside Islam. In time, in the Muslim view, all mankind will accept Islam or submit to Islamic rule. In the meantime, it is a religious duty of Muslims to struggle until this end is accomplished.

The name given by the Muslim jurists to this struggle is jihād, an Arabic word meaning effort or striving. One who performs this duty is called mujāhid. The word occurs several times in the Qur'ān in the sense of making war against the unbelievers. In the early centuries of Islamic expansion, this was its normal meaning. Between the House of Islam and the House of War there was, according to the sharī‘a, the Holy Law as formulated by the classical jurists, a state of war religiously and legally obligatory, which could end only with the conversion or subjugation of all mankind. A treaty of peace between the Muslim state and a non-Muslim state was thus in theory juridically impossible. The war, which would end only with the universal triumph of Islam, could not be terminated; it could only be interrupted for reasons of necessity or of expediency by a truce. Such a truce, according to the jurists, could only be provisional. It should not exceed ten years and could, at any time, be repudiated unilaterally by the Muslims who, however, were obliged by Muslim law to give the other side due notice before resuming hostilities."

Lewis goes on to indicate that the Shari'a law's requirements (and its attendant theology) did not always match the reality of what occurred and that other arrangements, supplementing the House of War and House of Islam, such as the House of Covenant, eventually arose.

As for Jihad, Lewis notes that the classical conception came to be seen, for a while, as a more millennial view (perhaps akin to one-time classical Jewish tradition, pre-Israel, of next year in Jerusalem - with next year being some distant future time). Such view was prevalent during the latter time of the Abbassid dynasty, when Muslims were under threat from all sides so that the notion of spreading the faith was rather unrealistic. However, the millennial view did not persist long, especially but not only with the rise of the Gazis - known more to history as the Ottoman Turks - who rekindled Jihad to conquer, most specifically, Europe.

In any event, the view regarding the basic theological and legal requirement to spread Islamic rule is still taught in places like al-Azhar. So, I cannot imagine the basis for your opinion.

You will note, further, that Goldhizer does not quite speak about forced conversions of Jews and Christians - only of people who lacked a revealed prophesy. Interestingly, historian Patricia Crone notes that, notwithstanding the commonly asserted view that Muslims did not force Jews and Christians to convert, the record shows rather plainly that such did sometimes occur.

You may say - which is correct - that Islam has no Pope or the like who states what is and is not Islam but some elements of Islam are rather well established and beyond much question. In this regard, you might consider that classical Judaism does not have a Pope or the like but during the classical period it would be rather foolish to claim that there Kashrut laws are not part of it.

And, notwithstanding your protest to the contrary, Islam is about as evangelical a faith as has ever existed. And, its teachings are rather blunt regarding the justification to use force in order to spread Muslim rule from the black to the red.

Note also that Goldhizer did not say that everyone must convert, as your comment suggests. Nor did he indicate that Jihad has only one meaning. He was writing about the religious command to spread Muslim rule. That, frankly, is the Jihad which, to non-Muslims, matters.

You write: "I do not disagree that the idea of inclusion of all within the dar il Islam is theologically desirable"

What do you mean? Are you saying that you would like to live as a non-Muslim in a Muslim country under Islamic rule? I really do not follow what you have in mind.

So far as understanding Jihad fi sabil Allah (i.e. Jihad war or, literally, Jihad in the path of Allah), I would recommend two books that might cure your naivety. The first is David Cook's brilliant Understanding Jihad. It is a masterful survey of the origins and development of the Jihad war and its ongoing significance. The second, which is not good history but which, within the book, includes a section that consists of translations of tracts by dozens of famed Islamic scholars on the issue of Jihad - from writers such Avicenna to al-Ghazali to, while probably not as great a thinker, the Ayatollah Khomeini -. It is called The Legacy of Jihad and it is by a professor of Medicine named Andrew Bostom. Some of the tracts included in the book have there own surveys of the views of their predecessors.

Now, you are correct that not all Muslims favor war to spread the faith. But, such is clearly the dominant view over the course of the religion's history. I might add, Islam is certainly not alone in holding itself the one true faith that is the property of mankind. That is also basically the classical Christian view. Where Christianity differs from Islam, I think, is that the view opposing the use of force to spread Christianity has strong support in the religious writings and in actual practice - most especially after the Crusade period - while, in Islam, the view to spread Muslim rule by force, as David Cook notes, takes up around 20% of all ahaditha - an astounding amount of religious writing on war - while the Koran itself is rather emphatic of the command to use force generally speaking (and not merely in connection with a specific circumstance) and, most especially, during the latter - and, hence, more important, so far as Islamic theology is concerned - period of the Prophet's life. And, in practice, the view opposing Jihad as war has not had great significance over the course of Islam's history.

