David C. Hendrickson & Robert W. Tucker: How Far Bush Has Strayed in Foreign Policy from the Founders'
[David C. Hendrickson is a professor of political science at Colorado College, and Robert W. Tucker, a professor emeritus of U.S. foreign policy at the Johns Hopkins University.]
...In Bush's first term, the "Bush Doctrine" meant above all the avowal that the United States would not sit on its hands and await the development of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of tyrants but was prepared, on the contrary, to take the offensive against them. Now it is the "being" and not the "doing" of autocratic states that creates the security threat to the United States, which can only be addressed by dramatic change in the character of these governments, either through reform or revolution. Though Bush concedes that ending tyranny is the work of generations, he also styles it as an urgent task of American security. He acknowledges, too, that such change is not primarily the task of arms, but he does not exclude the possibility that it may in the future be a task for arms, and he seems to pledge U.S. support to all those who seek to revolutionize despotic governments. "All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: the United States will not ignore your oppression, or excuse your oppressors. When you stand for your liberty, we will stand with you."
A central question raised by the Bush Doctrine is the extent to which it comports with the historic understanding of the American purpose. Normally, an active role in the propagation of free institutions is attributed to Woodrow Wilson, and it has become customary to identify America's recent presidents--especially Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush--as "neo-Wilsonians." But Bush goes further, insisting that the policy proclaimed in his second Inaugural Address is a logical outgrowth of America's historic commitment to free institutions: "From the day of our Founding, we have proclaimed that every man and woman on this earth has rights, and dignity, and matchless value. . . . Across the generations we have proclaimed the imperative of self-government. . . . Advancing these ideals is the mission that created our Nation."
The determination of the "intentions" or "original understanding" of the Founding Fathers has often excited attention and speculation, but as often as not their intentions have seemed shrouded in ambiguity. The "silences of the Constitution" have often been as important--and mystifying--as its plain avowals. But the questions raised by the Bush Doctrine--whether it is rightful to propagate changes in another nation's form of government and what role the United States should play in the protection and expansion of free institutions--often commanded serious attention, and the answers given by the Founders and their epigones lend no support to the Bush Doctrine.
The question of whether force might be used to revolutionize foreign governments arose quickly after the making of the Constitution, in the wars provoked by the French Revolution. The British government, James Madison would later recall, "thought a war of more than 20 years called for against France by an edict, afterwards disavowed, which assumed the policy of propagating changes of Government in other Countries." The offensive edict to which Madison refers is the declaration of the French Convention on November 19, 1792, that "it will accord fraternity and assistance to all peoples who shall wish to recover their liberty"--a declaration that bears an uncanny resemblance to the policy Bush announced in his second Inaugural Address. Alexander Hamilton also took umbrage at the doctrine and argued that the French decree was "little short of a declaration of War against all nations, having princes and privileged classes", equally repugnant "to the general rights of Nations [and] to the true principles of liberty." Thomas Jefferson, who unlike Hamilton strongly sympathized with the French Revolution, nevertheless acknowledged that "the French have been guilty of great errors in their conduct toward other nations, not only in insulting uselessly all crowned heads, but endeavoring to force liberty on their neighbors in their own form." Much as Hamilton and Jefferson differed in their assignment of guilt to the warring parties, both of them made their normative assessments of the European war in terms that emphasized the illegitimacy of war for the purpose of propagating changes of government in other countries. ...
Read entire article at National Interest
...In Bush's first term, the "Bush Doctrine" meant above all the avowal that the United States would not sit on its hands and await the development of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of tyrants but was prepared, on the contrary, to take the offensive against them. Now it is the "being" and not the "doing" of autocratic states that creates the security threat to the United States, which can only be addressed by dramatic change in the character of these governments, either through reform or revolution. Though Bush concedes that ending tyranny is the work of generations, he also styles it as an urgent task of American security. He acknowledges, too, that such change is not primarily the task of arms, but he does not exclude the possibility that it may in the future be a task for arms, and he seems to pledge U.S. support to all those who seek to revolutionize despotic governments. "All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: the United States will not ignore your oppression, or excuse your oppressors. When you stand for your liberty, we will stand with you."
A central question raised by the Bush Doctrine is the extent to which it comports with the historic understanding of the American purpose. Normally, an active role in the propagation of free institutions is attributed to Woodrow Wilson, and it has become customary to identify America's recent presidents--especially Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush--as "neo-Wilsonians." But Bush goes further, insisting that the policy proclaimed in his second Inaugural Address is a logical outgrowth of America's historic commitment to free institutions: "From the day of our Founding, we have proclaimed that every man and woman on this earth has rights, and dignity, and matchless value. . . . Across the generations we have proclaimed the imperative of self-government. . . . Advancing these ideals is the mission that created our Nation."
The determination of the "intentions" or "original understanding" of the Founding Fathers has often excited attention and speculation, but as often as not their intentions have seemed shrouded in ambiguity. The "silences of the Constitution" have often been as important--and mystifying--as its plain avowals. But the questions raised by the Bush Doctrine--whether it is rightful to propagate changes in another nation's form of government and what role the United States should play in the protection and expansion of free institutions--often commanded serious attention, and the answers given by the Founders and their epigones lend no support to the Bush Doctrine.
The question of whether force might be used to revolutionize foreign governments arose quickly after the making of the Constitution, in the wars provoked by the French Revolution. The British government, James Madison would later recall, "thought a war of more than 20 years called for against France by an edict, afterwards disavowed, which assumed the policy of propagating changes of Government in other Countries." The offensive edict to which Madison refers is the declaration of the French Convention on November 19, 1792, that "it will accord fraternity and assistance to all peoples who shall wish to recover their liberty"--a declaration that bears an uncanny resemblance to the policy Bush announced in his second Inaugural Address. Alexander Hamilton also took umbrage at the doctrine and argued that the French decree was "little short of a declaration of War against all nations, having princes and privileged classes", equally repugnant "to the general rights of Nations [and] to the true principles of liberty." Thomas Jefferson, who unlike Hamilton strongly sympathized with the French Revolution, nevertheless acknowledged that "the French have been guilty of great errors in their conduct toward other nations, not only in insulting uselessly all crowned heads, but endeavoring to force liberty on their neighbors in their own form." Much as Hamilton and Jefferson differed in their assignment of guilt to the warring parties, both of them made their normative assessments of the European war in terms that emphasized the illegitimacy of war for the purpose of propagating changes of government in other countries. ...