Victor Davis Hanson: Thoughts on the Hysteria About Afghanistan
[Victor Davis Hanson is the Martin and Illie Anderson Senior Fellow in Residence in Classics and Military History at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, a professor of Classics Emeritus at California State University, Fresno, and a nationally syndicated columnist for Tribune Media Services. He is also the Wayne & Marcia Buske Distinguished Fellow in History, Hillsdale College, where he teaches each fall semester courses in military history and classical culture.]
Afghanistan is a messy war, but so far it has been conducted with a minimum loss of American life while achieving some important goals. We can argue about current strategies, fault what’s been done in the past, deplore the length of the war, lament its cost, or blame each other for its inconclusiveness, but the facts remain that we removed the Taliban, weakened al Qaeda in the region, fostered a consensual government in the most unlikely of places, and helped to prevent another catastrophic attack on our nation originating from that part of the world — and did all this with a degree of skill that is reflected in losses that by historical standards are quite moderate.
After the initial invasion, the Afghan front was largely inactive for years. U.S. annual fatalities from 2001 through 2007 (12, 49, 48, 52, 99, 98, 117) averaged about 68. In comparison, the murder total in Chicago for 2007 was 509. Some parts of Chicago were far more dangerous than the Hindu Kush. The decisive first three months of the war (October to December 2001) accounted for a little over 1 percent of American military deaths that year, one in which there were no other major combat operations.
Indeed, in 2002 Afghanistan accounted for about 4 percent of all military personnel lost while on duty. For the first two years of the war, an American soldier was far more likely to die of illness while stationed outside of Afghanistan than to be killed inside Afghanistan. By 2006, the fatality rate in Afghanistan was 6 percent of all military deaths, including those lost to accidents, illnesses, and the war in Iraq.
We are rightly alarmed about the spike in fatalities over the last few months, but even at these highest monthly death rates of the entire war, we have lost 153 over roughly the last 100 days of combat — an average of about 1.5 per day. For much of the 1990s, we lost well over 3 American soldiers per day to accidents, illnesses, and suicides, a military fatality rate far higher than the rate of combat losses in both Iraq and Afghanistan during the last three months. (In comparison, Iraq’s fatalities over those same 100 days were 27 American deaths, or less than one loss every three days)...
Read entire article at Private Papers (website of Victor David Hanson)
Afghanistan is a messy war, but so far it has been conducted with a minimum loss of American life while achieving some important goals. We can argue about current strategies, fault what’s been done in the past, deplore the length of the war, lament its cost, or blame each other for its inconclusiveness, but the facts remain that we removed the Taliban, weakened al Qaeda in the region, fostered a consensual government in the most unlikely of places, and helped to prevent another catastrophic attack on our nation originating from that part of the world — and did all this with a degree of skill that is reflected in losses that by historical standards are quite moderate.
After the initial invasion, the Afghan front was largely inactive for years. U.S. annual fatalities from 2001 through 2007 (12, 49, 48, 52, 99, 98, 117) averaged about 68. In comparison, the murder total in Chicago for 2007 was 509. Some parts of Chicago were far more dangerous than the Hindu Kush. The decisive first three months of the war (October to December 2001) accounted for a little over 1 percent of American military deaths that year, one in which there were no other major combat operations.
Indeed, in 2002 Afghanistan accounted for about 4 percent of all military personnel lost while on duty. For the first two years of the war, an American soldier was far more likely to die of illness while stationed outside of Afghanistan than to be killed inside Afghanistan. By 2006, the fatality rate in Afghanistan was 6 percent of all military deaths, including those lost to accidents, illnesses, and the war in Iraq.
We are rightly alarmed about the spike in fatalities over the last few months, but even at these highest monthly death rates of the entire war, we have lost 153 over roughly the last 100 days of combat — an average of about 1.5 per day. For much of the 1990s, we lost well over 3 American soldiers per day to accidents, illnesses, and suicides, a military fatality rate far higher than the rate of combat losses in both Iraq and Afghanistan during the last three months. (In comparison, Iraq’s fatalities over those same 100 days were 27 American deaths, or less than one loss every three days)...