Sally Marks: Whither Iraq? A Commentary for Americans
The debate over Iraq thus far has focused on whether the United States should withdraw, not on whether it dares to do so. Since our present dilemma arose in part from reliance on Miss Rosy Scenario, plus extraordinary ineptitude in high places, we need to examine worst case possibilities (while praying they not occur) if withdrawal is precipitate and full or further folly aggravates a dicey situation. The worst case is World War III. That is not scaremongering; it could happen, as The New York Times’s diplomatic correspondent noted some months ago on Washington Week in Review. The situation is aggravated because the American people understandably want out of this bloody mess, and so domestic politics is coming to dictate policy and strategy, which is scary. A primer is needed on the risks of our situation, for well-intended demonstrations for immediate withdrawal can create dangers.
As a student of twentieth century international politics who has read heavily on the modern Middle East though it is not my specialty, I strongly opposed the 2003 Iraq war, partly because a nasty aftermath was likely. After all, the British faced a considerable insurgency there in 1920 as Iraq was being created. But what matters is where we are now. Americans need to face a few basic realities which for some reason neither the press nor the commentariat has urged upon them. The actions of the American people have consequences, especially in the Congress, whose oratory and deeds also produce effects– and not just in Washington....
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How would I withdraw from Iraq? Very slowly, very carefully, with as little linkage to domestic politics as possible (a tough one, that). With a great deal of basic, efficient economic aid (with maximum Iraqi input since, after all, it is their country) and massive job creation, including good jobs, not just garbage collection. Costly those, but cheap at the price. With intensive diplomacy in the entire region and as many steps from the Iraq Study Group’s report as possible. With a great deal of patience. Our president is too weak politically and probably too stubborn to proclaim a national emergency, though that is what we face. We need to pull together but are unlikely to do so. The goal is a regime in Iraq which can control and defend the country. Whether it is democratic is probably immaterial, since democracy is unlikely to long survive our departure. We probably cannot remove the democracy ourselves without damaging effects on the Iraqi people, but I confess to moments of wishing for the emergence of a reasonably benevolent strongman—perhaps on the order of King Faisal I.
What can we do? Recognize the gravity of the situation and that there are no good solutions. Do not confuse the “war on terror” with the war in Iraq, though we have allowed them to become entwined. Be patient, hard as that is. Accept that Iraqi politicians, unimpressive as many are, face difficult tasks in unfamiliar seas. Recognize that while Congressman Murtha is correct in saying that our ground forces are strained to the utmost and that is a factor, it is unfortunately not the only factor and we can do only a limited amount about it just now. Educate others. Pressure your representatives and senators to patience, caution, and very careful utterances, if any. Seek a more evenhanded policy in the Palestinian-Israeli situation and more attention to it, as all Arab states declare that vital. Fiercely resist any administration or Israeli moves to destabilize or bomb Iran (whose strange president was chosen in a genuine, democratic election). Any new destabilization is dangerous. And pray to whatever deity you prefer, reminding Him or Her that God reputedly looks out for drunkards, fools, and the United States of America.
Comment on Article by Cary Fraser, Pennsylvania State University
Sally Marks has done the profession a favour by raising an issue that needs to be addressed by diplomatic historians both as a contribution to a contemporary political debate that has been deprived of serious historical insight and as a topic for elucidation in classrooms.
I would suggest a few issues that also need to be addressed. First, the American decision to establish a long-term military presence in Saudi Arabia - the country entrusted with the guardianship of Islam's holiest sites - helped to stimulate the challenge to both the Saudi monarchy and American policy in the region. How will an American decision to establish/maintain bases in Iraq, where some of the holiest sites of Shi'a Islam are located, affect the course of the current occupation and ultimately the political environment that would bring about the reconstitution of a viable and sovereign Iraqi state which can manage its relations with the wider region.
Second, what will be the roles of Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and the European Union in the creation/maintenance of a new balance of power - including the management of existing and future nuclear forces - within the region?
Third, given the growing evidence of a crisis of leadership within the American political and military establishments over the origins, course, and consequences of the Iraq misadventure, has the Iraq war highlighted the need for the rapid emergence of a new generation of American leaders?
Fourth, in what ways can diplomatic historians become a source of curricular changes that will help to educate American citizens and leaders about dealing with a very complex world in which Iraq has served as a reminder that the proverbial road to hell is paved with the rhetoric of good intentions. As an historian of international relations, I was very puzzled by the minimal attention paid to an issue in the discussions about the invasion and occupation of Iraq that should have been obvious from the outset - how does an army garrison a desert? As a teacher, I am constantly amazed by my students' failure to appreciate the role of geography - physical and human - in the evolution of human affairs. I was astonished that the current administration and their supporters in the Congress seemed to have suffered from a similar failure.