Washington must realize that unless Arab regimes allow pluralism, power-sharing and judicial independence, liberal autocracy--not democracy--will be the result.

September 11 and its aftermath caused many American policymakers, both Democrats and Republicans, to re-evaluate Washington's traditional emphasis on promoting "stability" in the Middle East, even at the expense of democratization. Support for autocratic regimes, far from pacifying the region, came to be seen as the root cause for the growth of Islamic radicalism, culminating in the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. A strategy of promoting democracy throughout the so-called Greater Middle East was no longer considered to be an idealist dream but a realist necessity to ensure the long-term security of the United States.

The necessity for reform in the Middle East has never been more compelling. The Arab world faces the real possibility of social implosion. The Middle East confronts a demographic revolution, with nearly half of its population under twenty years of age. It is estimated that the region must create 100 million jobs over the next 15 years to accommodate its "youth bulge." Such a daunting challenge requires that governments implement structural reforms designed to boost economic growth by promoting investment and trade. Yet it is difficult to see how any government in the Middle East can undertake meaningful economic reforms without political modernization. After all, the preconditions for a successful market transition, such as the rule of law, accountability and transparency, are also the essential components of a democratic polity.

It is customary for U.S. officials to cite the successful campaign of unseating the autocracies of eastern Europe as the necessary paradigm for political change in the Arab world. Yet despite a bipartisan consensus, America's democratization efforts in the Middle East have historically eschewed any vigorous promotion of reform in favor of offering technical assistance. Instead of utilizing intensive diplomatic and economic pressure to force reluctant states to comply with reform criteria, successive U.S. administrations have opted for dialogue with the incumbent regimes. The region's leaders, far from being viewed as the main obstacles to reform, are often seen as the necessary partners in a shared progressive enterprise. And so Washington's strategy of political change, endorsed by both parties, follows a well-worn path of promoting liberalization rather than genuine democratization. And as a result, a strategy of incremental liberalization necessarily conforms to the parame ters established by the incumbent regimes.

Herein lies the fundamental weakness of America's approach. Washington has erred in its assumption that the region's ruling elites are prepared to initiate reforms but merely lack the expertise with which to carry them out. That misconception is evident in the proposals envisioned by the State Department, which emphasize technical assistance--aid to legislatures, training and exchange programs for civil servants, election monitors and so on.

The central dilemma of the Arab political order is not unfamiliarity with the process of political competition, but an entrenched elite that is determined to retain power. No amount of technical assistance can overcome that reality. This is not to say that the region's elites are unaware of the need for change and adaptation. Yet most Middle Eastern leaders--hereditary monarchs, revolutionary mullahs and perpetual presidents alike--are more attracted to the Chinese model, which seems to offer the promise of economic growth and development without displacing any of the political prerogatives of the ruling regime. This is not to downplay the value of the Arab world moving along a Chinese path. Liberal autocracies would certainly be an improvement over politically repressive, economically stagnant regimes--but they would not be functioning democracies.