Alexander Yakobson: Two States or One (Arab) State
[Alexander Yakobson teaches ancient history at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is an op-ed writer for Haaretz.]
Danny Rubinstein’s account, in his Summer 2010 Dissent article (“One State/Two States: Rethinking Israel and Palestine”), of the disdainful reaction of Sufyan Abu-Zayda, a prominent figure in the Palestinian Authority, to Benjamin Netanyahu’s “Bar-Ilan speech,” in which the right-wing prime minister of Israel formally accepted the two-state solution, is remarkable and telling. Someone who perceives this conflict as it is usually perceived—a small people struggling for national independence after decades of military occupation by a mighty regional power—would perhaps have expected something different. Admittedly, it is natural enough to avoid giving the rival side credit for any show of moderation. A moderate Palestinian spokesman might have questioned Netanyahu’s sincerity, called on the international community to hold the prime minister to his word, and insisted that the future Palestinian state be established on Palestinian terms rather than those suggested by Netanyahu. Instead, Abu-Zayda dismisses the very idea of separate Palestinian statehood: Netanyahu is not doing us any favors by agreeing to two states; we have another, more attractive option—“one state.”
It is often said that if the Palestinians are increasingly driven toward a one-state solution, this is because they have despaired of attaining a viable independent state alongside Israel—principally because of Israel’s settlement activity in the West Bank. Though Rubinstein’s article presents a much more nuanced and complicated picture of the reasons for “the decline of the Palestinian national movement,” his final conclusion is still that “the new Palestinian generation in the West Bank…would prefer to fight for equal rights in a single binational state rather than continue a struggle that seems almost hopeless [for an independent state].” But there isn’t much hopelessness in Abu-Zayda’s words. Instead, the Palestinian activist seems very confident that the future of his people is assured under any scenario. He is rightly convinced that a one-state solution (which will inevitably mean not a binational state but an Arab and Muslim state in the whole of former Mandatory Palestine—I will return to this point later) will be a complete victory for the Palestinian national cause. There may perhaps be an element of bravado here, but I think Rubinstein is right to treat what Abu-Zayda has to say seriously, as representing a widely shared Palestinian attitude. If this is how a moderate Palestinian sees things—and Abu-Zayda is certainly a moderate—then we have to ask whether the Palestinians have any reason to make the compromises necessary for a two-state solution, whatever Israel does. If they believe that they have nothing to lose, strategically, by rejecting any compromise, what are the chances of a compromise being reached? And if reached and implemented, will it be respected in the long run?...
Read entire article at Dissent
Danny Rubinstein’s account, in his Summer 2010 Dissent article (“One State/Two States: Rethinking Israel and Palestine”), of the disdainful reaction of Sufyan Abu-Zayda, a prominent figure in the Palestinian Authority, to Benjamin Netanyahu’s “Bar-Ilan speech,” in which the right-wing prime minister of Israel formally accepted the two-state solution, is remarkable and telling. Someone who perceives this conflict as it is usually perceived—a small people struggling for national independence after decades of military occupation by a mighty regional power—would perhaps have expected something different. Admittedly, it is natural enough to avoid giving the rival side credit for any show of moderation. A moderate Palestinian spokesman might have questioned Netanyahu’s sincerity, called on the international community to hold the prime minister to his word, and insisted that the future Palestinian state be established on Palestinian terms rather than those suggested by Netanyahu. Instead, Abu-Zayda dismisses the very idea of separate Palestinian statehood: Netanyahu is not doing us any favors by agreeing to two states; we have another, more attractive option—“one state.”
It is often said that if the Palestinians are increasingly driven toward a one-state solution, this is because they have despaired of attaining a viable independent state alongside Israel—principally because of Israel’s settlement activity in the West Bank. Though Rubinstein’s article presents a much more nuanced and complicated picture of the reasons for “the decline of the Palestinian national movement,” his final conclusion is still that “the new Palestinian generation in the West Bank…would prefer to fight for equal rights in a single binational state rather than continue a struggle that seems almost hopeless [for an independent state].” But there isn’t much hopelessness in Abu-Zayda’s words. Instead, the Palestinian activist seems very confident that the future of his people is assured under any scenario. He is rightly convinced that a one-state solution (which will inevitably mean not a binational state but an Arab and Muslim state in the whole of former Mandatory Palestine—I will return to this point later) will be a complete victory for the Palestinian national cause. There may perhaps be an element of bravado here, but I think Rubinstein is right to treat what Abu-Zayda has to say seriously, as representing a widely shared Palestinian attitude. If this is how a moderate Palestinian sees things—and Abu-Zayda is certainly a moderate—then we have to ask whether the Palestinians have any reason to make the compromises necessary for a two-state solution, whatever Israel does. If they believe that they have nothing to lose, strategically, by rejecting any compromise, what are the chances of a compromise being reached? And if reached and implemented, will it be respected in the long run?...