Mohamad Bazzi: Insurgency Continues Targeting Civilians--Which Is Almost Unprecedented

Mohamad Bazzi, Middle East Correspondent, in Newsday (8-5-05):

... while the guerrillas are skilled at modifying their military tactics, they seem indifferent to the political models of past insurgencies. Most successful rebellions in the past century shared two traits: They had widespread public support and a well-articulated political agenda, which usually appealed to nationalist sentiment. In Iraq, the insurgents have neither.

It could be a new kind of insurgency, one that does not have enough support or a clear political program to rule Iraq but is also difficult to defeat because it does not care about civilian casualties and destroying the country's infrastructure. In this context, past experience in Vietnam and elsewhere would offer the United States few lessons about how to fight back....

Since a renewed wave of violence in early April, insurgents have killed more than 2,700 Iraqis, according to the Iraqi Defense Ministry. Half of those killed were civilians, and the rest were members or recruits of the country's security forces.

Even the bloodiest rebellions of modern times did not target civilians the way the insurgents have in Iraq. In Algeria, for example, rebels fighting against French colonial rule in the 1950s and '60s adopted a classic guerrilla tactic: They provoked the occupying troops to use excessive force and kill thousands of civilians. That prompted a public backlash and international condemnation of French actions. The French eventually withdrew from Algeria, after as many as 1 million people had been killed.

The Algerian guerrillas did kill fellow countrymen, but they were usually people suspected of collaborating with the French, or civilians caught in the cross fire. The rebels also bombed cafes and markets, but they chose targets frequented by French soldiers and colonials.

"Traditionally, insurgents need at least passive support from the local population," said Kamil Tawil, a Lebanese historian and expert on militant movements.

Sunnis the driving force

The guerrillas now fighting in Iraq appear to have ignored even the lessons of Iraq's past rebellions. During the revolt of 1920, both Sunni and Shia Muslims rose up against the British occupation of what was then Mesopotamia. The uprising, in which 6,000 Iraqis and 500 British soldiers were killed, failed to dislodge British rule. But it demonstrated the potential of Sunni-Shia cooperation, and it has grown in political mythology to become the foundation of Iraqi nationalism.

Today, the insurgency is being driven by Iraq's Sunni minority. Most of those killed by insurgent attacks have been Shias and Kurds, and that has turned those communities against the rebellion. Even if they are able to drive out U.S. troops, the guerrillas are unlikely to gain control over all of Iraq without support from the Shia majority. Some segments of the insurgency could be hoping to foment a sectarian war that would lead to the partitioning of Iraq into Sunni, Shia and Kurdish regions.

One major lesson of the 1920 uprising was that any broad social movement in Iraq needs the support of Shia clerics. Prominent clerics issued religious rulings that made it a duty to fight the British occupation. Today, leading clerics have called for a U.S. withdrawal but they have not urged their followers to fight U.S. forces.

"History shows us that a great deal of pan-Arabism in Iraq was led by the Shia," said Wamidh Nadhmi, a political scientist at Baghdad University. "The clerics have a tremendous ability to mobilize Shia masses."

While Shias make up 60 percent of Iraq's population of 25 million, Sunnis had ruled the country since it gained independence in 1932. After the U.S. invasion and the promise of free elections, many Shias saw their best historical chance to take power. Shia clerics declared it a religious duty to vote in January's parliamentary elections, and a large Shia turnout swept a slate of Shia candidates into power....