Mary E. Stuckey: The “L” Word in American Electoral Politics
[Mary E. Stuckey is a professor of political science and communication at Georgia State University. She is interested in issues of political power and the national media, and especially how both affect minority groups. She is the author of eight books, including The President as Interpreter-in-Chief, Strategic Failures in the Modern Presidency, Defining Americans: The Presidency and National Identity, and Slipping the Surly Bonds: Reagan's Challenger Address. She is at work on Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and the National Agenda. She is also the editor-elect of the Southern Communication Journal.]
Last week, the editorial page of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution included a cartoon from the Richmond Times Dispatch, a conservative paper out of Richmond, Virginia. The cartoon, by Gary Brookins, features a NASCAR-style car, covered with bumper stickers announcing support for “protectionism,” “moveon.org,” and “taxes.” It is driven by a cheerful looking donkey, who is saying, “Step on the gas and keep turning left!”
Now, there is nothing especially new in accusing the Democrats of being “liberal,” Ronald Reagan did it all the time, and it has been used with great effectiveness against candidates such as Walter Mondale, Michael Dukakis, and John Kerry. But what is it that makes Americans so afraid of liberals?
A fascinating book by Bruce Miroff helps answer this question. The book, The Liberal Moment: The McGovern Insurgency and the Identity Crisis of the Democratic Party, has as its premise the idea that the last moment of true liberalism in American politics was the 1972 McGovern candidacy. When, through a combination of back luck, misguided strategy, and the chicanery of the Nixon White House, McGovern was thoroughly discredited, liberalism lost its way as well.
To (over) simplify his complex and detailed analysis, Miroff argues that because of the tainted nature of “McGovernism,” Democrats are vulnerable on foreign policy because they are seen as “weak,” and are threatened domestically because the claim of “liberalism” with all of its cultural associations severs working class constituents from their own class interests, and thus from the Democratic Party. We have seen similar arguments before, most notably in the well-known What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservative Won the Heart of America?. But to my knowledge, no one has tied the phenomena surrounding “the L word” to the history of American liberalism as refracted through the McGovern campaign.
This is important because of the way that it destabilizes and paralyzes centrist Democrats. When Hillary Clinton, whose positions are simply not that far removed from those of other Democrats—and indeed, are arguably more centrist than some—is tagged as the “liberal,” the specter of McGovernism and all its cultural and ideological baggage is raised.
And Democrats seem unable to counter that specter with any arguments that rise above a sort of weak-minded defensiveness. As Miroff puts it, “centrists explain themselves by what they are not and out of a fear of what Republicans will say they are. To make matters worse, defensiveness often bleeds over into pure expedience.” When centrist Democrats fail to make arguments out of actual conviction, they naturally appear to lack conviction. This lack of conviction alienates voters every bit as much as the policies associated with “liberalism.”
The more centrists try to accommodate the perceived national move to the Right, the more they alienate their actual constituency, and yet Leftist Democrats are electorally vulnerable. McGovern, who, Miroff shows, was not nearly as liberal as he was “accused” of being, demonstrated the electoral weakness of campaigns that veer too far Left, as Barry Goldwater provides as cautionary tale for those who lean—or who are perceived as leaning—too far to the Right.
Moreover, it is dangerous indeed to run for the presidency while criticizing America—such campaigns are perceived as “negative,” and “unpatriotic,” and that tends to leave very little argumentative space for the development of a different national agenda. Reagan, again, was adept at presenting a new agenda in a positive way—he relied heavily on the rhetoric of purification, asking Americans not to change their values, but to restore them. Democrats, the party of progress and change, has difficulty arguing for restoration, as it seems to contradict much of what they stand for ideologically.
Republicans have been deft at springing this trap on Democrats, and editorial such as the one that appeared in the Richmond Times Dispatch indicate that the trap is opening wide again.
The result is a Democratic party that faces what Miroff calls an “identity crisis,” but which is also an argumentative crisis. Lacking the ground to make a coherent set of claims based on what can be easily perceived as conviction, the Democrats tend to look like vacillators, practitioners of expediency, a perception that is as damaging as the fear that Democrats oppose “traditional” American values.
As instructive as the McGovern example is (and Miroff demonstrates that it is wonderfully instructive), it also points Democrats to the example of the Republicans during roughly the same period. They spent their time in the wilderness developing and arguing for a coherent set of ideas that could be called conservatism. Democrats do not seem to be doing similar work to articulate and thus restore something called “liberalism.” The New York Times, for instance, carried an article on October 14 headlined, “Candidates Spar Over Who is A Real Republican.” It is difficult to imagine a similar headline about the Democrats.
