Abraham Sofaer: A Reagan Strategy for Iran and Syria
[Mr. Sofaer, George P. Shultz senior fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution, was legal adviser to the Department of State from 1985 to 1990.]
The Iraq Study Group's recommendation that the Bush administration drop its preconditions and negotiate with Syria and Iran has been praised as a "no-brainer" -- and condemned as an improper effort to reward rogue regimes. Neither reaction is correct. Negotiating with enemies can be a useful aspect of effective diplomacy. But successful negotiations with enemies result not from the talks themselves but from the diplomatic strategy that accompanies them. The Group's recommendations deserve support, but must be effectively integrated into President Bush's strategy of ending state-sponsored terror.
The arguments against negotiating with Syria and Iran were also made against negotiating with the Soviet Union, and by some of the same people. Soviet misconduct easily matches that of Syria or Iran in aggression, oppression, murder, support for terrorist groups and mendacity. President Reagan challenged Soviet behavior by supporting groups fighting communist intervention, building the military, strengthening NATO, condemning human-rights violations, commencing a missile-defense program, and conveying the message of freedom in every way possible. George Shultz supported these efforts but sought to negotiate with the Soviets in an attempt to increase stability, reduce nuclear weapons, attain freedom for oppressed groups, and enhance understanding. To make negotiations possible the U.S. adopted specific policies, including:
• Regime acceptance. The U.S. refrained from activities aimed at destroying the Soviet regime it was seeking to influence, while vigorously denouncing its political and moral legitimacy.
• Limited linkage. Negotiations on human rights, arms control, regional issues and bilateral relations were pursued without linkage to Soviet conduct, enabling negotiations to proceed while the U.S. responded firmly through deeds.
• Rhetorical restraint. Reagan vigorously criticized the Soviet system and its behavior, but promised not to "crow" when the Soviets agreed to U.S. proposals, enabling Soviet leaders to avoid being seen as capitulating to U.S. demands.
• Self-interest. U.S. negotiating policy was based on convincing the Soviets to act in their own best interests.
The Study Group's "external" strategy for Iraq contains several elements necessary for successful diplomacy: the need for both incentives and "disincentives"; negotiations "without preconditions"; and negotiations that are "extensive and substantive," requiring a balancing of interests. The general incentives identified by the Group are unlikely, however, to lead to constructive discussions. While Syria and Iran should realize that preventing a breakdown in Iraq is in their interests, they see great advantages in having the U.S. lose strength and credibility in a costly effort to help a state they are relieved to see powerless. The notion that they will help in order to have "enhanced diplomatic relations" with the U.S. assumes that states will do what they know the U.S. wants simply because Washington will not otherwise talk to them. The pronouncements that accompany this Bush policy exemplify the sort of rhetoric that discourages cooperation. The possibility of obtaining U.S. assistance in joining the WTO would be a real incentive in an ongoing negotiation, but it is not a credible incentive in the context of hostile confrontation and proliferating sanctions....
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The Iraq Study Group's recommendation that the Bush administration drop its preconditions and negotiate with Syria and Iran has been praised as a "no-brainer" -- and condemned as an improper effort to reward rogue regimes. Neither reaction is correct. Negotiating with enemies can be a useful aspect of effective diplomacy. But successful negotiations with enemies result not from the talks themselves but from the diplomatic strategy that accompanies them. The Group's recommendations deserve support, but must be effectively integrated into President Bush's strategy of ending state-sponsored terror.
The arguments against negotiating with Syria and Iran were also made against negotiating with the Soviet Union, and by some of the same people. Soviet misconduct easily matches that of Syria or Iran in aggression, oppression, murder, support for terrorist groups and mendacity. President Reagan challenged Soviet behavior by supporting groups fighting communist intervention, building the military, strengthening NATO, condemning human-rights violations, commencing a missile-defense program, and conveying the message of freedom in every way possible. George Shultz supported these efforts but sought to negotiate with the Soviets in an attempt to increase stability, reduce nuclear weapons, attain freedom for oppressed groups, and enhance understanding. To make negotiations possible the U.S. adopted specific policies, including:
• Regime acceptance. The U.S. refrained from activities aimed at destroying the Soviet regime it was seeking to influence, while vigorously denouncing its political and moral legitimacy.
• Limited linkage. Negotiations on human rights, arms control, regional issues and bilateral relations were pursued without linkage to Soviet conduct, enabling negotiations to proceed while the U.S. responded firmly through deeds.
• Rhetorical restraint. Reagan vigorously criticized the Soviet system and its behavior, but promised not to "crow" when the Soviets agreed to U.S. proposals, enabling Soviet leaders to avoid being seen as capitulating to U.S. demands.
• Self-interest. U.S. negotiating policy was based on convincing the Soviets to act in their own best interests.
The Study Group's "external" strategy for Iraq contains several elements necessary for successful diplomacy: the need for both incentives and "disincentives"; negotiations "without preconditions"; and negotiations that are "extensive and substantive," requiring a balancing of interests. The general incentives identified by the Group are unlikely, however, to lead to constructive discussions. While Syria and Iran should realize that preventing a breakdown in Iraq is in their interests, they see great advantages in having the U.S. lose strength and credibility in a costly effort to help a state they are relieved to see powerless. The notion that they will help in order to have "enhanced diplomatic relations" with the U.S. assumes that states will do what they know the U.S. wants simply because Washington will not otherwise talk to them. The pronouncements that accompany this Bush policy exemplify the sort of rhetoric that discourages cooperation. The possibility of obtaining U.S. assistance in joining the WTO would be a real incentive in an ongoing negotiation, but it is not a credible incentive in the context of hostile confrontation and proliferating sanctions....