Andreas Umland: Europe's Share in the Ukrainian Malaise
[Dr Andreas Umland is a lecturer in contemporary East European history at The Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt in Upper Bavaria, general editor of the book series “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society”, and co-editor of the German-Russian journal "Forum for the Ideas and History of Contemporary Eastern Europe".]
Much can be heard from Western visitors of Ukraine or observers analyzing the post-Soviet region that Kyiv politics today is a “mess.” Hardly anybody (least of all, Ukrainians themselves) will disagree. Even lowbrow EU citizens may come up with an opinion on current Ukrainian affairs, and criticize the ensuing political chaos, in Kyiv. Sometimes, Western ignorance mixes with European arrogance to re-produce stereotypes about Ukraine eerily similar to the way in which former KGB officers in Moscow would like to portray Europe’s largest new democracy.
Worse, what mostly remains unmentioned in West European assessments of current Ukrainian affairs, is that the foremost Western organization dealing with Ukraine, the EU, bears responsibility for the current political disarray, at Kyiv. Most analysts would readily agree that the EU perspective played a considerable role in, or even was a necessary precondition for, the quick stabilization and democratization of post-communist Central Europe. Many political scientists would admit that, in Western Europe too, peace, stability and affluence during the last 60 years have been closely linked to European integration. However, few EU politicians and bureaucrats are prepared to state in public what would seem to logically follow from these observations, concerning the Ukrainian case. If EU prospects and membership had a clearly beneficial effect from Tallinn to Dublin, then the absence of a European perspective for a manifestly European country means also – the
absence of that effect, in the case of Ukraine.
The post-war notion of “Europe” is intimately linked to the economic, social and political dynamism of increasing pan-continental cooperation. When we say “European” today we often mean the EU and the largely positive repercussions which the integration process had and has on securing economic, political and social progress across borders. In the light of these historically recent achievements, some, however, forget about the state of Europe, in general, and of some European countries, in particular, before integration. Much of pre-war European history was, by contemporary standards, far “messier” than today Ukrainian politics is. Remember the League of Nations, Weimar Republic or Spanish Civil War?
Enlightened East European intellectuals too might admit that, without the prospect of EU membership, their countries could today look more like Belarus or Georgia rather than Portugal or Ireland. Both West and East European political elites and governmental apparatuses needed a road map towards a better and common future. Only when European integration, whether after the Second World or the Cold War, provided such a vision was it that politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals of many EU member states got their act together, and made their countries more politically and economically successful...
...Most Ukrainians themselves would be the first to admit that Ukraine is today not ready for EU membership or even for the candidacy status. However, many pro-European Ukrainians find it difficult to understand EU policies and rhetoric concerning these issues: Why, on the one hand, is Turkey an official candidate for EU membership, and Romania or Bulgaria already full members, when Ukraine, on the other hand, is not even provided with the tentative prospect of a future candidacy? Is Turkey more European, and are Romania or Bulgaria really that much higher developed than Ukraine? Didn’t the Orange Revolution and two following parliamentary elections – all approved by the OSCE, Council of Europe and EU – show the adherence of Ukrainians to democratic rules and values? Hasn’t Ukraine been more successful than other post-communist countries in averting inter-ethnic strife and in integrating national minorities? Didn’t the elites and population of
Ukraine show restraint when tensions were building up between conflicting political camps, in Kyiv, or as a result of provocative Russian behaviour, on Crimea?...
[This article appeared, in Russian and Ukrainian, first in "Zerkalo nedeli"/"Dzerkalo tyzhnia," and, in English (edited) at Open Democracy."]
Read entire article at Open Democracy
Much can be heard from Western visitors of Ukraine or observers analyzing the post-Soviet region that Kyiv politics today is a “mess.” Hardly anybody (least of all, Ukrainians themselves) will disagree. Even lowbrow EU citizens may come up with an opinion on current Ukrainian affairs, and criticize the ensuing political chaos, in Kyiv. Sometimes, Western ignorance mixes with European arrogance to re-produce stereotypes about Ukraine eerily similar to the way in which former KGB officers in Moscow would like to portray Europe’s largest new democracy.
Worse, what mostly remains unmentioned in West European assessments of current Ukrainian affairs, is that the foremost Western organization dealing with Ukraine, the EU, bears responsibility for the current political disarray, at Kyiv. Most analysts would readily agree that the EU perspective played a considerable role in, or even was a necessary precondition for, the quick stabilization and democratization of post-communist Central Europe. Many political scientists would admit that, in Western Europe too, peace, stability and affluence during the last 60 years have been closely linked to European integration. However, few EU politicians and bureaucrats are prepared to state in public what would seem to logically follow from these observations, concerning the Ukrainian case. If EU prospects and membership had a clearly beneficial effect from Tallinn to Dublin, then the absence of a European perspective for a manifestly European country means also – the
absence of that effect, in the case of Ukraine.
The post-war notion of “Europe” is intimately linked to the economic, social and political dynamism of increasing pan-continental cooperation. When we say “European” today we often mean the EU and the largely positive repercussions which the integration process had and has on securing economic, political and social progress across borders. In the light of these historically recent achievements, some, however, forget about the state of Europe, in general, and of some European countries, in particular, before integration. Much of pre-war European history was, by contemporary standards, far “messier” than today Ukrainian politics is. Remember the League of Nations, Weimar Republic or Spanish Civil War?
Enlightened East European intellectuals too might admit that, without the prospect of EU membership, their countries could today look more like Belarus or Georgia rather than Portugal or Ireland. Both West and East European political elites and governmental apparatuses needed a road map towards a better and common future. Only when European integration, whether after the Second World or the Cold War, provided such a vision was it that politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals of many EU member states got their act together, and made their countries more politically and economically successful...
...Most Ukrainians themselves would be the first to admit that Ukraine is today not ready for EU membership or even for the candidacy status. However, many pro-European Ukrainians find it difficult to understand EU policies and rhetoric concerning these issues: Why, on the one hand, is Turkey an official candidate for EU membership, and Romania or Bulgaria already full members, when Ukraine, on the other hand, is not even provided with the tentative prospect of a future candidacy? Is Turkey more European, and are Romania or Bulgaria really that much higher developed than Ukraine? Didn’t the Orange Revolution and two following parliamentary elections – all approved by the OSCE, Council of Europe and EU – show the adherence of Ukrainians to democratic rules and values? Hasn’t Ukraine been more successful than other post-communist countries in averting inter-ethnic strife and in integrating national minorities? Didn’t the elites and population of
Ukraine show restraint when tensions were building up between conflicting political camps, in Kyiv, or as a result of provocative Russian behaviour, on Crimea?...
[This article appeared, in Russian and Ukrainian, first in "Zerkalo nedeli"/"Dzerkalo tyzhnia," and, in English (edited) at Open Democracy."]