Joshua Kurlantzick : What the return of Japanese militarism means for Japan
In the halls of an office building near the Diet, Japan's parliament, aides are scurrying down corridors, planning for an upcoming national election. But Masaaki Nakayama, a former longtime MP from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), isn't focused on the poll. In a small hideaway office, he's drawing me a map of what he says is China's nefarious history of territorial conquest in Asia. Since the map goes back several thousand years, Nakayama has been drawing for more than an hour, his wrinkled hand scrawling furiously. Then he turns to current affairs. "You know how quickly a North Korean or Chinese missile could land in Japan?" he asks. "We have no spare time in the case of an attack." Then Nakayama says something that would shock many Japanese, even 60 years after the end of World War II: The country must rearm. ...
A more powerful Japanese military may be inevitable, even necessary, if Washington's relations with other countries in the region, such as South Korea and China, continue to deteriorate. And Japan today is a democracy with strong civilian control over the armed forces, which have participated effectively in international peacekeeping. But many American officials don't recognize the potential damage Japanese remilitarization will do to America's already shaky image in Asia. Americans may have forgotten about Japanese abuses in the Pacific Theater during World War II, but the populations of countries in the region have not, and these abuses are often magnified by nationalist governments in China and other Asian nations eager to deflect attention from their own shortcomings and to justify increases in defense spending.
Koizumi's rightward push on foreign policy has not been ignored in Asia. After visiting Tokyo, I went to Seoul, Beijing, and Bangkok. Seoul has claimed a disputed cluster of islands located between Japan and South Korea. South Korean protestors even cut off their fingers to signify that they would shed blood for the rocky outcrops, and, at large shopping centers, I noticed entrepreneurial South Korean merchants selling t-shirts, mobile phone holders, and other kitsch emblazoned with the word dokdo, the Korean name for the islands. At each stop, officials and analysts seemed more concerned about Japan than about Kim Jong Il's nukes, terrorism, or other vital regional issues that probably threaten them more than Tokyo. Ordinary citizens seem to share these views. As Time reported last year, a poll of 100,000 young Chinese by China Youth Daily revealed that 56 percent associate the personality trait "cruel" with the Japanese. At higher levels, this unease is growing as well. South Korean President Roh Muh-Hyun, who already has a rocky relationship with the Bush administration, has warned of a possible "diplomatic war" with Japan, and, earlier this year, China abruptly canceled a meeting between Vice Premier Wu Yi and Koizumi, with Wu simply jetting out of Tokyo.
Wu's snub was a warning. If the United States openly backs Japan's rearming, it could find itself and Tokyo ostracized by vital allies like Korea and Thailand, moving it even further from China. Many Japanese hawks don't seem to care. "What's the solution to North Korea?" Okazaki asked me when I visited his office. "A closer U.S.-Japan alliance." "What's the solution to China? A closer U.S.-Japan alliance." He pauses. "What's the solution to South Korea?" You can guess the rest. But, in the long run, America might not like the answer.
Read entire article at New Republic
A more powerful Japanese military may be inevitable, even necessary, if Washington's relations with other countries in the region, such as South Korea and China, continue to deteriorate. And Japan today is a democracy with strong civilian control over the armed forces, which have participated effectively in international peacekeeping. But many American officials don't recognize the potential damage Japanese remilitarization will do to America's already shaky image in Asia. Americans may have forgotten about Japanese abuses in the Pacific Theater during World War II, but the populations of countries in the region have not, and these abuses are often magnified by nationalist governments in China and other Asian nations eager to deflect attention from their own shortcomings and to justify increases in defense spending.
Koizumi's rightward push on foreign policy has not been ignored in Asia. After visiting Tokyo, I went to Seoul, Beijing, and Bangkok. Seoul has claimed a disputed cluster of islands located between Japan and South Korea. South Korean protestors even cut off their fingers to signify that they would shed blood for the rocky outcrops, and, at large shopping centers, I noticed entrepreneurial South Korean merchants selling t-shirts, mobile phone holders, and other kitsch emblazoned with the word dokdo, the Korean name for the islands. At each stop, officials and analysts seemed more concerned about Japan than about Kim Jong Il's nukes, terrorism, or other vital regional issues that probably threaten them more than Tokyo. Ordinary citizens seem to share these views. As Time reported last year, a poll of 100,000 young Chinese by China Youth Daily revealed that 56 percent associate the personality trait "cruel" with the Japanese. At higher levels, this unease is growing as well. South Korean President Roh Muh-Hyun, who already has a rocky relationship with the Bush administration, has warned of a possible "diplomatic war" with Japan, and, earlier this year, China abruptly canceled a meeting between Vice Premier Wu Yi and Koizumi, with Wu simply jetting out of Tokyo.
Wu's snub was a warning. If the United States openly backs Japan's rearming, it could find itself and Tokyo ostracized by vital allies like Korea and Thailand, moving it even further from China. Many Japanese hawks don't seem to care. "What's the solution to North Korea?" Okazaki asked me when I visited his office. "A closer U.S.-Japan alliance." "What's the solution to China? A closer U.S.-Japan alliance." He pauses. "What's the solution to South Korea?" You can guess the rest. But, in the long run, America might not like the answer.