Professor JB Kelly, 84, was one of the foremost commentators on the Middle East
As such Kelly was occasionally accused of being pro-Zionist. That was a simple error. He was critical of both Arab and Israeli actions at different times. His real admiration was for the British imperial servants, generally in the India Office, who had brought stability and genuine progress to Arabia and the Gulf. His real contempt was for the British and American governments who had appeased weak anti-imperial challengers, betraying their own diplomats, their sheikhly regional allies, and the subjects of repressive Arab rulers in turn.
Despite his distaste for Arab nationalist dictators, he was no supporter of the recent Iraq War. In fact, he was a strong critic of both the military campaign and of Tony Blair's statesmanship in general.
He took the view that the war had been embarked on almost frivolously, with neither a clear justification in terms of British or Western interests nor a clear idea of how its outcome would advance them. He saw it as an expression of a messianic thoughtlessness on Blair's part – and, in some respects, as the fitting climax to decades of Western policies based on fanciful illusions about the Arab world.
He did at various times, however, have some measure of influence over those policies; first over British strategy in the Arabian peninsula in the 1950s and 1960s, and then, after a move to Washington, over American Middle Eastern policy in the 1980s.
That influence came after Kelly, a professional historian, published his second book – Britain and the Persian Gulf 1795-1880 (1968) – which established him as the leading academic authority on the history of the region. At that time his detailed knowledge of border disputes and maritime treaties in the Gulf led to his advice being sought both by the Foreign Office and local sheikhdoms.
But his robust belief that the Gulf benefited greatly from a stabilising British military and political presence ensured that he would exercise less and less influence over British policy as London relinquished its role east of Suez in the 1970s. For their part, however, local emirates continued to seek his advice and support and to relish his deep knowledge of their own histories...
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Despite his distaste for Arab nationalist dictators, he was no supporter of the recent Iraq War. In fact, he was a strong critic of both the military campaign and of Tony Blair's statesmanship in general.
He took the view that the war had been embarked on almost frivolously, with neither a clear justification in terms of British or Western interests nor a clear idea of how its outcome would advance them. He saw it as an expression of a messianic thoughtlessness on Blair's part – and, in some respects, as the fitting climax to decades of Western policies based on fanciful illusions about the Arab world.
He did at various times, however, have some measure of influence over those policies; first over British strategy in the Arabian peninsula in the 1950s and 1960s, and then, after a move to Washington, over American Middle Eastern policy in the 1980s.
That influence came after Kelly, a professional historian, published his second book – Britain and the Persian Gulf 1795-1880 (1968) – which established him as the leading academic authority on the history of the region. At that time his detailed knowledge of border disputes and maritime treaties in the Gulf led to his advice being sought both by the Foreign Office and local sheikhdoms.
But his robust belief that the Gulf benefited greatly from a stabilising British military and political presence ensured that he would exercise less and less influence over British policy as London relinquished its role east of Suez in the 1970s. For their part, however, local emirates continued to seek his advice and support and to relish his deep knowledge of their own histories...