Frederick Kagan: New Strategy to Win Would Show President's Wisdom, Not Stubbornness
[Frederick W. Kagan is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a former history professor at West Point.]
America faces a critical moment in Iraq. Sectarian violence threatens to destroy Iraq's government and society and what's left of America's will to fight. Yet the consequences of accepting defeat would be horrendous. Iran and Iraq's Sunni neighbors would vie for dominance, and the conflict would likely expand throughout the Middle East. Al Qaeda could establish a base in the ensuing vacuum. Abandoning Iraq to chaos would harm America's vital interests immeasurably.
It is essential, therefore, to adopt a new strategy. We must secure Iraq's population and thereby bring the violence under control, abandoning the failed attempt to hand responsibility over to the Iraqis prematurely.
As we saw in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, military forces, together with political and diplomatic initiatives, can control ethnic and sectarian conflict. A large scale two-year effort to clear and hold critical areas in Baghdad that are the center of sectarian violence in the capital can succeed today. U.S. forces secured Tal Afar in 2005 and parts of Sadr City in 2004.
U.S. commanders admit that recent attempts to gain control of Baghdad in Operation Together Forward II failed through lack of resources. Many neighborhoods were cleared, but there were too few American troops to maintain security in those areas. U.S. military forces know how to establish security and maintain it, but they cannot do so without the necessary resources and time.
Securing the critical areas of Baghdad would require a surge of at least 35,000 more U.S. combat troops into Iraq (some would go into Anbar province and elsewhere to contain any spillover from Baghdad). This surge would come from extending the tours of soldiers already in Iraq and accelerating the deployment of a few brigades. It would require two years to succeed, accompanied by economic reconstruction and political efforts to strengthen the Iraqi government. Training of the Iraqi army would continue, and the Iraqis would have to take responsibility for their own security at the end of these efforts. They can only do so, however, if we bring the violence down as we train the Iraqis up.
Some argue that these actions would "break" our Army by destroying morale. But with more than a million men under arms, these claims are not credible. The extensions are modest and within the bounds of what the United States has done in this conflict. Above all, let us consider the alternative: A defeated Army would have to withdraw under fire, humiliated, watching as the enemy tortures and kills the Iraqis it had worked with and defended. Nothing would break the Army more surely than ignominious defeat....
[Click here to read his report.]
Read entire article at USA Today
America faces a critical moment in Iraq. Sectarian violence threatens to destroy Iraq's government and society and what's left of America's will to fight. Yet the consequences of accepting defeat would be horrendous. Iran and Iraq's Sunni neighbors would vie for dominance, and the conflict would likely expand throughout the Middle East. Al Qaeda could establish a base in the ensuing vacuum. Abandoning Iraq to chaos would harm America's vital interests immeasurably.
It is essential, therefore, to adopt a new strategy. We must secure Iraq's population and thereby bring the violence under control, abandoning the failed attempt to hand responsibility over to the Iraqis prematurely.
As we saw in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, military forces, together with political and diplomatic initiatives, can control ethnic and sectarian conflict. A large scale two-year effort to clear and hold critical areas in Baghdad that are the center of sectarian violence in the capital can succeed today. U.S. forces secured Tal Afar in 2005 and parts of Sadr City in 2004.
U.S. commanders admit that recent attempts to gain control of Baghdad in Operation Together Forward II failed through lack of resources. Many neighborhoods were cleared, but there were too few American troops to maintain security in those areas. U.S. military forces know how to establish security and maintain it, but they cannot do so without the necessary resources and time.
Securing the critical areas of Baghdad would require a surge of at least 35,000 more U.S. combat troops into Iraq (some would go into Anbar province and elsewhere to contain any spillover from Baghdad). This surge would come from extending the tours of soldiers already in Iraq and accelerating the deployment of a few brigades. It would require two years to succeed, accompanied by economic reconstruction and political efforts to strengthen the Iraqi government. Training of the Iraqi army would continue, and the Iraqis would have to take responsibility for their own security at the end of these efforts. They can only do so, however, if we bring the violence down as we train the Iraqis up.
Some argue that these actions would "break" our Army by destroying morale. But with more than a million men under arms, these claims are not credible. The extensions are modest and within the bounds of what the United States has done in this conflict. Above all, let us consider the alternative: A defeated Army would have to withdraw under fire, humiliated, watching as the enemy tortures and kills the Iraqis it had worked with and defended. Nothing would break the Army more surely than ignominious defeat....
[Click here to read his report.]