Gordon Gibson: 'Winning' in Afghanistan sounds a lot like 'winning' in Vietnam
[Gordon Gibson is senior fellow in Canadian studies at The Fraser Institute and a regular columnist for The Globe and Mail.]
The escalated American war in Afghanistan is shaping up as another Vietnam, which brought a generation of grief to the United States.
The parallels are uncanny. Both wars concern far-off lands with difficult supply lines and people with centuries-old resistance to foreign control. In each case, the other side is fuelled not just by nationalism but also by ideology - communism in Vietnam, Islamism in Afghanistan. In each case, local resistance has the military advantage of relatively safe sanctuaries - North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the one case, Pakistan in the other.
In each case, there's an elephant next door - the People's Liberation Army (Vietnam), and fear over control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal (Afghanistan). In each case, these things did or will constrain the full exercise of American destructive power lest they awaken the elephant.
In each case, one of the things you need to do to "win" - i.e. destroy the agricultural base supporting the enemy (poppies in Afghanistan) is ruled out by a mixture of morals and politics, a combination that can paralyze decision-making. In each case, the other side has infinite patience unless utterly crushed.
It's not all one-sided. Today's U.S. military is far more proficient at guerrilla action, and Washington has more allies in Afghanistan than it did in Vietnam. Alas, most of them (Canadians and Brits notably excluded) don't want to fight. And most distressing of all, if there is a "win," what is it?
In Vietnam, it was supposed to be propping up the surrounding "domino" countries that Washington feared would go communist if Vietnam were lost. Didn't happen. In Afghanistan, instead of a corrupt government dominated by aggressive Islam and oppressive of women, we would have, um, a corrupt government dominated by aggressive Islam and oppressive of women but (sort of) elected.
The Taliban version would undoubtedly be more brutal, but is making this choice for the Afghan people a moral or strategic imperative for Western nations?
There is the issue of potential bases for al-Qaeda in a Talibanized Afghanistan, but history has shown that local dictators can control such terrorists much more effectively than foreigners if given the right incentives. Targeted operations can quietly kill remaining threats to American security if Barack Obama is prepared to rebuild this covert capacity and empower it.
Perhaps Mr. Obama, with enough time, money and troops, could achieve in Afghanistan what Lyndon Johnson did in Vietnam - namely, he spent his way to military dominance, then was brought down by political controversy at home. In Vietnam, it was always another 30,000 troops that would bring victory. This didn't happen, and the failure ended the Johnson presidency. The United States has now been in Afghanistan (not to mention Iraq) for seven years. Even the Obama Teflon will have limits.
Far better for Mr. Obama to adopt the Nixonian solution: Find a plausible time to declare victory, then leave. Ten years on, 9/11 will have been avenged...
Read entire article at Globe and Mail
The escalated American war in Afghanistan is shaping up as another Vietnam, which brought a generation of grief to the United States.
The parallels are uncanny. Both wars concern far-off lands with difficult supply lines and people with centuries-old resistance to foreign control. In each case, the other side is fuelled not just by nationalism but also by ideology - communism in Vietnam, Islamism in Afghanistan. In each case, local resistance has the military advantage of relatively safe sanctuaries - North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the one case, Pakistan in the other.
In each case, there's an elephant next door - the People's Liberation Army (Vietnam), and fear over control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal (Afghanistan). In each case, these things did or will constrain the full exercise of American destructive power lest they awaken the elephant.
In each case, one of the things you need to do to "win" - i.e. destroy the agricultural base supporting the enemy (poppies in Afghanistan) is ruled out by a mixture of morals and politics, a combination that can paralyze decision-making. In each case, the other side has infinite patience unless utterly crushed.
It's not all one-sided. Today's U.S. military is far more proficient at guerrilla action, and Washington has more allies in Afghanistan than it did in Vietnam. Alas, most of them (Canadians and Brits notably excluded) don't want to fight. And most distressing of all, if there is a "win," what is it?
In Vietnam, it was supposed to be propping up the surrounding "domino" countries that Washington feared would go communist if Vietnam were lost. Didn't happen. In Afghanistan, instead of a corrupt government dominated by aggressive Islam and oppressive of women, we would have, um, a corrupt government dominated by aggressive Islam and oppressive of women but (sort of) elected.
The Taliban version would undoubtedly be more brutal, but is making this choice for the Afghan people a moral or strategic imperative for Western nations?
There is the issue of potential bases for al-Qaeda in a Talibanized Afghanistan, but history has shown that local dictators can control such terrorists much more effectively than foreigners if given the right incentives. Targeted operations can quietly kill remaining threats to American security if Barack Obama is prepared to rebuild this covert capacity and empower it.
Perhaps Mr. Obama, with enough time, money and troops, could achieve in Afghanistan what Lyndon Johnson did in Vietnam - namely, he spent his way to military dominance, then was brought down by political controversy at home. In Vietnam, it was always another 30,000 troops that would bring victory. This didn't happen, and the failure ended the Johnson presidency. The United States has now been in Afghanistan (not to mention Iraq) for seven years. Even the Obama Teflon will have limits.
Far better for Mr. Obama to adopt the Nixonian solution: Find a plausible time to declare victory, then leave. Ten years on, 9/11 will have been avenged...