And this is a fact that may well work against Democrats in an electoral context that seems to be favoring them.
Read entire article at Britannica Blog
Last week, the editorial page of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution included a cartoon from the Richmond Times Dispatch, a conservative paper out of Richmond, Virginia. The cartoon, by Gary Brookins, features a NASCAR-style car, covered with bumper stickers announcing support for “protectionism,” “moveon.org,” and “taxes.” It is driven by a cheerful looking donkey, who is saying, “Step on the gas and keep turning left!”
Now, there is nothing especially new in accusing the Democrats of being “liberal,” Ronald Reagan did it all the time, and it has been used with great effectiveness against candidates such as Walter Mondale, Michael Dukakis, and John Kerry. But what is it that makes Americans so afraid of liberals?
A fascinating book by Bruce Miroff helps answer this question. The book, The Liberal Moment: The McGovern Insurgency and the Identity Crisis of the Democratic Party, has as its premise the idea that the last moment of true liberalism in American politics was the 1972 McGovern candidacy. When, through a combination of back luck, misguided strategy, and the chicanery of the Nixon White House, McGovern was thoroughly discredited, liberalism lost its way as well.
To (over) simplify his complex and detailed analysis, Miroff argues that because of the tainted nature of “McGovernism,” Democrats are vulnerable on foreign policy because they are seen as “weak,” and are threatened domestically because the claim of “liberalism” with all of its cultural associations severs working class constituents from their own class interests, and thus from the Democratic Party. We have seen similar arguments before, most notably in the well-known What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservative Won the Heart of America?. But to my knowledge, no one has tied the phenomena surrounding “the L word” to the history of American liberalism as refracted through the McGovern campaign.
This is important because of the way that it destabilizes and paralyzes centrist Democrats. When Hillary Clinton, whose positions are simply not that far removed from those of other Democrats—and indeed, are arguably more centrist than some—is tagged as the “liberal,” the specter of McGovernism and all its cultural and ideological baggage is raised.
And Democrats seem unable to counter that specter with any arguments that rise above a sort of weak-minded defensiveness. As Miroff puts it, “centrists explain themselves by what they are not and out of a fear of what Republicans will say they are. To make matters worse, defensiveness often bleeds over into pure expedience.” When centrist Democrats fail to make arguments out of actual conviction, they naturally appear to lack conviction. This lack of conviction alienates voters every bit as much as the policies associated with “liberalism.”
The more centrists try to accommodate the perceived national move to the Right, the more they alienate their actual constituency, and yet Leftist Democrats are electorally vulnerable. McGovern, who, Miroff shows, was not nearly as liberal as he was “accused” of being, demonstrated the electoral weakness of campaigns that veer too far Left, as Barry Goldwater provides as cautionary tale for those who lean—or who are perceived as leaning—too far to the Right.
Moreover, it is dangerous indeed to run for the presidency while criticizing America—such campaigns are perceived as “negative,” and “unpatriotic,” and that tends to leave very little argumentative space for the development of a different national agenda. Reagan, again, was adept at presenting a new agenda in a positive way—he relied heavily on the rhetoric of purification, asking Americans not to change their values, but to restore them. Democrats, the party of progress and change, has difficulty arguing for restoration, as it seems to contradict much of what they stand for ideologically.
Republicans have been deft at springing this trap on Democrats, and editorial such as the one that appeared in the Richmond Times Dispatch indicate that the trap is opening wide again.
The result is a Democratic party that faces what Miroff calls an “identity crisis,” but which is also an argumentative crisis. Lacking the ground to make a coherent set of claims based on what can be easily perceived as conviction, the Democrats tend to look like vacillators, practitioners of expediency, a perception that is as damaging as the fear that Democrats oppose “traditional” American values.
As instructive as the McGovern example is (and Miroff demonstrates that it is wonderfully instructive), it also points Democrats to the example of the Republicans during roughly the same period. They spent their time in the wilderness developing and arguing for a coherent set of ideas that could be called conservatism. Democrats do not seem to be doing similar work to articulate and thus restore something called “liberalism.” The New York Times, for instance, carried an article on October 14 headlined, “Candidates Spar Over Who is A Real Republican.” It is difficult to imagine a similar headline about the Democrats.
And this is a fact that may well work against Democrats in an electoral context that seems to be favoring them.