Bernard Lewis: The UN Is Likely to Botch the Job in Iraq

Bernard Lewis, in the WSJ (May 12, 2004):

The U.S. turn to the United Nations for help in Iraq raises two questions, one of perception, the other of substance.

There can be no doubt that this appeal, in the context of the events in Fallujah, will be perceived in many circles in the Middle East -- and not only in the Middle East -- as signifying fear and flight, in other words, as the beginning of a scuttle. It is now clear that what happened in Fallujah in March was a carefully staged replay of what happened in Somalia in October 1993, when American soldiers were seized, lynched, dismembered and dragged through the streets.

This was intended to achieve the same result -- a precipitous American departure. The line that Americans are degenerate, soft and pampered -- "hit them and they will run" -- has been a major theme of Islamic terrorists for some time now. It was temporarily silenced by the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, but then revived by what was seen as public dithering and wavering. The turn to the U.N. will be perceived, or at least presented, as final and conclusive evidence of their view of America, and may well serve as the starting point of a new wave of terrorist action against Americans, reaching far beyond Iraq and perhaps even as far as these shores. One is reminded of Ehud Barak's decision to withdraw the Israeli forces from Lebanon. The decision was right and indeed long overdue, but the manner of the withdrawal was disastrous, and led directly to the current Intifada. I remember a conversation in an Arab country at the time, when I was told triumphantly: "The Israelis have become soft and pampered, like their American patrons. Our Lebanese brothers have shown us the way." Perceptions, even if inaccurate, are powerful and important, and may at times be self-fulfilling.

The second point is one of substance. The record of the U.N. in dealing with conflicts is not encouraging -- neither in terms of fairness, nor of efficacy. Its record on human rights is even worse -- hardly surprising, since the members of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights include such practitioners of human rights as Cuba, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Zimbabwe. In dealing with conflicts, as a European observer once remarked, its purpose seems to be conservation rather than resolution.

A case in point: In 1947 the British Empire in India was partitioned into two states, India and Pakistan. There was a bitter military struggle, and an estimated 10 million refugees were displaced. Despite continuing friction, some sort of accommodation was reached between the two states and the refugees were resettled. No outside power or organization was involved.

In the following year, 1948, the British-mandated territory of Palestine was partitioned -- in terms of area and numbers, a triviality compared with India. Yet that conflict continues, and the 750,000 Arab refugees from Israel and their millions of descendants remain refugees, in camps maintained and staffed by the U.N. Except for Jordan, no Arab state has been willing to grant citizenship to the Palestinian refugees or to their locally born descendants, or even to allow them the rights of resident aliens. They are now entering their fifth generation as stateless refugee aliens. The whole operation is maintained and sustained by a massive apparatus of U.N. officials, some of whom have spent virtually their whole careers on this issue. What progress has been made on the Arab-Israel problem -- the resettlement in Israel of Jewish refugees from the Arab-held parts of mandatory Palestine and from Arab countries, the Egyptian and Jordanian peace agreements -- was achieved outside the framework of the U.N. One shudders to think what might have been the fate of the Indian subcontinent if the U.N. had been involved in its partition.

The question of substance is of course of far greater importance in the long term. The question of perception is immediate, but could have long-term consequences.