David Gibbs: Kosovo ... a template for disaster
[David Gibbs is professor of history and government at the University of Arizona. His latest book is First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia,
Vanderbilt University Press, 2009.]
As they weigh up whether to support the attack on Muammar Gaddafi's regime, some western commentators are taking comfort from the 1999 Nato air war against Serbia, which is widely viewed as a successful humanitarian mission that protected Kosovans from Serbian aggression. Moreover it was done at low cost to the intervening powers, who suffered no combat casualties. And ultimately it led to the ousting of Serbia's villainous leader, Slobodan Milosevic. The Libya intervention, it is hoped, will have a similarly positive outcome.
In reality, Kosovo presents little basis for optimism with regard to Libya. Its success is based on a series of myths.
The first is that in Kosovo, war constituted a morally simple conflict, between aggressive Serbs and victimised Kosovan Albanians; and that Nato, in backing the Albanians, was furthering the cause of human rights. In fact, none of the parties were particularly moral. The war crimes of Serbian forces are well known, but their Kosovan adversaries committed crimes too. In early 1999, Tony Blair believed that the Kosovo Liberation Army was "not much better than the Serbs", according to Alastair Campbell's memoirs. And the UK defence minister George Robertson stated that until shortly before the Nato bombing campaign, "the KLA were responsible for more deaths in Kosovo than the Yugoslav [Serb] authorities had been."
Despite this record, Nato selected the KLA as its ground force, while its planes bombed the Serbs. And after Milosevic capitulated and the bombing ended, Nato forces in effect put the KLA in charge of Kosovo. Once in power, it promptly terrorised ethnic Serbs, Roma and other ethnic groups, forcing out almost a quarter million people.
The record of Nato complicity in KLA war crimes is very relevant for the intervention in Libya. Once again western states will be seeking local allies, in Benghazi and elsewhere, among the Libyan opposition to Gaddafi. We must hope that they are more careful in choosing them. However, the Kosovo case gives us little assurance. The states leading the Libya intervention clearly do not have a positive record in their past selection of allies in the Middle East. Indeed, such unsavoury figures as Hosni Mubarak, Zine Ben Ali or Gaddafi himself had close ties to the states now claiming the moral high ground in their interventionist actions...
Read entire article at Guardian (UK)
Vanderbilt University Press, 2009.]
As they weigh up whether to support the attack on Muammar Gaddafi's regime, some western commentators are taking comfort from the 1999 Nato air war against Serbia, which is widely viewed as a successful humanitarian mission that protected Kosovans from Serbian aggression. Moreover it was done at low cost to the intervening powers, who suffered no combat casualties. And ultimately it led to the ousting of Serbia's villainous leader, Slobodan Milosevic. The Libya intervention, it is hoped, will have a similarly positive outcome.
In reality, Kosovo presents little basis for optimism with regard to Libya. Its success is based on a series of myths.
The first is that in Kosovo, war constituted a morally simple conflict, between aggressive Serbs and victimised Kosovan Albanians; and that Nato, in backing the Albanians, was furthering the cause of human rights. In fact, none of the parties were particularly moral. The war crimes of Serbian forces are well known, but their Kosovan adversaries committed crimes too. In early 1999, Tony Blair believed that the Kosovo Liberation Army was "not much better than the Serbs", according to Alastair Campbell's memoirs. And the UK defence minister George Robertson stated that until shortly before the Nato bombing campaign, "the KLA were responsible for more deaths in Kosovo than the Yugoslav [Serb] authorities had been."
Despite this record, Nato selected the KLA as its ground force, while its planes bombed the Serbs. And after Milosevic capitulated and the bombing ended, Nato forces in effect put the KLA in charge of Kosovo. Once in power, it promptly terrorised ethnic Serbs, Roma and other ethnic groups, forcing out almost a quarter million people.
The record of Nato complicity in KLA war crimes is very relevant for the intervention in Libya. Once again western states will be seeking local allies, in Benghazi and elsewhere, among the Libyan opposition to Gaddafi. We must hope that they are more careful in choosing them. However, the Kosovo case gives us little assurance. The states leading the Libya intervention clearly do not have a positive record in their past selection of allies in the Middle East. Indeed, such unsavoury figures as Hosni Mubarak, Zine Ben Ali or Gaddafi himself had close ties to the states now claiming the moral high ground in their interventionist actions...