Nicolaus Mills: What BHO can learn from FDR
[Nicolaus Mills is a professor of American Studies at Sarah Lawrence College and author of the forthcoming book, Winning the Peace: The Marshall Plan and America's Coming of Age as a Superpower.]
As the financial crisis worsens, Barack Obama has been drawn into increased cooperation with the Bush administration. It is an important step for him to take, but if he allows the history of Franklin Roosevelt's transition to power in 1932 to be his guide, Obama will move cautiously in the weeks before his inauguration and continue to insist we have only "one president at a time".
After winning the 1932 election on November 8, Roosevelt had a four-month wait until his inauguration on March 4. In the long interval the economy continued its downward spiral, and the unpopular Herbert Hoover – in the name of "the common good of the country" – did everything he could to get Roosevelt to join him in a series of shared undertakings.
Shortly after the election, Hoover received a joint Anglo-French request for a postponement of the first world war debt payments that were scheduled to fall due on December 15. There was no easy answer as to how hard to press for repayment, and Hoover decided that the best way to deal with the problem was to get Roosevelt to work with him and advocate a common position on the debts. But Roosevelt, who agreed that the debts should be paid, declined to cooperate with Hoover, writing him: "I think you will recognise that it would be unwise for me to accept joint responsibility with you when, as a matter of constitutional fact, I would be wholly lacking in any attendant authority."
The politeness of FDR's letter concealed the depth of his differences with Hoover. Hoover believed that the main causes of the depression lay abroad. By contrast, Roosevelt believed that the principal sources of the depression were domestic, and he looked on any joint action with Hoover on war debts as a distraction from his own strategy. The most Roosevelt would do was agree to a brief November 22 meeting at the White House, which went nowhere.
Hoover was, however, still not done trying to get Roosevelt to work with him. Three months later, on February 17, Hoover sent Roosevelt a long letter in which he declared: "It would steady the country greatly if there could be prompt assurance that there will be no tampering or inflation of the currency; that the budget will be unquestionably balanced, even if further taxation is necessary; that government credit will be maintained by refusal to exhaust it in the issue of securities."
In his letter, Hoover was acting as though he had won the 1932 election. He was essentially asking Roosevelt, who in an election with a turnout of almost 40 million had defeated him by over seven million votes, to abandon his own economic programme in favour of Hoover's approach to the depression. Hoover's underlying motives were reflected in a memo from him to Republican senator David Reed of Pennsylvania, in which he observed that if Roosevelt agreed with him, "he will have ratified the whole major programme of the Republican administration; that is, it means the abandonment of 90% of the so-called New Deal."..
Read entire article at Guardian (UK)
As the financial crisis worsens, Barack Obama has been drawn into increased cooperation with the Bush administration. It is an important step for him to take, but if he allows the history of Franklin Roosevelt's transition to power in 1932 to be his guide, Obama will move cautiously in the weeks before his inauguration and continue to insist we have only "one president at a time".
After winning the 1932 election on November 8, Roosevelt had a four-month wait until his inauguration on March 4. In the long interval the economy continued its downward spiral, and the unpopular Herbert Hoover – in the name of "the common good of the country" – did everything he could to get Roosevelt to join him in a series of shared undertakings.
Shortly after the election, Hoover received a joint Anglo-French request for a postponement of the first world war debt payments that were scheduled to fall due on December 15. There was no easy answer as to how hard to press for repayment, and Hoover decided that the best way to deal with the problem was to get Roosevelt to work with him and advocate a common position on the debts. But Roosevelt, who agreed that the debts should be paid, declined to cooperate with Hoover, writing him: "I think you will recognise that it would be unwise for me to accept joint responsibility with you when, as a matter of constitutional fact, I would be wholly lacking in any attendant authority."
The politeness of FDR's letter concealed the depth of his differences with Hoover. Hoover believed that the main causes of the depression lay abroad. By contrast, Roosevelt believed that the principal sources of the depression were domestic, and he looked on any joint action with Hoover on war debts as a distraction from his own strategy. The most Roosevelt would do was agree to a brief November 22 meeting at the White House, which went nowhere.
Hoover was, however, still not done trying to get Roosevelt to work with him. Three months later, on February 17, Hoover sent Roosevelt a long letter in which he declared: "It would steady the country greatly if there could be prompt assurance that there will be no tampering or inflation of the currency; that the budget will be unquestionably balanced, even if further taxation is necessary; that government credit will be maintained by refusal to exhaust it in the issue of securities."
In his letter, Hoover was acting as though he had won the 1932 election. He was essentially asking Roosevelt, who in an election with a turnout of almost 40 million had defeated him by over seven million votes, to abandon his own economic programme in favour of Hoover's approach to the depression. Hoover's underlying motives were reflected in a memo from him to Republican senator David Reed of Pennsylvania, in which he observed that if Roosevelt agreed with him, "he will have ratified the whole major programme of the Republican administration; that is, it means the abandonment of 90% of the so-called New Deal."..