Richard Reeves: Hail to the Chief — in Public, That Is
President Obama must have been a bit surprised when, on his 54th day in office, the former vice president, Richard Cheney, decided to go on television and brand him a danger to the Republic. “ “He is,” said Cheney, “making some choices that, in my mind, will, in fact, raise the risk to the American people of another attack.”
That is not the way the game is usually played. Even former President George W. Bush understood that. Speaking two days after Cheney to an audience of 2,000 people in Calgary, Canada, he was, predictably, asked about Cheney’s remarks and said of his successor:
“He deserves my silence. I love my country a lot more than I love politics. I think it is essential that he be helped in office.”
That’s better — or at least validates the norm of history.
On President Kennedy’s 86th day in office, April 16,1961, a United States-backed and trained brigade of exiles tried to overthrow Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba by invasion at a place called the Bay of Pigs. It was, of course, a total disaster, one of the great embarrassments in American history. The 35th president deflected some criticism by publicly taking responsibility for the incompetence and stupidity of that adventure. But he also immediately began a series of “national unity” meetings, beginning with former Vice President Richard Nixon, his 1960 opponent, and former President Dwight Eisenhower, revered by much of the country for his military leadership during World War II.
Nixon was first, coming to the White House on April 20. “It was the worst experience of my life,” Kennedy told his old adversary. Then he asked what Nixon would do now. The answer was: “I would find a proper legal cover and then I would go in.”
The president said no to that; he was afraid the Soviet Union would retaliate where the western Allies were weakest, in Berlin. Nixon nodded, then said that whatever Kennedy decided, “I will support you to the hilt.”
Two days later, he invited Eisenhower for lunch at Camp David. Kennedy had never seen the presidential retreat, which Eisenhower had named for his grandson. They walked the paths of the 125-acre reservation and the old five-star general gave the young ex-Navy lieutenant the tongue-lashing of his life. The conversation, reconstructed from Eisenhower’s notes from the meeting, went something like this:
“No one knows how tough this job is until he’s been in it a few months,” Kennedy began.
“Mr. President,” answered Eisenhower,” If you will forgive me, I think I mentioned that to you three months ago.”
“I certainly have learned a lot since then.”
“Mr. President, before you approved this plan, did you have everybody in front of you debating the thing so you got the pros and cons yourself and then made the decision, or did you see these people one at a time?”
“Well, I did have a meeting … I just took their advice.”
“Mr. President, were there any changes in the plan that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved?”
“Yes, there were. We did want to call off one bombing sally.”
“Why was that called off? Why did they change plans after the ships were at sea?”
“Well, we felt it necessary that we keep our hand concealed in this affair …”
“Mr. President, how could you expect the world to believe that we had nothing to do with it? Where did those people get the ships to go from Central America to Cuba? Where did they get the weapons? Where did they get all the communications and all the other things they would need? How could you have possibly kept from the world any knowledge that the United States was involved? I believe there is only one thing to do when you get into this kind of thing — it must be a success.”
“I assure you that, hereafter, if we get into anything like this, it is going to be a success.”
“Well, I’m glad to hear that,” said Eisenhower.
It was time to meet the press. Reporters were lined up along the electric fence around the reservation. Kennedy began by saying: “I asked President Eisenhower here to bring him up to date on recent events and get the benefit of his thoughts and experience.”
Despite the criticism he delivered in private, Eisenhower said, “I am all in favor of the United States supporting the man who has to carry the responsibility for our foreign affairs.”
Kennedy helicoptered back to the White House, angrily stalking the Oval Office, cursing his military leaders and the Central Intelligence Agency, ending his tirade with: “How could I have been so stupid?”
He called in the chief architects of the Bay of Pigs invasion plan, the C.I.A. director Allen Dulles, and Richard Bissell, who planned the operation. He told Bissell: “In a Parliamentary system I would resign. In our system the president can’t and doesn’t. You and Allen must go.”
And so, Kennedy began the last eight of his first 100 days in the White House.
Read entire article at NYT blog
That is not the way the game is usually played. Even former President George W. Bush understood that. Speaking two days after Cheney to an audience of 2,000 people in Calgary, Canada, he was, predictably, asked about Cheney’s remarks and said of his successor:
“He deserves my silence. I love my country a lot more than I love politics. I think it is essential that he be helped in office.”
That’s better — or at least validates the norm of history.
On President Kennedy’s 86th day in office, April 16,1961, a United States-backed and trained brigade of exiles tried to overthrow Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba by invasion at a place called the Bay of Pigs. It was, of course, a total disaster, one of the great embarrassments in American history. The 35th president deflected some criticism by publicly taking responsibility for the incompetence and stupidity of that adventure. But he also immediately began a series of “national unity” meetings, beginning with former Vice President Richard Nixon, his 1960 opponent, and former President Dwight Eisenhower, revered by much of the country for his military leadership during World War II.
Nixon was first, coming to the White House on April 20. “It was the worst experience of my life,” Kennedy told his old adversary. Then he asked what Nixon would do now. The answer was: “I would find a proper legal cover and then I would go in.”
The president said no to that; he was afraid the Soviet Union would retaliate where the western Allies were weakest, in Berlin. Nixon nodded, then said that whatever Kennedy decided, “I will support you to the hilt.”
Two days later, he invited Eisenhower for lunch at Camp David. Kennedy had never seen the presidential retreat, which Eisenhower had named for his grandson. They walked the paths of the 125-acre reservation and the old five-star general gave the young ex-Navy lieutenant the tongue-lashing of his life. The conversation, reconstructed from Eisenhower’s notes from the meeting, went something like this:
“No one knows how tough this job is until he’s been in it a few months,” Kennedy began.
“Mr. President,” answered Eisenhower,” If you will forgive me, I think I mentioned that to you three months ago.”
“I certainly have learned a lot since then.”
“Mr. President, before you approved this plan, did you have everybody in front of you debating the thing so you got the pros and cons yourself and then made the decision, or did you see these people one at a time?”
“Well, I did have a meeting … I just took their advice.”
“Mr. President, were there any changes in the plan that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved?”
“Yes, there were. We did want to call off one bombing sally.”
“Why was that called off? Why did they change plans after the ships were at sea?”
“Well, we felt it necessary that we keep our hand concealed in this affair …”
“Mr. President, how could you expect the world to believe that we had nothing to do with it? Where did those people get the ships to go from Central America to Cuba? Where did they get the weapons? Where did they get all the communications and all the other things they would need? How could you have possibly kept from the world any knowledge that the United States was involved? I believe there is only one thing to do when you get into this kind of thing — it must be a success.”
“I assure you that, hereafter, if we get into anything like this, it is going to be a success.”
“Well, I’m glad to hear that,” said Eisenhower.
It was time to meet the press. Reporters were lined up along the electric fence around the reservation. Kennedy began by saying: “I asked President Eisenhower here to bring him up to date on recent events and get the benefit of his thoughts and experience.”
Despite the criticism he delivered in private, Eisenhower said, “I am all in favor of the United States supporting the man who has to carry the responsibility for our foreign affairs.”
Kennedy helicoptered back to the White House, angrily stalking the Oval Office, cursing his military leaders and the Central Intelligence Agency, ending his tirade with: “How could I have been so stupid?”
He called in the chief architects of the Bay of Pigs invasion plan, the C.I.A. director Allen Dulles, and Richard Bissell, who planned the operation. He told Bissell: “In a Parliamentary system I would resign. In our system the president can’t and doesn’t. You and Allen must go.”
And so, Kennedy began the last eight of his first 100 days in the White House.