Charles Powell: Without visionary politicians, the Berlin Wall would still stand
[Lord Powell was private secretary and foreign policy adviser to Margaret Thatcher, 1983-1990.]
The next few months mark the 20th anniversaries of the greatest events in Europe since the end of World War Two in 1945. They include the fall of the Berlin Wall, the overthrow of Communism in Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany and the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union was to follow not long afterwards. Taken together, they were a political earthquake whose tremors are still being felt.
They were heady days, as nation after nation in Eastern Europe threw out their Communist rulers and rejoined the mainstream of European democracy. The barbed wire which ran through the centre of Europe was rolled up, and Hungarians, Czechs and Poles emerged almost dazed into the daylight of a new world.
The Berlin Wall represented everything that was evil about communism and the tyranny which was its trademark. I recall watching television in my office in No 10 Downing Street in disbelief at pictures of people pouring across the Wall. It was a day we longed to see but never quite believed would happen. I remember, too, Margaret Thatcher's sense of elation, tempered with wise caution. It was not only a joyful moment, but a dangerous one. No one knew how the Soviet Union would react, particularly if the popular mood in East Germany led to incidents involving Soviet forces.
Chancellor Helmut Kohl telephoned Mrs Thatcher in the early evening to describe the scenes in Berlin and the good-humoured and festive crowds. More soberingly, the Soviet ambassador came round to No 10 later that evening to hand over a message from Mr Gorbachev about the danger that the situation could get out of control. He sent similar messages to President Bush and President Mitterrand, urging us all to counsel restraint and handle these dramatic events in a low-key manner. Late-night visits from Soviet ambassadors were historically not a good sign and we wondered whether some counter-move was being planned which would puncture our hopes that the Cold War was finally drawing to a close.
Managing the process of bringing the Cold War to a peaceful end was the focus of diplomacy over the ensuing months. It had to be done with great care to avoid overt humiliation of the Soviet Union, which would destabilise the position of Mr Gorbachev and lead to a backlash or coup by hardliners, as eventually was attempted in typically cack-handed fashion in August, 1991. It was no time for triumphalism or dancing on the crumbling remains of the Wall.
It was important, too, to ensure that while Cold War division and barriers were swept away, we did not lose the main Western institutions such as Nato in the deluge. Obviously, the organisation's role would change over time as the Soviet threat to Europe's security diminished. But Nato had been the cement binding the United States to Europe, ensuring that American forces remained on the front line of Europe's defence after 1945, instead of promptly going home as happened after the First World War. This was no time to let go of nurse.
Mrs Thatcher believed that history taught that the break-up of great empires, like the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, was a dangerous moment and called for great caution in matters of security and defence. She saw a risk that euphoria would lead to rash decisions, such as West Germany agreeing to leave Nato as the price for Soviet agreement to rapid reunification with East Germany.
She also understood how crucial Mr Gorbachev's restraint had been in enabling the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe to succeed. Earlier Soviet leaders would have cracked down ruthlessly on dissent, as they did in Hungary in 1957 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Mrs Thatcher had invested a great deal in her relationship with Mr Gorbachev since being the first Western leader to meet him in 1984. They had conferred many times over the ensuing years, and she understood the difficulties he faced in pushing through his policies of reform and opening up in the Soviet Union. She saw him as a man she could do business with and passed on this conviction to President Reagan and later to President Bush. His co-operation was essential to dismantling the Cold War, but it could only be secured by taking reasonable account of Soviet interests, rather than rubbing his nose in the collapse of the Communist system...
Read entire article at Telegraph (UK)
The next few months mark the 20th anniversaries of the greatest events in Europe since the end of World War Two in 1945. They include the fall of the Berlin Wall, the overthrow of Communism in Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany and the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union was to follow not long afterwards. Taken together, they were a political earthquake whose tremors are still being felt.
They were heady days, as nation after nation in Eastern Europe threw out their Communist rulers and rejoined the mainstream of European democracy. The barbed wire which ran through the centre of Europe was rolled up, and Hungarians, Czechs and Poles emerged almost dazed into the daylight of a new world.
The Berlin Wall represented everything that was evil about communism and the tyranny which was its trademark. I recall watching television in my office in No 10 Downing Street in disbelief at pictures of people pouring across the Wall. It was a day we longed to see but never quite believed would happen. I remember, too, Margaret Thatcher's sense of elation, tempered with wise caution. It was not only a joyful moment, but a dangerous one. No one knew how the Soviet Union would react, particularly if the popular mood in East Germany led to incidents involving Soviet forces.
Chancellor Helmut Kohl telephoned Mrs Thatcher in the early evening to describe the scenes in Berlin and the good-humoured and festive crowds. More soberingly, the Soviet ambassador came round to No 10 later that evening to hand over a message from Mr Gorbachev about the danger that the situation could get out of control. He sent similar messages to President Bush and President Mitterrand, urging us all to counsel restraint and handle these dramatic events in a low-key manner. Late-night visits from Soviet ambassadors were historically not a good sign and we wondered whether some counter-move was being planned which would puncture our hopes that the Cold War was finally drawing to a close.
Managing the process of bringing the Cold War to a peaceful end was the focus of diplomacy over the ensuing months. It had to be done with great care to avoid overt humiliation of the Soviet Union, which would destabilise the position of Mr Gorbachev and lead to a backlash or coup by hardliners, as eventually was attempted in typically cack-handed fashion in August, 1991. It was no time for triumphalism or dancing on the crumbling remains of the Wall.
It was important, too, to ensure that while Cold War division and barriers were swept away, we did not lose the main Western institutions such as Nato in the deluge. Obviously, the organisation's role would change over time as the Soviet threat to Europe's security diminished. But Nato had been the cement binding the United States to Europe, ensuring that American forces remained on the front line of Europe's defence after 1945, instead of promptly going home as happened after the First World War. This was no time to let go of nurse.
Mrs Thatcher believed that history taught that the break-up of great empires, like the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, was a dangerous moment and called for great caution in matters of security and defence. She saw a risk that euphoria would lead to rash decisions, such as West Germany agreeing to leave Nato as the price for Soviet agreement to rapid reunification with East Germany.
She also understood how crucial Mr Gorbachev's restraint had been in enabling the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe to succeed. Earlier Soviet leaders would have cracked down ruthlessly on dissent, as they did in Hungary in 1957 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Mrs Thatcher had invested a great deal in her relationship with Mr Gorbachev since being the first Western leader to meet him in 1984. They had conferred many times over the ensuing years, and she understood the difficulties he faced in pushing through his policies of reform and opening up in the Soviet Union. She saw him as a man she could do business with and passed on this conviction to President Reagan and later to President Bush. His co-operation was essential to dismantling the Cold War, but it could only be secured by taking reasonable account of Soviet interests, rather than rubbing his nose in the collapse of the Communist system...