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Ronen Bergman: Lessons on Egypt From Carter and the Shah

[Mr. Bergman is a senior military and intelligence analyst for Yedioth Ahronoth, an Israeli daily. He is currently working on a book about the Mossad and the art of assassination.]

The White House's reaction to the rioting in Egypt is shortsighted—and typical of what is wrong with the Obama administration's Middle East policy. Only days ago, President Hosni Mubarak was a longstanding and valued ally of the U.S. His regime was the beneficiary of a $2 billion annual American aid package (the second largest after Israel). And the White House and the State Department tread carefully when broaching the issue of human rights with Mr. Mubarak.

But after not even a week of protests, official U.S. statements regarding Egypt have suddenly made human rights and democracy all the rage. There's also been talk of terminating U.S. aid.

The U.S. has played this game with dictatorial regimes in the Middle East for decades. The dilemma it faces is difficult, but it certainly isn't new: Support a distasteful regime because it is a strategic ally, or disavow the dictatorship because it betrays fundamental American values like freedom and democracy.

The first option gives the U.S. immediate practical benefits, not the least of which is increased regional stability. But there is a price for this pact with the devil: The U.S. image is tarnished by association, and the citizens who suffer under the dictator's yoke are not likely to forget American support for the abuses.

With the second option, U.S. short-term interests will likely suffer as other players rush in to fill the void. Image-wise, the U.S. shines. And the hope is that in the long run, the country—and others—will remember this principled stand and the U.S. will gain some practical benefit from it.

The most difficult maneuver to execute is switching from one option to the other midstream. In fact, the U.S. has never accomplished this maneuver successfully in the Middle East, and all indications are that it is unlikely to succeed now.

The most obvious example of this failure was President Jimmy Carter's catastrophic mishandling of the events in Iran in 1978-79...
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