Losing wars is always bad. One of the major reasons for America’s current global predominance economically and politically is that America doesn’t lose wars very often. It seems likely, however, that the American people are about to be told that they have to decide to lose the Iraq war, that accepting defeat is better than trying to win, and that the consequences of defeat will be less than the costs of continuing to fight. For some, the demand to “end this war” is a reprise of the great triumph of their generation: forcing the U.S. to lose the Vietnam War and feel good about it. But even some supporters are being seduced by their own weariness of the struggle, and are being tempted to believe the unfounded defeatism — combined with the unfounded optimism about the consequences of defeat — that hyper-sophisticates have offered during every major conflict. Americans have a right to be weary of this conflict and to desire to bring it to an end. But before we choose the easier and more comfortable wrong over the harder and more distasteful right, we should examine more closely the two core assumptions that underlie the current antiwar arguments: that we must lose this war because we cannot win it at any acceptable cost, and that it will be better to lose than to continue trying to win.

The hyper-sophisticates of the American foreign-policy and intellectual establishment direct their invective at the whole notion of winning or losing. What’s the definition of winning? If we choose to withdraw from an ill-conceived and badly executed war, that’s not really losing, is it? We can and should find ways to use diplomacy rather than military power to handle the consequences of any so-called defeat. Less-sophisticated antiwar leaders on both sides will ask simply why the U.S. should continue to spend its blood and treasure to fight in “a far-off land of which we know little,” as Neville Chamberlain famously said in defense of his abandonment of Czechoslovakia to the Nazis. We have, after all, more pressing problems at home to which the Iraq war is only contributing. As is often the case, there is a level between over-thinking and under-thinking a problem that is actually thinking. Yes, in the world as it is, whatever line we sell ourselves, there really is victory and there really is defeat, the two are different, and their effects on the future diverge profoundly. And yes, the reason we must continue to spend money and the lives of the very best Americans in that far-off land is that the interests of every American are actually at stake.

We will consider below just how much of a diversion of resources away from more desirable domestic priorities the Iraq war actually is, but the more important point is simply this: Unless the advocates of defeat can show, as they have not yet done, that the consequences of losing are very likely to be small not simply the day after the last American leaves Iraq, but over the next five, ten, and 50 years, then what they are really selling is short-term relief in exchange for long-term pain. As drug addicts can attest, this kind of instant-gratification temptation is very seductive — it’s what keeps drug dealers in business despite the terrible damage their products do to their customers. “Just end the pain now and deal with the future when it gets here” is as bad a strategy for a great nation as it is for a teenager.

The antiwar party has continually adapted its arguments, but not its conclusions, to the changing circumstances on the ground. At the end of 2006, the argument was that Iraq was in full-scale sectarian civil war, that no conceivable additional American forces could reduce the violence, that the whole notion of having American troops try to do so was foolish, and that we should instead slash our forces dramatically and turn to diplomacy with Iraq’s neighbors. When the surge began, the antiwar party crowed loud and long that success was impossible, rising violence inevitable, and the whole business doomed to failure. When Coalition operations brought the violence under control, the antiwar party admitted that security had improved but insisted that the political progress the surge was supposed to enable had not occurred and would not occur. Additional arguments popped up to explain that the fall in violence had nothing to do with the surge anyway — it resulted from the Anbar Awakening, which had preceded the surge; or, alternatively, from the fact that American troops were simply buying and arming former Sunni insurgents; and from Moqtada al Sadr’s ceasefire that he could lift at any moment, plunging Iraq right back into complete chaos. The antiwar party rather gleefully seized upon recent Iraqi Security Forces operations against Sadr’s militia and other illegal gangs as proof of this — the general glee with which the antiwar party has greeted any setback in Iraq is extremely distasteful and unseemly, whatever domestic political benefits they believe they will receive from those setbacks. Even if one believes that defeat is inevitable and withdrawal necessary, no American should take pleasure in the prospect of that defeat. But the key talking points now seem to be two: that the war costs too much, and that it is already inevitably lost whatever temporary progress the surge may have achieved. What follows is an exploration of these and a few other key antiwar talking points....

[This article extends over another 5 website pages.]

Tim Matthewson - 4/14/2008

Isn't it odd that Kagan relegates General Petraeus to a secondary position? Perhaps it is because Petraeus does not support the positions of the administration that sees the war as part of a conflict with international terrorism.

General David Petraeus' testimony before Congress has bolstered President Bush's position in the debate over the future of the war and provided Republicans with a measure of political relief by recommending withdrawal of about 25,000 troops by next summer.

