Peter C. Rollins: Another Tet Offensive in the Summer of 2007?
[Peter C. Rollins is the Producer/Director of Television’s Vietnam. He earned his Ph.D. at Harvard University after serving as a Marine Officer, 1963-66. He has written nearly 100 journal publications and is author or co-author of numerous books devoted to visual literacy, to include The Columbia Companion to American History on Film (2004).]
The Tet offensive of 1968 was a turning point for the Vietnam war and is a model for what may happen during the late Summer of 2007. As General William C. Westmoreland reported to President Lyndon B. Johnson and, as Johnson communicated to the Australian cabinet during a visit ‘down under,’ the U.S. forces and our South Vietnamese allies had made important strides during 1967. Looking ahead, Walt W. Rostow and others predicted a “Battle of the Bulge” attack which would be aimed at the U.S. national will to continue a protracted conflict.
We now know that the inner circles of power in Hanoi, capital of North Vietnam, had debated what would be the purpose of the attacks: one faction led by General Giap argued that the goal should be a military victory across the country; another group stressed the importance of the simultaneous attacks as a psychological blow. When orders were disseminated to troops in the South (or heading south) the adopted strategy was to win a military victory. The Accuracy in Media television program, Television’s Vietnam: The Impact of Media (1986; re-released in 2007 with an update) shows that Tet brought a painful surprise for the North. The Tet offensive was a total disaster as a military offensive: by March, it was clear that the Viet Cong (pajama-clad troops in the south) had been destroyed and that the apparent setbacks at Khe Sanh and Hue had played out as American victories with tens of thousands of North Vietnamese troops killed.
When Accuracy in Media released its film in 1986, the thesis that Tet was a military disaster for the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese, but—at the same time—a psychological victory for them, was considered controversial, even though the documentary was supported by years of research by Peter Braestrup and James Banerian. (Since 1986, the major television networks have produced documentaries confirming the validity of this once paradoxical thesis.) The American military and Vietnamese allies fought well and prevailed on the ground in Vietnam while the American press announced disaster, incompetence, and debacle to readers and viewers back in the United States. The visual aspects of the Tet offensive in Saigon and Khe Sanh were particular favorites which signaled the end of the “lying” about successes in Vietnam and the unmasking of leaders such as General Westmoreland and LBJ. (Some 14 years later, CBS returned to this message about “lying” in a documentary entitled The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception in which Mike Wallace “proved” that Tet should not have been a surprise and that previous reports of progress were clearly fabrications by a sycophantic general unwilling to deliver bad news to his commander-in-chief.
How does this relate to a forthcoming “Tet offensive”?
Under General David Petraeus, our President ordered a “troop surge” to begin in the Spring of 2007, with the troop levels coming up to the desired higher level by early August. Democratic spokesmen in the House and Senate cried foul when the strategy was offered, but approved Petraeus to take command of forces in Iraq—followed by reluctance to fund the strategy of the new leader whom they had approved by an 81-0 vote. President Bush, although he has consistently refused to set calendar deadlines for success, has stressed throughout the debate that the General would be brought back in September to render an evaluation of the surge and to sort out the options for future military, diplomatic, and economic commitments. Rather than suspend judgment, the Senate spent a “sleepover” evening during July, signaling to Americans and those beyond that the will to win was as flexible as the much-advertised sleep-number mattress....
Read entire article at Accuracy in Media
The Tet offensive of 1968 was a turning point for the Vietnam war and is a model for what may happen during the late Summer of 2007. As General William C. Westmoreland reported to President Lyndon B. Johnson and, as Johnson communicated to the Australian cabinet during a visit ‘down under,’ the U.S. forces and our South Vietnamese allies had made important strides during 1967. Looking ahead, Walt W. Rostow and others predicted a “Battle of the Bulge” attack which would be aimed at the U.S. national will to continue a protracted conflict.
We now know that the inner circles of power in Hanoi, capital of North Vietnam, had debated what would be the purpose of the attacks: one faction led by General Giap argued that the goal should be a military victory across the country; another group stressed the importance of the simultaneous attacks as a psychological blow. When orders were disseminated to troops in the South (or heading south) the adopted strategy was to win a military victory. The Accuracy in Media television program, Television’s Vietnam: The Impact of Media (1986; re-released in 2007 with an update) shows that Tet brought a painful surprise for the North. The Tet offensive was a total disaster as a military offensive: by March, it was clear that the Viet Cong (pajama-clad troops in the south) had been destroyed and that the apparent setbacks at Khe Sanh and Hue had played out as American victories with tens of thousands of North Vietnamese troops killed.
When Accuracy in Media released its film in 1986, the thesis that Tet was a military disaster for the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese, but—at the same time—a psychological victory for them, was considered controversial, even though the documentary was supported by years of research by Peter Braestrup and James Banerian. (Since 1986, the major television networks have produced documentaries confirming the validity of this once paradoxical thesis.) The American military and Vietnamese allies fought well and prevailed on the ground in Vietnam while the American press announced disaster, incompetence, and debacle to readers and viewers back in the United States. The visual aspects of the Tet offensive in Saigon and Khe Sanh were particular favorites which signaled the end of the “lying” about successes in Vietnam and the unmasking of leaders such as General Westmoreland and LBJ. (Some 14 years later, CBS returned to this message about “lying” in a documentary entitled The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception in which Mike Wallace “proved” that Tet should not have been a surprise and that previous reports of progress were clearly fabrications by a sycophantic general unwilling to deliver bad news to his commander-in-chief.
How does this relate to a forthcoming “Tet offensive”?
Under General David Petraeus, our President ordered a “troop surge” to begin in the Spring of 2007, with the troop levels coming up to the desired higher level by early August. Democratic spokesmen in the House and Senate cried foul when the strategy was offered, but approved Petraeus to take command of forces in Iraq—followed by reluctance to fund the strategy of the new leader whom they had approved by an 81-0 vote. President Bush, although he has consistently refused to set calendar deadlines for success, has stressed throughout the debate that the General would be brought back in September to render an evaluation of the surge and to sort out the options for future military, diplomatic, and economic commitments. Rather than suspend judgment, the Senate spent a “sleepover” evening during July, signaling to Americans and those beyond that the will to win was as flexible as the much-advertised sleep-number mattress....
Related Links
D.M. Giangreco: Why We Should Expect Insurgents to Use Petraeus's September Report to Launch a 'Tet Offensive'