Richard Reeves: Missile Gaps and Other Broken Promises
On the morning of his 17th day as President, John F. Kennedy was still in bed at 8 a.m. and, as was his habit, reading The New York Times. One glance at the front page and he exploded, calling his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara and saying: “What the hell is this ….”
“This” was a headline: “Kennedy Defense Study Finds No Evidence of a ‘Missile Gap.’ ”
Not good. Kennedy’s most powerful campaign line had been: “We are facing a gap on which we are gambling with our survival …”
McNamara, a Republican who had been the president of Ford Motors, was considered the best of the new president’s Cabinet choices. He may have been the best and the brightest, but he was a political amateur. The evening before, McNamara had invited reporters covering the Defense Department into his office for drinks and a get-acquainted session. Unfortunately, the new guy did not know the rules of the game.
The session was “N.F.A.” — not for attribution — which McNamara thought was the same as “off the record.” In fact, the phrase meant reporters could use anything the secretary said as long as they did not identify him as the source.
McNamara rather casually smiled when reporters asked about the missile gap. He said there was no such thing, and if there was any gap was heavily in favor of the United States. When the president called, McNamara stammered that he was sorry, but that, in fact, the United States could absorb a full-scale Soviet missile attack and still have more than enough nuclear missiles to destroy 100 Soviet cities, kill 100 million Soviet citizens and destroy 80-percent of that country’s industrial capacity in a few hours.
A presidential news conference had already been scheduled for Feb. 8 and, predictably, White House correspondents asked Kennedy about the disappearing gap: “It would be premature to reach a judgment as to whether there is a gap or was no gap,” he replied.
He was lying. He knew there was no gap. He had been told so by Central Intelligence Agency briefers during the campaign. On the day before he became president, Kennedy was told by his predecessor, Dwight Eisenhower, that there was no missile gap. The United States had a huge advantage, said Eisenhower, “and one invulnerable weapon, Polaris.” These were the nuclear missiles aboard United States Navy submarines in the oceans off the coasts of the Soviet Union.
(Later CIA reports indicated that during the 1960 campaign, the Soviets probably had only three intercontinetal ballistic missiles. At the time, though, the C.I.A. estimated, incorrectly, there were about 90 Soviet ICBMs and 200 bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, although none of those bombers had the range to reach the United States. At the same time, the United States had 108 missiles that could reach Soviet targets and were in the process of deploying 30 more in Turkey. In addition, the United States Air Force had 600 nuclear-ready bombers capable of reaching Soviet targets.)
The McNamara blunder into truth-telling was not only problem Kennedy had with talented amateurs. Walter Heller, who went from the campus of the University of Minnesota to become chairman of the president’s Council of Economic Advisers, had briefed reporters on the administration’s plans to deal with an ongoing recession, and gave them actual numeric goals that began appearing in newspapers around the country. “Never do that again,” Kennedy told Heller in an angry telephone call. “Forget those numbers. Numbers can come back to haunt you. Words can always be explained away.”
Kennedy had learned quickly, as Barack Obama is now, the gap between campaigning and governing. Events are in the saddle for a president, whether the 35th or 44th. Obama planned to be a president getting us out of Iraq, now he is trying to get us out of debt
As for the missile gap, and the White House’s inability to explain away McNamara’s numbers, Kennedy decided he had to get some real numbers out there. He was afraid that the Soviet Union and other countries that might believe that the United States was as weak as he had said it was in his campaign rhetoric. He dispatched the deputy secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric, to give a speech — which Kennedy himself edited line by line and number by number — which could be called saber-rattling but was actually saber-describing.
Speaking to the National Business Council at Hot Springs, Va., Gilpatric laid it out: “This nation has nuclear retaliatory force of such lethal power that an enemy which brought it into play would be an act of self-destruction on his part … The total number of our nuclear delivery vehicles, tactical as well as strategic, is in the tens of thousands; and of course, we have more than one warhead for each vehicle.”