Yet Petraeus did not toe the White House line completely, resisting efforts to portray Iraq as part of a global struggle against
terrorism or predict that al-Qaeda will take over if U.S. forces pull out. Asked whether fighting in Iraq makes the United States safer, as Bush argues, Petraeus answered, "I don't know" -- a reply that was featured in an antiwar ad.

Nor did Petraeus cast the war in terms the White House is fond of using -- a global fight against terrorism, where failure would threaten the U.S. homeland. Iran and al-Qaeda in Iraq are both problems, Petraeus said, but "the fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources."

Neither is Petraeus optimistic about peace or victory in Iraq, however the two terms might be defined. Petraeus showed members of Congress a slide -- the last of 13 he presented -- that projected U.S. forces staying in Iraq for an indeterminate time. It did not attach dates indicating any set timetable for withdrawal. Rather, Petraeus's spokesman said, the envisioned drawdown to 35,000 to 50,000 troops would be "conditions based."

Neither Petraeus nor Ambassador Crocker mentioned the nearly 4 1/2 years of U.S. military involvement that began with the March 2003 invasion; both seemed to date U.S. involvement in Iraq as beginning anew with the troop escalation that started early this year. Realism, Crocker suggested, means suspending demands that Iraq reach its eighteen (18) political and security benchmarks that Congress has set for it -- few of which the Iraqis have achieved -- and accepting instead more modest forms of progress.

Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus is President Bush's choice to become the top U.S. military commander in Iraq, posed a riddle years ago that now becomes his own conundrum to solve: "Tell me how this ends." That query, uttered repeatedly to a reporter then embedded in Petraeus's 101st Airborne Division, revealed skepticism about prospects in Iraq -- and the man now asked to forestall a military debacle.

Skepticism is rife, inside and outside the Army. "Petraeus is being
given a losing hand. I say that reluctantly. The war is unmistakably
going in the wrong direction," retired Army Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey
said in an interview yesterday. "The only good news in all this is that
Petraeus is so incredibly intelligent and creative. . . . I'm sure he'll
say to himself, 'I'm not going to be the last soldier off the roof of
the embassy in the Green Zone.' " Petraeus is seen by many others as perhaps the last, best hope for success in Iraq. "If anyone can pick up the baton and run with it, it is David Petraeus," said retired Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, a former Army chief of staff.

President Bush has reverted to his blend of NeoCon cynicism and Wilsonian idealism. His position may be summed up in a few sentences utterte recently in a speech before US. troops here in the U.S.

" . . . a defeat in Iraq would have consequences far beyond that country, and . . . would be felt by Americans here at home. For the same reason, helping the Iraqis defeat their enemies and build a
free society would be a strategic victory that would resound far beyond
Iraq's borders. If Al Qaida is defeated in Iraq after all the resources it has poured into the battle there, it will be a powerful blow against the global terrorist movement. If Iran is turned back in its attempt to gain undue influence over Iraq, it will be a setback to its ambitions to dominate the region. If people across the Middle East see freedom prevail in multi- ethnic, multi-sectarian Iraq, it will mark a decisive break from the long reign of tyranny in that region. And if the Middle East grows in freedom and prosperity, the appeal of extremism will decline, the prospects of peace will advance, and the American people will be safer here at home. The surge has opened the door to this strategic victory. Now we must seize the opportunity and sustain the initiative, and do what it takes to prevail."

Even among policy making officials in the Bush administration, not everybody agree with the President's assertions, which he has been repeating ever since the American intervention in Iraq in 2003. And it is readily apparent that even General Petraeus does not accept as true even the president's major assertions about the war and about its significance.

Kenneth Laurence Davis - 4/11/2008

"...the reason we must continue to spend money and the lives of the very best Americans in that far-off land is that the interests of every American are actually at stake."

Kagan makes no effort throughout his piece to define what he means by "interests" or why they are worth the deaths of many more people, but not him.

Gary W. Daily - 4/11/2008

Kagan's view that "the more important point is simply this: Unless the advocates of defeat can show, as they have not yet done, that the consequences of losing are very likely to be small not simply the day after the last American leaves Iraq, but over the next five, ten, and 50 years, then what they are really selling is short-term relief in exchange for long-term pain."

How silly.

Tim Matthewson - 4/11/2008

President Bush said Thursday that the senior United States commander in Iraq could “have all the time he needs” before reducing American forces there any further, but he promised shorter tours for troops and longer breaks for them at home.
“If Iran makes the right choice, America will encourage a peaceful relationship between Iran and Iraq,” he said. “Iran makes the wrong choice, America will act to protect our interests and our troops and our Iraqi partners.”