Michael Lind: History shows that piecemeal reform is better than a Big Bang
In its push to solve the long-term problems of U.S. healthcare and energy in only a few months by means of comprehensive reform legislation, the Obama administration and the Democratic majority could be inspired by the story of Henry Clay's success in framing the Compromise of 1850. In the greatest feat of his long career in American politics, the great Kentucky senator put together a comprehensive package of reforms that won bipartisan support, resolved outstanding issues about slavery and the territories annexed from Mexico after the Mexican War of 1846-48, and saved the Union from civil war for a decade.
At least that's how the Compromise of 1850 tends to be remembered. But it's the political equivalent of false memory syndrome. In fact, things didn't work out that way. Clay's original omnibus bill was defeated in the Senate. Clay had a nervous breakdown. Another senator, Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois (Lincoln's famous rival), broke the omnibus bill into five separate bills. Each of the five bills was passed with a different majority. One of them -- the Fugitive Slave Act, which required all U.S. citizens to assist in the apprehension of runaway slaves -- was a moral and political monstrosity. And a decade later, civil war came anyway.
But there's no need to turn to the 19th century to learn to be cautious about giant, complicated, omnibus pieces of legislation that are supposed to solve multiple problems at the same time and for a long time to come. Our own era offers its own cautionary lessons about "comprehensive reform."
Remember the comprehensive immigration reform of 2006? It was a typical piece of comprehensive legislation designed to solve many problems all at once, from the legalization of illegal immigrants in the U.S. to sweeping reforms of legal immigration categories. As the legislation worked its way through Congress, it got worse and worse, as one lobby after another insisted on particular provisions. The final version would have resembled the definition of a camel as a horse designed by committee, if camels had three heads and legs on only one side.
The comprehensive immigration reform bill, praised by the Democratic leaders of Congress and defended by the mindless partisan progressive echo chamber in the media, was a horror. What should have been a simple, straightforward path to legal status for millions of legal immigrants had morphed into a Kafkaesque system that would require 11 years at a minimum for amnestied illegal immigrants to become U.S. citizens. Even worse, at the last minute, the U.S. business community managed to insert a provision creating an entirely new category of "guest workers" -- in reality, indentured servants -- who could be brought in as a scab army to undercut the wages and unionization activities of U.S. citizen-workers and legal immigrants (including amnestied immigrants). At the price of gaining business support, Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi agreed to the flooding of the labor market by several hundred thousand of these new business serfs a year.
Fortunately, the immigration reform bill collapsed under its own grotesque complexity. Trying to please every special interest, it alienated enough special interests -- labor on the left, nativists on the right -- that it died for lack of support in Congress.
Will comprehensive energy reform and comprehensive healthcare reform suffer the fate of comprehensive immigration reform? It seems increasingly likely....
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At least that's how the Compromise of 1850 tends to be remembered. But it's the political equivalent of false memory syndrome. In fact, things didn't work out that way. Clay's original omnibus bill was defeated in the Senate. Clay had a nervous breakdown. Another senator, Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois (Lincoln's famous rival), broke the omnibus bill into five separate bills. Each of the five bills was passed with a different majority. One of them -- the Fugitive Slave Act, which required all U.S. citizens to assist in the apprehension of runaway slaves -- was a moral and political monstrosity. And a decade later, civil war came anyway.
But there's no need to turn to the 19th century to learn to be cautious about giant, complicated, omnibus pieces of legislation that are supposed to solve multiple problems at the same time and for a long time to come. Our own era offers its own cautionary lessons about "comprehensive reform."
Remember the comprehensive immigration reform of 2006? It was a typical piece of comprehensive legislation designed to solve many problems all at once, from the legalization of illegal immigrants in the U.S. to sweeping reforms of legal immigration categories. As the legislation worked its way through Congress, it got worse and worse, as one lobby after another insisted on particular provisions. The final version would have resembled the definition of a camel as a horse designed by committee, if camels had three heads and legs on only one side.
The comprehensive immigration reform bill, praised by the Democratic leaders of Congress and defended by the mindless partisan progressive echo chamber in the media, was a horror. What should have been a simple, straightforward path to legal status for millions of legal immigrants had morphed into a Kafkaesque system that would require 11 years at a minimum for amnestied illegal immigrants to become U.S. citizens. Even worse, at the last minute, the U.S. business community managed to insert a provision creating an entirely new category of "guest workers" -- in reality, indentured servants -- who could be brought in as a scab army to undercut the wages and unionization activities of U.S. citizen-workers and legal immigrants (including amnestied immigrants). At the price of gaining business support, Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi agreed to the flooding of the labor market by several hundred thousand of these new business serfs a year.
Fortunately, the immigration reform bill collapsed under its own grotesque complexity. Trying to please every special interest, it alienated enough special interests -- labor on the left, nativists on the right -- that it died for lack of support in Congress.
Will comprehensive energy reform and comprehensive healthcare reform suffer the fate of comprehensive immigration reform? It seems increasingly likely....