John T. Kuehn: Abolish the office of Secretary of Defense
The political and defense communities of 2006 had the wrong debate about former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.1
Instead of “should he stay or should he go,” the debate should have been whether we even need the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). It is perhaps time to admit that the great post–World War II American experiment called “unification” has failed.2 The recent civil-military relations spat over the handling of the Department of Defense (DOD) by its former chief is merely the occasion for this essay. The conflict was not as much about Rumsfeld’s personality as some would have us believe. The criticism that Rumsfeld received in 2006 and prior has precedence in the tenures of Secretaries past, including James Forrestal, Louis Johnson, Robert McNamara, and a host of others whom many have forgotten.3 It would seem that when problems continually reoccur, we need to look at their cause systemically instead of indulging in the scapegoating common to American culture.
The problem is deeper than any political appointee; the source is the office itself. Simply put, the Secretary of Defense and his supporting staff are too powerful. The wisdom of the creation and relevance of the original organization are what need to be reconsidered.
The unification of the Departments of the Navy and War (now renamed the Department of the Army) with the new Department of the Air Force as subordinate organizations under a new Secretary of Defense occurred as a result of the lessons learned from World War II. Unification did not occur naturally or without conflict. The Navy, in fact, was its greatest opponent. Unification had initially been attempted after World War I, principally due to the efforts of advocates such as General William “Billy” Mitchell for an independent air force.4 The clamor became so serious that President Calvin Coolidge convened a board in September 1925 to examine a number of questions, the fifth of which was, “Should there be a Department of National Defense under which should be grouped all the military defensive organizations of the Government?” The board included nine civilian and retired military members, including Rear Admiral Frank Friday Fletcher (uncle of the famous Jack Fletcher) and Congressman Carl Vinson. They elected Dwight W. Morrow (a banker and lawyer) as their chairman. The Morrow Board concluded its hearings in November of that year and did “not recommend a Department of National Defense, either as comprising the Army and the Navy or as comprising three coordinate Departments of Army, Navy, and Air. The disadvantages outweigh the advantages.” 5 These wise words seem to have special clarity in 2007.
Nevertheless, unification was legislatively implemented by the National Security Act of 1947. This act was significantly modified by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 and again in 1986 with the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Two reorganizations, and our national security structure is still in a muddle. Perhaps it is time for a real “transformation.”...