I will turn the tables and ask that you read what I actually wrote,

"I do not disagree that the idea of inclusion of all within the dar il Islam is theologically desirable"

"What do you mean? Are you saying that you would like to live as a non-Muslim in a Muslim country under Islamic rule? I really do not follow what you have in mind."

That is correct. You do not follow what I have in mind. I spoke of something theologically desirable through Muslim beliefs. I am not a Muslim, so where do you get the idea that I want to live under Islamic rule?

What I stated is that there is a broad Muslim desire to bring non-Muslims into that religion. The desire for Sha'ria is not a given, although that certainly is the position of a great many Muslims.

Given that you have not offered any particular credentials, but continue to condescend about things such as my "naivete", no thank you as far as your book recommendations. I hear you as in belief that you are universally right and no one who does not agree with you could possibly have anything to contribute. Since I look at this forum as a place for a courteous exchange of views among historians, goodbye.

Howard,

You are free to read what you like.

I asked you what you meant because your words were insufficiently clear. Now, you reply, "What I stated is that there is a broad Muslim desire to bring non-Muslims into that religion. The desire for Sha'ria is not a given, although that certainly is the position of a great many Muslims," which is perfectly clear.

I think you are correct about the above, for what it is worth. However, the desire to have other people join the faith is, after all, part and parcel of Islamic evangelicalism aka Jihad and dawa.

I am certainly not forcing you to speak. And, I was not being condescending. I sensed substantial ignorance on your part.

As for desire for Shari'a, in Egypt, the PA and Jordan, the group desiring Shari'a law is, if we believe the polling, 65%. That figure comes via Martin Kramer. That suggests that quite a large group has rather traditional Islamic views. Do you not think so?


"And, I was not being condescending. I sensed substantial ignorance on your part." Oh? How is this not condescending, given that you have no idea of my background? The only data you have is that some of my ideas differ from yours. That would seem to suggest that you consider your views on Islam, to use a delightfully mixed metaphor, are ex cathedra and infallible; any with the temerity to disagree are ignorant and wrong.

As to polling, without extensive methodological data, I do not consider it likely that standard opinion polling is statistically valid in a society that does not assume freedom of expression. Going back 30 years or so, I did software support of "opinion polls" of villagers in Vietnam, and saw the principal investigator produce ludicrous results. So, as a general statement, I do not give any credibility to polls of Muslims in nondemocratic societies.

To take your example of "Egypt, the PA and Jordan", even if the respondents answered honestly to well-designed questions, which indeed might be the case in Jordan, I'd have to see the statistical methodology by which the results from these three significantly different populations were combined.

I am perfectly willing and eager to have a substantive discussion, but one of the prerequisites to such is that the participants respect one another sufficiently to believe that each may bring something to the table.

Howard,

As for polling, note that I said "if we believe the polling" - and, if you read my other comments, you will see that I have been rather critical of polling in the Muslim regions, most recently polling that showed FATAH winning a substantial victory (which, as you know, did not occur) and polling showing that a reformer might win the Iranian election (which also did not materialize) but also, more generally, polling in societies where public consensus tends to stifle critical debate -. So, I think you are on to something.

On the other hand, the polling is rather consistent with how people in that part of the world actually vote. Such is clearly the case in Egypt as well as in the PA. And, it is certainly consistent with religious revivalism which has swept the Muslim regions. If people vote for Islamist parties, would they not also favor the program espoused by such parties? And, is it not the case that the understanding the rulers of the various Muslim countries have taken from the "street" is that people want Islamic law? In this regard, I note that there has been a clear trend across that region to make Islam a basis and, as of late, "the" basis for any laws. How is the current situation any different - except by degree and the fact that, unlike in the past, there had been, for some time, an absence of Shari'a - from the idea behind customary law that existed in the Ottoman Empire which, in effect, developed a common law from the Shari'a?

As for having a discussion, I certainly take your ideas seriously. On the other hand, the view that the dominant view over the ages among Muslims has not been consistent with the general formula noted by Ibn Khaldun is difficult to argue factually. I certainly agree that there have been different views but even more or less apologetic writers such as Reza Aslan concede the classical, mainstream view involves Jihad to extend Islam's rule. I am thus ask that you provide evidence showing that Khaldun, Ignaz Goldhizer, Avicenna, al-Ghazali and Bernard Lewis' understand of the mainstream view is wrong such that the pro-Jihad strain of thought is one among many mainstream views held by the bulk of Muslim scholars. My contention is that the pro-Jihad view is the mainstream view (e.g. the view taught at al-Azhar University to this day) although there have been, as in all religions, those who reject the mainstream position.


You observe, "On the other hand, the polling is rather consistent with how people in that part of the world actually vote. Such is clearly the case in Egypt as well as in the PA."

