[Andrew J. Bacevich is professor of history and international relations at Boston University. He is the editor of The Long War: A New History of U.S. National Security Policy Since World War II. ]

... Although the deluded and disingenuous may persist in pretending otherwise, his mission is not to "win" the Iraq war. Coalition forces in Iraq are not fighting to achieve victory. Their purpose is far more modest. According to [David] Petraeus himself, U.S. troops and their allies are "buying time for Iraqis to reconcile." President Bush and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates have explicitly endorsed this new strategy, but history will remember Petraeus as its principal architect. To avoid the fate of his hapless predecessors, Petraeus must show that his strategy of buying-time-to-reconcile can produce tangible results. Yet an exploration of what the buying-time strategy actually means reveals that the prospects of its success are exceedingly slim. The cult of Petraeus exists not because the general has figured out the war but because hiding behind the general allows the Bush administration to postpone the day when it must reckon with the consequences of its abject failure in Iraq.

The most fundamental question that should be asked about the strategy is: Exactly how much time does Petraeus need to buy? The answer: a lot. With his frequent references to "the Washington clock" and "the Baghdad clock," Petraeus himself has recognized that "buying time" is by no means a simple proposition. The problem with the two clocks--one driven by domestic politics and the other connected to events in Iraq itself--is that they are wildly out of synch. As Petraeus himself has acknowledged, "The Washington clock is ticking faster than the Baghdad clock." Indeed, the steady erosion of popular and congressional support for the war, lately even among Republicans, suggests that time on the Washington clock has all but expired.

To correct this situation, Petraeus speaks of "trying to speed up the Baghdad clock a bit to produce some progress on the ground that can, perhaps ... put a little more time on the Washington clock." Yet Petraeus himself must recognize that this qualifies at best as a long shot. He knows that any counterinsurgency is by definition a protracted project. Success requires not weeks or months of exertions but years. As he told the BBC in a recent interview, "The average counterinsurgency is somewhere around a nine- or a ten-year endeavor." For his strategy to succeed, putting "a little more time" on the Washington clock won't come close to doing the trick. Indeed, unless the Petraeus strategy gains the firm and enthusiastic support of President Bush's successor, it doesn't stand a chance of working. Yet, unless John McCain's campaign pulls off a remarkable turnaround--an unlikely event--the president who takes office in January 2009 won't have campaigned on a strategy of "buying time" to prolong the Iraq war....

Barry DeCicco - 8/15/2007

George,

First, the ability to push something through politically does not mean that that thing was either a good idea, or truthful.

Second, you've repeatedly dismissed both the President and the GOP, who, you might want to know were holding the cards in Congress for the past six years. Still do, in many respects, considering that they are successfully fillibusting like crazy.

Third, "No one called President Bush on this war.". Start with Krugman, then Fallows, then go through the back issues of Antiwar.com, Brad DeLong's blog, and just about any popular liberal/libertarian blog from 2002-03 - they will provide you with link after link after link to people calling Bush on this war.

Then, when you have read the history which we have lived through, we can debate.

George Robert Gaston - 8/14/2007

Why did the congress and the press give them carte blanche? For the same reason they will bring the general in for a four day hearing. Ask questions, nod wisely at the answers, approve the man for the position, get their picture taken with him, walk out in the lobby and announce that the policy the general presented will not work.

If they thought it would not work, why did they confirm him? What I am saying has nothing to do with Bush. The war is lousy. It was a bad idea, as was Vietnam. However, congress playing an Alfonse and Gaston (forgive the pun) game with it just makes it worse. This is not one of our legislative branch’s shining hours of courage.

If you read some of the stuff that is coming out in the New York Times in the past few days, it seems they are now starting to caution against pulling out of Iraq too soon. I suspect this is because they think a Democrat is going to be the next president, and they have to give her some editorial cover. Look for more of that kind of thing to creep into the press discussion.

