Richard Reeves: How Kennedy Won the House and Lost the South
It happened to John F. Kennedy just days into his presidency. It will happen to President Obama, too. Probably it already has.
The bad news was delivered to Kennedy at breakfast with Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, Democrat of Texas, who said: “Mr. President, I don’t believe we have the votes …”
The new president, a former member of the House, was shocked. Even presidents believe what they read in the papers, and the conventional wisdom in 1961 was that “Mister Sam” controlled the 263 Democrats in the House. With only 174 Republicans, there should have been more than enough votes to do what Kennedy wanted done: expand the Rules Committee from 12 to 15 members.
By bringing the House Rules Committee in line in 1961, John F. Kennedy turned the Democratic South into Republican territory for decades. The 12 stood between Kennedy and his agenda. There were eight Democrats and four Republicans on Rules, the committee that controlled the schedule of the House, which meant the Democrats should have had total control over the release of proposed legislation to debate and voting by the full House. Presidents had the power to command the national debate by summoning press and television coverage. Yet Rayburn — who had come to the House in 1913 and had been speaker for 16 years — was telling Kennedy that he did not have the power to control what Congress debated.
The president’s proposals would die in Rules if the two senior, Southern, conservative Democrats on the committee, Howard Smith of Virginia, the chairman, and William Colmer of Mississippi, joined the Republicans. When that happened, and it often did, particularly on civil rights legislation, the 6-to-6 tie vote killed liberal proposals right there. Kennedy had taken it for granted that Rayburn could change all that, marshalling the 274 Democrats on a full House vote to add three members to Rules. The idea was that Rayburn would appoint two younger and more liberal Democrats to guarantee 8-to-7 votes, bringing administration legislation to the floor for full House votes.
“Larry,” said the president to his Congressional liaison, Larry O’Brien. “What is this? We can’t lose this one, Larry. The ball game is over if we do.”
He was right about that. He wanted to break the coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats, mostly Southerners, who were the real ruling class of the Congress. In fact, that coalition was stronger after the 1960 election, despite Kennedy’s victory. Moderate Democrats in Congress owed little to the president, who had won by less that one-tenth of one percent of the popular vote, and had lost to the Republican candidate, Richard Nixon, in most of their districts. Many Democrats in Congress had been hurt rather than helped by the Northern liberal at the top of the ticket.
Kennedy sent O’Brien to Capitol Hill with orders to find out what he had to do to win the Rules Committee vote. “You have to begin by promising a balanced budget,” O’Brien said when he came back. Within an hour Kennedy issued this statement:
The president’s top economists, Walter Heller and Paul Samuelson, who wanted Kennedy to cut taxes to stimulate the economy, protested inside the Oval Office. But Rules was the game, and they would have to play along. Heller gave a confusing press briefing, avoiding any numbers at all. It ended when one frustrated reporter asked: “How can we judge a stimulating effect without knowing the cost?”
“How did you answer that?” Kennedy later asked.
“Fast talk and rapid gestures,” said Heller.
“Good job,” said the president.
On the last day of January, on Kennedy’s 11th day in office, Sam Rayburn stepped down from the speaker’s chair for the first time since it became his perch, and from the floor of the House pleaded for the Rules Committee expansion. He won, the president won, by a vote 217 to 212.
It was a victory, one that resonated for years. Kennedy was able to get much of his program through the Congress. Yet, politically, that vote and the humiliation of Reps. Smith and Colmer were the beginning of the end of Democratic control below the Mason-Dixon line. Kennedy — and Lyndon Johnson after him — were able to push liberal agenda items, including civil rights legislation, through Congress. But the price was high: over the next 30 years, the Republicans rose. The solid Democratic South became the solid Republican South. At least until last year, when black Southerners came out in record numbers and Virginia, North Carolina and Florida were won by Barack Obama.
Read entire article at NYT
The bad news was delivered to Kennedy at breakfast with Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, Democrat of Texas, who said: “Mr. President, I don’t believe we have the votes …”
The new president, a former member of the House, was shocked. Even presidents believe what they read in the papers, and the conventional wisdom in 1961 was that “Mister Sam” controlled the 263 Democrats in the House. With only 174 Republicans, there should have been more than enough votes to do what Kennedy wanted done: expand the Rules Committee from 12 to 15 members.
By bringing the House Rules Committee in line in 1961, John F. Kennedy turned the Democratic South into Republican territory for decades. The 12 stood between Kennedy and his agenda. There were eight Democrats and four Republicans on Rules, the committee that controlled the schedule of the House, which meant the Democrats should have had total control over the release of proposed legislation to debate and voting by the full House. Presidents had the power to command the national debate by summoning press and television coverage. Yet Rayburn — who had come to the House in 1913 and had been speaker for 16 years — was telling Kennedy that he did not have the power to control what Congress debated.
The president’s proposals would die in Rules if the two senior, Southern, conservative Democrats on the committee, Howard Smith of Virginia, the chairman, and William Colmer of Mississippi, joined the Republicans. When that happened, and it often did, particularly on civil rights legislation, the 6-to-6 tie vote killed liberal proposals right there. Kennedy had taken it for granted that Rayburn could change all that, marshalling the 274 Democrats on a full House vote to add three members to Rules. The idea was that Rayburn would appoint two younger and more liberal Democrats to guarantee 8-to-7 votes, bringing administration legislation to the floor for full House votes.
“Larry,” said the president to his Congressional liaison, Larry O’Brien. “What is this? We can’t lose this one, Larry. The ball game is over if we do.”
He was right about that. He wanted to break the coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats, mostly Southerners, who were the real ruling class of the Congress. In fact, that coalition was stronger after the 1960 election, despite Kennedy’s victory. Moderate Democrats in Congress owed little to the president, who had won by less that one-tenth of one percent of the popular vote, and had lost to the Republican candidate, Richard Nixon, in most of their districts. Many Democrats in Congress had been hurt rather than helped by the Northern liberal at the top of the ticket.
Kennedy sent O’Brien to Capitol Hill with orders to find out what he had to do to win the Rules Committee vote. “You have to begin by promising a balanced budget,” O’Brien said when he came back. Within an hour Kennedy issued this statement:
A new administration must of necessity build upon the spending and revenue estimates already submitted. Within that framework, barring the development of national defense needs or a worsening economy, it is my current intention to advocate a program of expenditures, including revenues from a stimulation of the economy, which will not of and by themselves unbalance the earlier budget.
The president’s top economists, Walter Heller and Paul Samuelson, who wanted Kennedy to cut taxes to stimulate the economy, protested inside the Oval Office. But Rules was the game, and they would have to play along. Heller gave a confusing press briefing, avoiding any numbers at all. It ended when one frustrated reporter asked: “How can we judge a stimulating effect without knowing the cost?”
“How did you answer that?” Kennedy later asked.
“Fast talk and rapid gestures,” said Heller.
“Good job,” said the president.
On the last day of January, on Kennedy’s 11th day in office, Sam Rayburn stepped down from the speaker’s chair for the first time since it became his perch, and from the floor of the House pleaded for the Rules Committee expansion. He won, the president won, by a vote 217 to 212.
It was a victory, one that resonated for years. Kennedy was able to get much of his program through the Congress. Yet, politically, that vote and the humiliation of Reps. Smith and Colmer were the beginning of the end of Democratic control below the Mason-Dixon line. Kennedy — and Lyndon Johnson after him — were able to push liberal agenda items, including civil rights legislation, through Congress. But the price was high: over the next 30 years, the Republicans rose. The solid Democratic South became the solid Republican South. At least until last year, when black Southerners came out in record numbers and Virginia, North Carolina and Florida were won by Barack Obama.