Depends what you mean by voting. Ironically, the PA elections probably were more fair than those in Egypt, if for no other reason than no PA faction was able to control the elections. Modern Egypt has not yet had free and fair elections, compared with those Maghreb states that have been independently judged to have open multiparty elections.

"And, it is certainly consistent with religious revivalism which has swept the Muslim regions. If people vote for Islamist parties, would they not also favor the program espoused by such parties?"

Revivalism that has swept "the Muslim regions?" Indonesia is not Islamist, although it has the largest Muslim population of any state. I've mentioned Maghreb voting. Turkey is a special case, in that the Army acts as a guarantor of secularism.

Is Lebanon a "Muslim region"? Kuwait has an increasingly open political process; why, then, are women taking an increasing role?

"And, is it not the case that the understanding the rulers of the various Muslim countries have taken from the "street" is that people want Islamic law?"

Not necessarily. I have not noted the governments of Syria, Egypt or Saudi Arabia being terribly concerned with the wishes of the street. I don't agree there has been a "clear trend" to Islamicize, but I don't necessarily understand what you mean by "the region". Arab? Middle Eastern including what -- Persian, Turkic, Maronite, Druze? Central Asian? Maghreb?

"I am thus ask that you provide evidence showing that Khaldun, Ignaz Goldhizer, Avicenna, al-Ghazali and Bernard Lewis' understand of the mainstream view is wrong such that the pro-Jihad strain of thought is one among many mainstream views held by the bulk of Muslim scholars." I'm willing to go with one of many. Since disproof can be no more than one example, I suggest that such evidence lies in the rejection of some of the more extreme forms of the lesser jihad, such as Qutbism, or the substitution of lesser jihad for the Haj in al-Turabi's version of Mahdist thought.

Howard,

You write: "Depends what you mean by voting. Ironically, the PA elections probably were more fair than those in Egypt, if for no other reason than no PA faction was able to control the elections. Modern Egypt has not yet had free and fair elections, compared with those Maghreb states that have been independently judged to have open multiparty elections."

I do not take any of these elections to be free by Western standards. And, I include the PA elections. Elections in that part of the world fit the pattern of consensus coercion events, which, in turn, is a product of a society defined primarily by religious conceptions.

You write: "Revivalism that has swept "the Muslim regions?" Indonesia is not Islamist, although it has the largest Muslim population of any state. I've mentioned Maghreb voting. Turkey is a special case, in that the Army acts as a guarantor of secularism."

Fair enough with respect to Indonesia. And, it does have a large Muslim population, as you say. I had in mind places like Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, etc., etc.

You write: "Is Lebanon a "Muslim region"? Kuwait has an increasingly open political process; why, then, are women taking an increasing role?"

Lebanon's modern origins relate to protecting the Maronite Christians. However, its Muslim population has grown dramatically. At this point, it is unclear whether it can be called a Muslim land although, no doubt, factions within the Muslim population would prefer it to be part of the House of Islam.

You write: Not necessarily. I have not noted the governments of Syria, Egypt or Saudi Arabia being terribly concerned with the wishes of the street. I don't agree there has been a "clear trend" to Islamicize, but I don't necessarily understand what you mean by "the region". Arab? Middle Eastern including what -- Persian, Turkic, Maronite, Druze? Central Asian? Maghreb?

In Egypt, Islam has been made, as of late, the sole basis on which legislation may be made. In Saudi Arabia, that has always been the case. In Iran, that is now the case. In Pakistan, such is also the case. That will certainly be the case in whatever government arises in Iraq - at least in the Shi'a and Sunni portions. Etc., etc. Syria remains somewhat more secular although that most likely is a product of the waning Ba'athist movement and the fact that the ruler is neither Shi'a nor Sunni and thus protects his rule by suppressing such movements.

You write: I'm willing to go with one of many. Since disproof can be no more than one example, I suggest that such evidence lies in the rejection of some of the more extreme forms of the lesser jihad, such as Qutbism, or the substitution of lesser jihad for the Haj in al-Turabi's version of Mahdist thought.

Your view appears to be that because some Islamic scholars reject the mainstream view, such fact shows that such aberrant positions were or are part of the mainstream view. I propose two points in response. ONE: your position is not logical if the intent is to show that such exceptional views are part of the mainstream; and TWO your argument proves my point.

Consider this analogy to understand my first point. There were Jewish scholars pre-20th Century who rejected aspects of legalism (e.g. the Hasidim) but, beyond all doubt, the mainstream view at that time was legalism, not the Hasidic view. I trust you know this to be the case. Which is to say, the fact that there are exceptions does not disprove the existence of a mainstream view. I might also add: the Hasidim were and are a much, much larger movement than the few exceptions you assert yet they were certainly not the mainstream.