The businessmen in Virginia might have wondered why he was telling them this. But they were not the real audience. The audience was Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and other world leaders. After the speech, Kennedy reinforced the message by saying he was ready to do whatever it took “to protect our lead.”
Read entire article at NYT blog
“This” was a headline: “Kennedy Defense Study Finds No Evidence of a ‘Missile Gap.’ ”
Not good. Kennedy’s most powerful campaign line had been: “We are facing a gap on which we are gambling with our survival …”
McNamara, a Republican who had been the president of Ford Motors, was considered the best of the new president’s Cabinet choices. He may have been the best and the brightest, but he was a political amateur. The evening before, McNamara had invited reporters covering the Defense Department into his office for drinks and a get-acquainted session. Unfortunately, the new guy did not know the rules of the game.
The session was “N.F.A.” — not for attribution — which McNamara thought was the same as “off the record.” In fact, the phrase meant reporters could use anything the secretary said as long as they did not identify him as the source.
McNamara rather casually smiled when reporters asked about the missile gap. He said there was no such thing, and if there was any gap was heavily in favor of the United States. When the president called, McNamara stammered that he was sorry, but that, in fact, the United States could absorb a full-scale Soviet missile attack and still have more than enough nuclear missiles to destroy 100 Soviet cities, kill 100 million Soviet citizens and destroy 80-percent of that country’s industrial capacity in a few hours.
A presidential news conference had already been scheduled for Feb. 8 and, predictably, White House correspondents asked Kennedy about the disappearing gap: “It would be premature to reach a judgment as to whether there is a gap or was no gap,” he replied.
He was lying. He knew there was no gap. He had been told so by Central Intelligence Agency briefers during the campaign. On the day before he became president, Kennedy was told by his predecessor, Dwight Eisenhower, that there was no missile gap. The United States had a huge advantage, said Eisenhower, “and one invulnerable weapon, Polaris.” These were the nuclear missiles aboard United States Navy submarines in the oceans off the coasts of the Soviet Union.
(Later CIA reports indicated that during the 1960 campaign, the Soviets probably had only three intercontinetal ballistic missiles. At the time, though, the C.I.A. estimated, incorrectly, there were about 90 Soviet ICBMs and 200 bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, although none of those bombers had the range to reach the United States. At the same time, the United States had 108 missiles that could reach Soviet targets and were in the process of deploying 30 more in Turkey. In addition, the United States Air Force had 600 nuclear-ready bombers capable of reaching Soviet targets.)
The McNamara blunder into truth-telling was not only problem Kennedy had with talented amateurs. Walter Heller, who went from the campus of the University of Minnesota to become chairman of the president’s Council of Economic Advisers, had briefed reporters on the administration’s plans to deal with an ongoing recession, and gave them actual numeric goals that began appearing in newspapers around the country. “Never do that again,” Kennedy told Heller in an angry telephone call. “Forget those numbers. Numbers can come back to haunt you. Words can always be explained away.”
Kennedy had learned quickly, as Barack Obama is now, the gap between campaigning and governing. Events are in the saddle for a president, whether the 35th or 44th. Obama planned to be a president getting us out of Iraq, now he is trying to get us out of debt
As for the missile gap, and the White House’s inability to explain away McNamara’s numbers, Kennedy decided he had to get some real numbers out there. He was afraid that the Soviet Union and other countries that might believe that the United States was as weak as he had said it was in his campaign rhetoric. He dispatched the deputy secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric, to give a speech — which Kennedy himself edited line by line and number by number — which could be called saber-rattling but was actually saber-describing.
Speaking to the National Business Council at Hot Springs, Va., Gilpatric laid it out: “This nation has nuclear retaliatory force of such lethal power that an enemy which brought it into play would be an act of self-destruction on his part … The total number of our nuclear delivery vehicles, tactical as well as strategic, is in the tens of thousands; and of course, we have more than one warhead for each vehicle.”
The businessmen in Virginia might have wondered why he was telling them this. But they were not the real audience. The audience was Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and other world leaders. After the speech, Kennedy reinforced the message by saying he was ready to do whatever it took “to protect our lead.”