James Morris: Parallels Between Niger And Irish Famines
[James T Morris is the executive director of the UN World Food Programme.]
Niger demonstrated that too sharp a focus on market liberalisation and poverty reduction does not always help the hungry, writes James Morris
When pictures of wide-eyed and emaciated African children from Niger began stalking our television screens in July and August this year, the Irish Government and public responded as they have done many times before. Generously.
If any European nation is equipped to understand the impact of food shortages, starvation and destitution, it is Ireland.
The Great Hunger of 1845-50 was not so long ago and the historical footprint it left on the psyche of a nation is too large to ignore. There is an understanding and empathy here, and when hunger rears its head anywhere else in the world, the United Nations World Food Programme is comforted to know that support from Ireland is never far away.
The humanitarian crisis that struck Niger may have resonated even more deeply in Ireland because of the unfortunate parallels with the Great Famine of the mid-19th century. Niger is also a fragile economy, its people living on the edge of hunger. This year they found themselves caught up in the destructive interplay of drought, food shortages and the downside of free-market reform.
Hunger and starvation are rarely the result of one single factor. While the Irish Famine was popularly blamed on the spread of potato blight, most historians have revealed the true complexity of the crisis. Here, as in many contemporary humanitarian crises in Africa, politics, economics and social engineering were also partly to blame.
To the international media, Niger may have appeared to present another simple story of starvation. In recent months, much has been said about the failure of humanitarian agencies to respond in a timely and efficient way to avoid loss of life.
Unfortunately, little effort has been made to try to understand what really went on in Niger and why the crisis almost became a catastrophe.
Niger demonstrated that too sharp a focus on market liberalisation and poverty reduction does not always help the hungry, writes James Morris
When pictures of wide-eyed and emaciated African children from Niger began stalking our television screens in July and August this year, the Irish Government and public responded as they have done many times before. Generously.
If any European nation is equipped to understand the impact of food shortages, starvation and destitution, it is Ireland.
The Great Hunger of 1845-50 was not so long ago and the historical footprint it left on the psyche of a nation is too large to ignore. There is an understanding and empathy here, and when hunger rears its head anywhere else in the world, the United Nations World Food Programme is comforted to know that support from Ireland is never far away.
The humanitarian crisis that struck Niger may have resonated even more deeply in Ireland because of the unfortunate parallels with the Great Famine of the mid-19th century. Niger is also a fragile economy, its people living on the edge of hunger. This year they found themselves caught up in the destructive interplay of drought, food shortages and the downside of free-market reform.
Hunger and starvation are rarely the result of one single factor. While the Irish Famine was popularly blamed on the spread of potato blight, most historians have revealed the true complexity of the crisis. Here, as in many contemporary humanitarian crises in Africa, politics, economics and social engineering were also partly to blame.
To the international media, Niger may have appeared to present another simple story of starvation. In recent months, much has been said about the failure of humanitarian agencies to respond in a timely and efficient way to avoid loss of life.
Unfortunately, little effort has been made to try to understand what really went on in Niger and why the crisis almost became a catastrophe.