Michael Schwartz: So things are improving in Iraq? A response to O’Hanlon and Pollack
The NY Times op ed, entitled"A War We Just Might Win," by Brookings Institute Fellows Michael O’Hanlan and Kenneth Pollack is attracting a lot of attention in the major media, from the President and his hench-people, and even from the anti-war movement. That is what makes this an important document—the attention. In fact, it is just another puff piece that repeats (as though it were authentic journalism) the official American government line. These guys went to the Green Zone and other secure locations and talked only to occupation officials (“American and Iraqi military and civilian personnel”). We should not take their testimony as primary data, but as a presentation of the American military’s version of the current status of the war. Knowing that, we should not be surprised that they say “we just might win,” since the U.S. military has been saying that (or even more positive things) right along.
But what is the reality there? And are they (meaning the U.S. military leadership) right that we just might “win.” Not at all.
In fact, I think that this op-ed is actually a “benchmark” that the surge is officially over; that we have entered the next stage of the war—the (almost certain to be a failing) attempt to co-opt the Sunni insurgency.
Keep in mind that O’Hanlon and Pollack rest most of their argument on the prospect that the “alliance” between the U.S. military and the Sunni insurgents has been and will be successful in rolling back Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia and other jihadists. (They refer to as picking “the right adversary.”)
But let’s be clear on one point: this is a reversal of the surge strategy. The surge was supposed to clean out both the Sunni militias and the jihadists (aka “al Qaeda”) from the Sunni neighborhoods and towns; and purge the Mahdi’s army from the Shia neighborhoods and towns. (Petraeus and the gang abandoned offensive against the Mahdis several months ago; instead of trying to destroy the Mahdi’s army, they are now trying to select Shia areas of the country where the Mahdis have not consolidated power and prevent them from doing so. In the meantime, as I say in my recent Tom Dispatch commentary, the Mahdis have expanded their domain in Baghdad and strengthened their ties with the Shia community. They are now in a position to win any (actual) election they choose to contest in any part of the Shia areas, except perhaps Basra.)
After several months of failing to uproot the Sunni militias (i.e., insurgents) from various neighborhoods and towns around Baghdad (but succeeding in annihilating many communities), Petraeus has also abandoned this aspect of the surge—the most crucial element—except in selected places (e.g., Baquba, which is quiet now, after the destruction of several neighborhoods in July). In its place, he has negotiated an “alliance” with these very same militias that he has been fighting during the surge and for all these years since the end of “major combat opertaions.” This is the strategy that O’Hanlon and Pollack find so promising. (See the Tom Dispatch commentary for a more complete discussion of the nature of the “alliance.”)
The immediate consequence of this alliance is that the nationalist insurgents will fight against the jihadists (generally referred to in the U.S. press as “Al Qaeda in Iraq,” but actually consisting of a number of small groups that target Shia civilians with carbombs and other terrorist weapons). This fight has been brewing for quite some time. Over the last few years, the jihadists have increasingly alienated the Sunni communities that host them because the nationalists do not support attacks on Iraqi civilians (even Shia), and they bitterly resent the attempts by the jihadists to impose their particular fundamentalist ideas on their hosts. This friction has led jihadists to use their terrorist tactics within some of these communities (and therefore antagonizing large majorities of the populations) and/or to less spectacular violent confrontations.
In the past, the local insurgents could not effectively expel the jihadists because of the Americans, who not only kept them busy with constant invasions into their cities or towns or communities, but also because any effort to fight a sustained battle would expose them to easy attack from the Americans. So this truce with the Americans is an opportunity for them to put their unhindered energy into expelling the jihadists. In most places they will probably be successful.
So this “alliance” is actually a double victory for the insurgency. Not only are they finally able to expel the jihadists, but Petraeus is also giving up his attempt to dislodge them. That is, he has agreed to leave the indigenous militias in charge. Violence will be (and has been in Anbar province) drastically reduced, since the major violence occurred when the Americans sought to wrest control from the local insurgents (now Petraeus’ allies), mainly from the application of overwhelming U.S. firepower. (It has been these battles that account for most of the death and destruction in Iraq (much, much more than the carbombs and the death squads put together)).
When O’Hanlon and Pollack say in their NY Times commentary that the surge might work, they mean that this “alliance” has been and will continue to reduce the jihadist presence in these communities. At the same time, it has consolidated the power of the militias, which were, only a few months ago, the chief target of the Bush surge.
So this alliance is not “working” to advance Bush Administration strategy for pacifying the country. Instead it is a victory for the nationalist insurgents, who will finally obtain uncontested sovereignty over their local communities.
Petraeus hopes that after a while, he can turn this into an American victory by buying off the leadership of the local guerrillas and getting them to accept, first American, and then Iraqi government control of the communities. They will probably refuse (they detest the Iraqi government even more than they detest the Americans). So, in most areas, the fighting will be renewed very shortly.
But in those areas where the US can buy-out or co-opt the leadership, the U.S. (and its client Iraqi government) will seek to integrate the community into their vision of the new Iraq, including the shuttering of government enterprises and services (and/or the services provided by local clerical leaders in place of the government), the abandonment of the food and fuel subsidies (many of which are now being implemented on the community level by local groups), and all the rest of the “old” Iraq that the U.S. has been trying to destroy since the occupation began. If the battle hasn’t already begun, it will begin then, because the local insurgents have been demanding all along that the government deliver the services to which they feel they are entitled, and these are exactly the services that the Americans have pledged to replace with “the market.”
Stated bluntly, if the U.S. wants to get control of these rebellious communities, for itself or for its client government in Baghdad, it will have to renew its war with the nationalist insurgency.
Therefore, the only way the “alliance” can lead to peace in the Sunni areas is if the U.S. abandons its effort to control them.
If the U.S. does abandon its effort to gain control of Sunni cities and communities, it be the beginning of a real American withdrawal from Iraq, because the Iraqi government is already moribund. It has no army or police force (that does not depend on the U.S.) and it has no administrative or governing presence outside the Green Zone. Without the U.S. fighting a war of conquest around the country, it could not extend its power beyond the building in which the parliament meets.
If the U.S. leaves these little city-states alone, then each local municipality will be controlled by its local militia. By and large this would leave the Sadrists (who are irretrievably anti-American) in control of the Shia areas, and the Sunni nationalist insurgents (who are irretrievably anti-American) in control of the Sunni areas. Eventually, they would erect a new government that reflected their common interests. (Their common interests include: that the Americans have to be expelled; that the American effort to dismantle the Iraqi welfare state and erect a neoliberal state is exactly and completely wrong; and that the government should not be an ally of the US.) Even before the government consolidated itself, the American presence would become untenable, as the various insurgent groupings would certainly lob grenades into military bases and mine all the highways that brought supplies to American troops. Without an offensive strategy, the American troops would certainly be “sitting ducks.”
So this episode (like many before it) can only lead to peace if it leads to U.S. withdrawal. My guess is that Bush and the gang (including the leading Democrats) will not opt for withdrawal.
We can therefore expect a return to ferocious attacks on Sunni communities in the near future and perhaps equally ferocious attacks on Mahdi army strongholds (e.g., Sadr City) in the not too distant future.