By the way, the press does shape public opinion. At least they tell their advertisers they shape public opinion. No one called President Bush on this war. The woman who is the likely presidential candidate for the Democratic Party voted for this war. Her husband endorsed the decision to go to war. I would think these are serious, intelligent people who are not easily duped.

Now we find out the reason the CIA assumed there were nuclear weapons in Iraq was because in 1991 they had a nuclear program. What kind of a national intelligence organization does that imply? To me it implies one that has been gutted, and had become lazy and politicized. We as a country need to have a good house cleaning there, regardless of who is president. But the wise men of the House and Senate Intelligence committees are not likely to let that happen.
Mr DeCicco, I think we have a long way to go on this thing.

Barry DeCicco - 8/14/2007

"The answer is the Senators want it both ways. Our fourth estate and our academic establishment are letting them have it both ways. "

Wow, my high-school civics class was really wrong! I didn't know that the fourth estate and the academic establishment had that much power.

Oh wait - they don't.

Bush and the Republicans wanted this war; Bush got as close to a carte blanche from Congress that any president has had. Bush and the Republicans gave the rest of us happy talk while things deteriorated, year after year, disaster after disaster.


In the end, this war is 100% the responsibility of Bush and the Republicans.

George Robert Gaston - 8/14/2007

If the Senators did not think the general was being honest with them, why didn’t they say it during the confirmation hearings?

The answer is the Senators want it both ways. Our fourth estate and our academic establishment are letting them have it both ways. The general is a far cry from being one of the “troops”. He’s a big boy, and should be capable of answering some tough questions. However, the tough questions were never posed.

As an aside; if you look at the record, General Westmorland never got the troop strength he asked for in Vietnam. The number he asked for came from a study ordered by Matthew Ridgway during the Eisenhower administration. The Ridgway study said it would take 500,000 troops, 10 years and the outcome was problematic. Eisenhower sent as many advisors as we could get out in one aircraft. Both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations chose to ignore the study.

John Richard Clark - 8/14/2007

Petraeus' proposals are a cruel joke on the Army. He, and any other general officer with any common sense, knows that he cannot accomplish the Bush administration's objectives with less than a million US troops on the ground.

Just like Westy forty years earlier, he went before Congress with a flawed strategy and groundless optimism that it will work. And just like Westy, he'll try and fail and get kicked upstairs to the Chief of Staff's office while American troops are needlessly killed and wounded.

George Robert Gaston - 8/13/2007

It could be that the reason so much stock was put in General Petraeus, and his plan is because the new Democratic congress gushed all over him during the conformation process to show their support for the “troops” (whatever that means). Hence, the press knows his name.

However one must remember the minute the man walked out of the building the leadership in the Senate started to undercut what he proposed during the conformation process. This is just a small detail [Andrew]overlooked in his article.

Lisa Kazmier - 8/12/2007

Turn loose? What? You really think the troop strength is there to do that when Gen. Shinski wanted at least twice as many troops?

Perhaps you can tell the Bush twins to turn themselves in to a new draft board?

John Richard Clark - 8/11/2007

If you are right, then Petraeus, Odierno, and the JCS had a moral responsibility to immediately retire from the armed forces and inform the media that they disagreed with the Bush administration's flawed military strategy in Iraq. A mass resignation of the JCS, the theater CG designate, and his deputy would have destroyed the "surge" plan and emboldened Congress to launch investigations of the war planning function at the Defense Department.

Unfortunately, General Petraeus is just another careerist, ticket-punching military bureaucrat the Army officer corps culture has continued to produce since 1947. He is William C. Westmoreland, version 2.0.

Vernon Clayson - 8/11/2007

You wish, Bacevich, in the event you've not heard, the military does the bidding of our masters, the president and members of the congress. The general is not alone at the top, the conduct of the war is prescribed by men far from the battle, he has to work within guidelines that limit his actions and the action of our military. Were he allowed to turn loose our forces Iraq would soon come to heel, our masters are not concerned with Iraq or the loss of a few soldiers, they care only about who among them will win the next round of elections. For all we know he may be the next MacArthur, fired for telling our masters how to win a war.