John B. Judis: Sorry, But I Hear Echoes of Vietnam
[John B. Judis is Senior Editor for The New Republic]
I don’t oppose what Barack Obama plans to do in Afghanistan. I don’t know enough, and from what I know, I don’t have an alternative to propose. I would have preferred he find a way to achieve American objectives without escalating the war, but I agree with his objective of denying al Qaeda a home in Afghanistan through a Taliban victory, and I hope that his strategy will achieve it. Still, I have my doubts.
What bothers me is the echo of Vietnam in 1964 and 1965. Of course, there are differences--and Obama tried to cite them in his speech--but the similarities are disturbing:
-- Obama says that in Afghanistan, in contrast to Vietnam, we are not “facing a broad-based popular insurgency.” But if you look at South Vietnam in the early ‘60s, the National Liberation Front, or Viet Cong, did not have broad support. What it had was funding and organization and an ability to build support against what became a foreign invader. It seems that in the Pashtun South of Afghanistan, the Taliban is very similarly positioned...
...-- Obama says that in contrast with Vietnam, the U.S. is “joined by a broad coalition of 43 nations that recognizes the legitimacy of our action.” Again, a misleading comparison. During the Vietnam war, the U.S. called the shots but it enjoyed very active military support from other countries in the Pacific region, including Australia, South Korea, Thailand, and New Zealand. South Korea lost thousands of soldiers in the war. I don’t know if there were 43 countries who recognized “the legitimacy of our action,” but I would suspect there may have been. That wasn’t the problem. The problem was that U.S. was pretty much on its own militarily in an Asian country that had long suffered from Western, and then Japanese, colonialism. Its intervention could be cast as a continuation of Western colonialism....
... How important are these similarities? In Vietnam, America’s problems were ultimately political. As long as Vietnam’s Communists could portray the United States forces as colonial interlopers, the U.S. couldn’t win. Its support was bound to erode, even after scoring military victories. The U.S. could have a similar problem in Afghanistan...
Read entire article at The New Republic
I don’t oppose what Barack Obama plans to do in Afghanistan. I don’t know enough, and from what I know, I don’t have an alternative to propose. I would have preferred he find a way to achieve American objectives without escalating the war, but I agree with his objective of denying al Qaeda a home in Afghanistan through a Taliban victory, and I hope that his strategy will achieve it. Still, I have my doubts.
What bothers me is the echo of Vietnam in 1964 and 1965. Of course, there are differences--and Obama tried to cite them in his speech--but the similarities are disturbing:
-- Obama says that in Afghanistan, in contrast to Vietnam, we are not “facing a broad-based popular insurgency.” But if you look at South Vietnam in the early ‘60s, the National Liberation Front, or Viet Cong, did not have broad support. What it had was funding and organization and an ability to build support against what became a foreign invader. It seems that in the Pashtun South of Afghanistan, the Taliban is very similarly positioned...
...-- Obama says that in contrast with Vietnam, the U.S. is “joined by a broad coalition of 43 nations that recognizes the legitimacy of our action.” Again, a misleading comparison. During the Vietnam war, the U.S. called the shots but it enjoyed very active military support from other countries in the Pacific region, including Australia, South Korea, Thailand, and New Zealand. South Korea lost thousands of soldiers in the war. I don’t know if there were 43 countries who recognized “the legitimacy of our action,” but I would suspect there may have been. That wasn’t the problem. The problem was that U.S. was pretty much on its own militarily in an Asian country that had long suffered from Western, and then Japanese, colonialism. Its intervention could be cast as a continuation of Western colonialism....
... How important are these similarities? In Vietnam, America’s problems were ultimately political. As long as Vietnam’s Communists could portray the United States forces as colonial interlopers, the U.S. couldn’t win. Its support was bound to erode, even after scoring military victories. The U.S. could have a similar problem in Afghanistan...