Larry Berman and Edward Miller: Obama, learn the lessons of Vietnam -- from JFK, not LBJ
[Berman is professor of political science at UC Davis and author of "Planning A Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam." Miller is Assistant Professor of History at Dartmouth College; he is writing a book on the United States and the politics of nation building in South Vietnam during the Diem years (1954-1963).]
In the Obama administration's review of strategic options in Afghanistan, the debate over the "lessons" of Vietnam has loomed large. But which Vietnam lessons are the most relevant? Instead of drawing analogies to the policies and strategies of the Johnson and Nixon years, it may be more useful to consider the Vietnam dilemmas and choices faced by John F. Kennedy from 1961 to 1963.
Upon taking office in January 1961, Kennedy learned that conditions in South Vietnam were much worse than he anticipated. Recent gains had given the communist-led Viet Cong insurgency control over large portions of the countryside and the population. Equally worrisome was the deteriorating political situation in Saigon. South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem was a long-time U.S. ally who had once been hailed in Washington as the "miracle man of Southeast Asia." By 1961, however, Diem's authoritarian rule had alienated large numbers of his compatriots, including many fellow anti-communists. The loudest complaints concerned the power and privileges wielded by Diem's brothers and other family members - complaints not unlike those heard today about Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
More than most of his advisers, Kennedy sensed the dangers that lurked in Vietnam. Although he admired Diem, he feared that the Vietnamese leader might be repeating earlier mistakes made by France during its futile colonial war in Vietnam in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Kennedy therefore ordered a thorough review of U.S. policy. In late 1961, after months of discussions and fact-finding missions, his advisers recommended a major expansion in the scope and nature of the U.S. involvement - a strategy referred to as "getting on with the war."
Kennedy rejected some proposals, including the dispatch of U.S. regular combat forces, but he approved deliveries of modern helicopters and armored vehicles to the South Vietnamese army, as well as more aid for Diem's nation-building programs. The number of U.S. military advisers also rose sharply, from fewer 1,000 in 1961 to more than 16,000 in 1963.
At first, the new strategy seemed to work. The South Vietnamese army's battlefield fortunes improved during 1962, thanks in part to the U.S.-supplied advisers and equipment. By 1963, however, the communists had devised new tactics and showed signs of regaining the initiative. At the same time, Saigon was plunged into political crisis by the emergence of an anti-Diem protest movement led by Buddhist monks. When Diem cracked down on the protestors, the calls for his ouster intensified. Kennedy's advisers were split between those who believed that Diem must go and those who deemed him the best chance for victory. Kennedy himself was conflicted and unsure of what to do. In the end, he allowed the U.S. ambassador in Saigon to encourage South Vietnamese army commanders to overthrow Diem. The coup took place on Nov. 1, 1963. Diem was captured and killed the next day - just three weeks before Kennedy's assassination in Dallas.
In retrospect, Kennedy's ambivalence about Vietnam was understandable. In both 1961 and 1963, the debate within his administration focused on false choices between different paths to escalation, rather than on the critical question of whether large-scale escalation was necessary or advisable...
Read entire article at NY Daily News
In the Obama administration's review of strategic options in Afghanistan, the debate over the "lessons" of Vietnam has loomed large. But which Vietnam lessons are the most relevant? Instead of drawing analogies to the policies and strategies of the Johnson and Nixon years, it may be more useful to consider the Vietnam dilemmas and choices faced by John F. Kennedy from 1961 to 1963.
Upon taking office in January 1961, Kennedy learned that conditions in South Vietnam were much worse than he anticipated. Recent gains had given the communist-led Viet Cong insurgency control over large portions of the countryside and the population. Equally worrisome was the deteriorating political situation in Saigon. South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem was a long-time U.S. ally who had once been hailed in Washington as the "miracle man of Southeast Asia." By 1961, however, Diem's authoritarian rule had alienated large numbers of his compatriots, including many fellow anti-communists. The loudest complaints concerned the power and privileges wielded by Diem's brothers and other family members - complaints not unlike those heard today about Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
More than most of his advisers, Kennedy sensed the dangers that lurked in Vietnam. Although he admired Diem, he feared that the Vietnamese leader might be repeating earlier mistakes made by France during its futile colonial war in Vietnam in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Kennedy therefore ordered a thorough review of U.S. policy. In late 1961, after months of discussions and fact-finding missions, his advisers recommended a major expansion in the scope and nature of the U.S. involvement - a strategy referred to as "getting on with the war."
Kennedy rejected some proposals, including the dispatch of U.S. regular combat forces, but he approved deliveries of modern helicopters and armored vehicles to the South Vietnamese army, as well as more aid for Diem's nation-building programs. The number of U.S. military advisers also rose sharply, from fewer 1,000 in 1961 to more than 16,000 in 1963.
At first, the new strategy seemed to work. The South Vietnamese army's battlefield fortunes improved during 1962, thanks in part to the U.S.-supplied advisers and equipment. By 1963, however, the communists had devised new tactics and showed signs of regaining the initiative. At the same time, Saigon was plunged into political crisis by the emergence of an anti-Diem protest movement led by Buddhist monks. When Diem cracked down on the protestors, the calls for his ouster intensified. Kennedy's advisers were split between those who believed that Diem must go and those who deemed him the best chance for victory. Kennedy himself was conflicted and unsure of what to do. In the end, he allowed the U.S. ambassador in Saigon to encourage South Vietnamese army commanders to overthrow Diem. The coup took place on Nov. 1, 1963. Diem was captured and killed the next day - just three weeks before Kennedy's assassination in Dallas.
In retrospect, Kennedy's ambivalence about Vietnam was understandable. In both 1961 and 1963, the debate within his administration focused on false choices between different paths to escalation, rather than on the critical question of whether large-scale escalation was necessary or advisable...