Moshe Ma'oz: Bush Needs to Reach Out tyo Syria Like His Father Did

[Moshe Ma'oz is a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace and a professor emeritus of Islamic and Middle Eastern studies at Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has published several books and many articles on Syrian modern history and politics, including Syria and Israel From War to Peacemaking (Clarendon Press, 1995).]

... [Flynt] Leverett, [author of Inheriting Syria: Bashar's Trial by Fire(Brookings Institution Press, 2005)], a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a former senior analyst at the National Security Council, Department of State, and Central Intelligence Agency, lists American grievances against Bashar al-Assad, including helping the anti-American insurgency in Iraq; sponsoring Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist organizations Hamas and Islamic Jihad; developing weapons of mass destruction; occupying Lebanon (until the recent pullout); and maintaining an oppressive regime in Syria. Leverett asserts that the "Bush administration has failed to develop a genuine policy toward Syria, if by 'policy' one means an integrated series of public positions, diplomatic initiatives, and other measures ... all rooted in a strategy for persuading Syria to change its problematic behavior and cooperate in the pursuit of U.S. goals." He contrasts Bush's confrontational attitude toward Assad with the strategic cooperation that George H.W. Bush (in 1990-91) and Bill Clinton (from 1992 to 2000) maintained with Assad's father.

Apparently neither Bush père nor Clinton were concerned about the autocratic nature of Hafez al-Assad's regime and its failure to initiate economic reforms. Both U.S. presidents wished to advance American strategic objectives in the region, regardless of Assad's brutal record. As Clinton writes in his memoir concerning his visit to Damascus in 1994: "No American president had been there in 20 years because of Syria's support for terrorism and its domination of Lebanon. ... He [Assad] was a ruthless but brilliant man who had once wiped out a whole village. ... But I knew there would never be security and stability in the region unless Syria and Israel were reconciled."

Leverett favors a similar approach by the current Bush administration and a resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations. That strategy would allow Washington to put its differences with Damascus over terrorism and weapons development into a more politically manageable framework, and could also enlist Syrian cooperation in stabilizing Iraq.

Unfortunately, political conditions in Damascus and Jerusalem are not ripe for the revival of the peace process, and Washington insists that Assad should comply with its list of demands before any peace negotiations with Israel could restart. The Bush administration continues to pressure Damascus to change its behavior or risk a forced regime change. That belligerent strategy has been carried out through economic and diplomatic sanctions under Congress's 2003 Syria Accountability Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act.

But Leverett persuasively argues that unilateral sanctions are not likely to change Assad's behavior, and that European countries, Russia, Japan, and China are not prepared to join the United States in isolating Damascus. Pursuing regime change militarily would also be problematic for the United States, not only because of severe strain on the American forces engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also because of the likelihood of popular anti-American reactions in the Arab and Muslim worlds.

Leverett suggests a more realistic, conditional, carrot-and-stick engagement, similar to American dealings with Sudan and Libya. The United States would impose on Damascus "costs for continued noncompliance with U.S. requirements but also promise significant benefits in the event of cooperation" -- notably helping Assad obtain the expertise and resources he needs to advance Syria's internal reforms, and promising him continued American involvement in Syrian-Israeli conciliation.

A British-trained ophthalmologist, Bashar al-Assad, unlike his father, had been exposed to Western notions of democracy and modernization. During the first several months of his rule, he tolerated free discussion of civil society through newly created political forums. He also allowed the printing of new newspapers and the opening of private universities. While trying to reform the ruling Baath Party while diminishing its massive influence, he has attempted also to modernize Syria's backward economy by introducing private banking, opening a stock exchange, inviting foreign-Arab investment, and appointing a Western-educated economist to a senior administrative position.

Most of those political and economic reforms have been stalled by opposition from the conservative old guard. But regional shifts in power and American inducement could spur Assad to salvage his reformist policies. If Assad could combine his own democratic impulses with his father's diplomatic expediency, and if Bush could recapture his father's focus on long-term regional goals, both could help modernize and stabilize the Middle East. Whether their coteries would get out of the way of such progress is another question.