Andrew J. Bacevich: Karzai Should Study Chiang Kai-shek to Stay in Power
The American approach to empire has its peculiarities.
Prominent among them is a variant of the “Great Man” theory of history. In their efforts to expand the Pax Americana while disguising its existence, U.S. officials are always on the lookout for some prominent local chieftain to help carry the load.
Not just anyone will do, though. The chieftain needs to be a figure locals will reckon with. He — the person invariably is a he — needs to possess all the makings of a Great Man.
Finding a man of destiny who is also compliant can be tricky, however. Consider the Obama administration’s current brouhaha with Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
The essential issue is striking a balance. The United States wants to recruit puppets, even as it insists with a (more or less) straight face that its puppets are partners — co-equals, valued friends and allies.
So on the one hand, Washington looks for someone willing to take orders, or, at the very least, stick to assigned cue cards, while on the other, it wants someone who conveys the impression of being strong and independent.
All too often, the puppets’ willingness to play along ebbs over time. Told often enough that they are sovereign, they start acting as though, in fact, they are. Or, to put it another way, they start acting “uppity.” When they do, it usually means bad news.
The most famous pigheaded puppet was Ngo Dinh Diem, selected by the Eisenhower administration in the mid-1950s to be president of the new Republic of Vietnam.
By May 1961, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson was hailing Diem as the “Churchill of Asia.” By November 1963, Diem was dead — murdered during a military coup green-lighted by the administration of John F. Kennedy....
If he’s smart, Karzai will switch the Diem playbook for the one devised by Chiang Kai-shek during World War II.
As president of Nationalist China, Chiang ranked high on the list of valued U.S. allies. President Franklin D. Roosevelt even included the Kuomintang leader — preposterously — in what he called the “Big Four.”
As Washington saw it, China’s job was to help America fight Japan. As Chiang saw it, Washington’s role was to prepare him to resume his fight against Mao Tse-Tung — once the unpleasantness with the Japanese ended.
Chiang’s willfulness drove Gen. Joseph Stilwell, the U.S. commander in China, batty.
Yet, in the end, Stilwell departed the scene — relieved of command by FDR — and Chiang survived. How did this happen?
The secret of Chiang’s survivability lay in his ability to mobilize the China lobby and convince his legions of U.S. sympathizers that Stilwell was the problem and he was the solution.
Karzai might want to study Chiang’s success....