The pertinent logic expression applicable to your argument is exceptio probat regulam in casibus non exceptis? That is, more or less, the exception proves the rule. I am referring to the mainstream, not an unanimous view. So, the expression is exactly applicable.

I was referring to communal activity to spread the faith and, if necessary, by violence. Such is the mainstream view in the Muslim regions and always has been. That is true whether or not one treats Jihad as a substitute for the Hajj. That is true whatever the view taken by Qutb.

Again, the mainstream is not any less a mainstream due to the existence of exceptions. That is a matter of simple logic. And, by extension, if there is a position held by a small group, then such position is not part of the mainstream.


CORRECTION:
remove the question mark from the sentence that reads: "The pertinent logic expression applicable to your argument is exceptio probat regulam in casibus non exceptis"

May I propose refocus from an area where we, at best, can agree to disagree? I suggest that if one postulates that the majority of Muslims are threats, rigid containment is perhaps the most ethical of bad alternatives.

If, however, there are more tolerant subgroups, and these, as I contend, are not an insignificant number (especially outside the Middle East), there is a potential benefit to engaging and encouraging them. From my direct experience, that does characterize a fair number of Muslims from subsaharan Africa, an area where decisions are still being made.

Howard,

I certainly agree that there are Muslims who have no interest in fighting anyone. And, I have no problem being supportive of people who reject Jihad or want to treat the Prophet's injunction to make the entire world into the House of Islam as being something postponed into a millennial project.

My view, nonetheless, differs radically from yours. My contention is that religion is among history's most significant forces - usually an irrational force as seen by those not party to the faith.

I have no expectation - although obviously I would prefer if it could be achieved - of convincing people who adopt a religious cause to change that cause and I have no expectation of convincing other members of the faith to do it for me, especially when the position taken by the objectionable group is legitimate in that religion's tradition - something that you would have to concede if you say that it is an accepted strain of Islamic thought.

As I see it, whether or not there may or may not be peaceful strains of Islam is largely irrelevant. What matters is that the strain that advocates war is perceived to be legitimate, which it is, and has a large number of followers - with those taking the opposite point of view considered the enemy based on the takfir argument that traces its origins at least to the Kharajites.

You will note that thus far, there has been basically an absence of Muslim theological opposition in the Muslim regions to the effect that Jihad is illegitimate or that the spread of Islam ought be postponed to some distant date - akin to "Next year in Jerusalem," as Jews used to say in a non-political manner. [Note: this is not to suggest that no one objects to the tactics of the Jihadists but, rather that opposition to the Jihadists' basic goals is hard to find and is certainly not sustain or substantial.]

I would contrast my point with the position adopted by many Sunni theological scholars with respect to the coming of a Mahdi. While numerous Sunnis have claimed to be the Mahdi (or have been proclaimed the Mahdi by followers), there has pretty much always been sharp theological attacks by Sunnis against the notion of any Mahdi. Which is to say, there is a substantial counterargument that might be raised by any Muslim who opposes anyone claiming to be a Mahdi. That, unfortunately, cannot be said about a Muslim who advocates Jihad as a war of conquest.

For example, when there was an alleged Mahdi in Saudi Arabia (i.e. in connection with the capture, back in 1979, of the Grand Mosque), sharp theological arguments opposed to Mahdism were presented by clerics and in newspapers. See the discussion on this point in Timothy Furnish's book Holiest Wars.

By contrast, no sustained theological argument has been raised in opposition to the Jihadists. The reason why, frankly, is that the position taken by the Jihadists is entirely legitimate in the Islamic tradition while the view that Jihad for conquest has no place has no strong tradition. As a result, it is rather difficult to argue against someone who accepts Jihadism. In fact, it is a fruitless endeavor well worth trying but almost surely destined to fail.

Again: we are dealing with religion. Those who might prefer tolerance towards others, if they challenge the Jihadists, become enemies and targets of the Jihadists. They are, in Western parlance, excommunicated and in essence apostates who deserve to be killed, by the reckoning of the Jihadists. And, the argument favoring Jihad is sufficiently strong that I do not imagine Jihadists succumbing to rational argument - although, I favor anything that works so if you can make it work, go for it.


I would agree that rational argument will not work with present Jihadists. My point in identifying alternative within Islam is to work strategically in strengthening ideas that may reduce the future supply of those causing problems.

There are times and targets that can only be solved with superior firepower. There are others that are a longer-term prospect. I hope it isn't too tangential, but the long-term problem does include such things as better language and area studies instruction in the US. While it's something of a tempest in a teapot when it comes to having JROTC in high schools, I'd far rather see the same budget go to "hard" language instruction.

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