Jeffrey Herf: The hypocrisy of Britain and France over Israel's Nukes
Two weeks ago, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) voted to refer the matter of Iran's nuclear program to the U.N. Security Council. There is plenty to like about the IAEA resolution, starting with the large majority it commanded among the organization's member states--even the usually recalcitrant Russians and Chinese signed on. Moreover, the strong text refers to Iran's "many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply" with Nuclear Proliferation Treaty agreements; asserts an "absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes"; and notes Tehran's "history of concealment" regarding its nuclear activities. In other words, the resolution states publicly and unambiguously what everyone has long known: that Iran has been lying about its nuclear program.
Yet the resolution also contains a key flaw: At the insistence of Egypt, and with the backing of the European Union, the text contains a clause calling for the creation of "a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery"--a pointed jab at the region's only nuclear power, Israel. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the American delegation tried unsuccessfully to block the clause, rightly fearing that it could be used as anti-Israel propaganda and would provide an excuse for Iran to sidestep its obligations in the future. "The Americans are worried that once it is there, it will stay there forever and allow the Iranians to hide behind it," one ambassador told The New York Times. Indeed, in the court of world opinion, easily inflamed by anti-Israel rhetoric and no less easily swayed by fuzzy talk about a nuclear-free Middle East, the clause gives Iran a powerful rhetorical weapon. If it remains committed to proceeding with a nuclear program, Tehran can claim the need to deter Israel's nuclear weapons. It could make a reasonable and "generous" offer to refrain from developing nuclear weapons if only Israel would unilaterally eliminate its weapons. And when Israel refuses, Iran can claim that it is Israel standing in the way of a nuclear-free regional utopia. Moreover, as fear of a nuclear Iran intensifies, this language will open the door for Israel's critics in the BBC and like-minded organs in Europe to blame the Jewish state for any threat that Iran may pose to the continent. It could shift the focus of attention at the United Nations from Iran's weapons to those of the one stable democracy in the Middle East--and thereby fragment the coalition of countries seeking to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear arms.
But the clause is not merely bad geopolitical strategy; it is also the height of hypocrisy. Two of the governments that backed the language were Britain and France; and it was only a quarter of a century ago, during the battle over missile deployments in Europe, that those countries found themselves in a situation almost exactly analogous to Israel's role in the Iran debate. The stance taken by London and Paris then was the correct one--and the exact opposite of the position they have forced on Israel now.
Between 1981 and 1983, the United States and the Soviet Union conducted Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force negotiations in Geneva. Throughout this time, Moscow insisted that the nuclear arsenals of Britain and France be included in the balance of forces to be discussed--a proposal that London and Paris adamantly opposed. Including British and French weapons in their calculus allowed the Soviets to claim that a balance of forces existed in Europe even after they had deployed several hundred SS-20s pointed at the western half of the continent. Had British and French weapons been counted in the intermediate range nuclear balance, the Soviets could have proposed to dismantle their SS-20 arsenal if only Britain and France would eliminate their own nuclear deterrents. Aware that the slogan of a "nuclear-free Europe" might lead to demands for their unilateral nuclear disarmament, the British and French governments persistently rejected this Soviet negotiating ploy.
The Soviet strategy was to turn non-nuclear West Germany against Britain and France. And it almost worked. Massive demonstrations in Western Europe opposed the deployment of American medium-range missiles, as did West Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD). But Britain and France held firm, arguing that their own nuclear arsenals were weapons of last resort intended only to deter attacks on their homelands. Besides, they pointed out, their weapons had been deployed long before the SS-20s appeared. While such arguments surprised no one coming from Margaret Thatcher, the French socialist president François Mitterand was even more emphatic: On January 20, 1983, in the midst of a heated West German election fought in large part over the missile question, he stunned the SPD by making these arguments in a memorable speech to the West German parliament--in effect endorsing the conservatives led by Helmut Kohl. Britain and France understood very well that the Soviets might offer to eliminate their SS-20s if Britain and France would give up their nuclear weapons. But they also understood that a nuclear-free Europe of this sort was simply another name for unilateral disarmament; and Thatcher and Mitterand would have none of it. Six weeks after Mitterand spoke in Bonn, Kohl won the West German elections. He pledged to proceed with the Cruise and Pershing 2 deployments if the Soviet Union maintained its SS-20s or refused to conduct negotiations that did not include British and French weapons in Europe's medium-range balance of forces. The Soviet effort to split the Atlantic alliance had failed.
So NATO installed the missiles in West Germany; and, instead of leading to nuclear confrontation, the deployments led to the fall of the hardliners in Moscow, the rise of reformers, and, in 1987, the acceptance by Mikhail Gorbachev of the "zero-zero" option offered by President Reagan. In 1981, when Reagan had first presented that option--a promise not to deploy any American Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles if the Soviets would dismantle their SS-20s--liberals, with the exception of this magazine, greeted his proposal with scorn. Surely, they argued, Reagan's offer was merely a ploy to place American missiles in Europe, for the Soviets would never agree to dismantle their SS-20s. And yet, in 1987, that is exactly what happened. Meanwhile, because America had refused to bargain away the right to self-defense of its allies in London and Paris, the British and French arsenals remained intact.
Fast forward to the present. A country sworn to Israel's destruction is moving towards acquiring nuclear weapons; the anti-Semitism of radical Islam is ascendant in the Muslim world; and Hamas has just won an election in the Palestinian territories. Now, more than ever, Israel needs a strong deterrent against its enemies. At such a moment, the Jewish state's nuclear weapons should be just as much a non-issue as Britain and France wanted their own nuclear arsenals to be during the early 1980s. ...
Read entire article at New Republic
Yet the resolution also contains a key flaw: At the insistence of Egypt, and with the backing of the European Union, the text contains a clause calling for the creation of "a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery"--a pointed jab at the region's only nuclear power, Israel. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the American delegation tried unsuccessfully to block the clause, rightly fearing that it could be used as anti-Israel propaganda and would provide an excuse for Iran to sidestep its obligations in the future. "The Americans are worried that once it is there, it will stay there forever and allow the Iranians to hide behind it," one ambassador told The New York Times. Indeed, in the court of world opinion, easily inflamed by anti-Israel rhetoric and no less easily swayed by fuzzy talk about a nuclear-free Middle East, the clause gives Iran a powerful rhetorical weapon. If it remains committed to proceeding with a nuclear program, Tehran can claim the need to deter Israel's nuclear weapons. It could make a reasonable and "generous" offer to refrain from developing nuclear weapons if only Israel would unilaterally eliminate its weapons. And when Israel refuses, Iran can claim that it is Israel standing in the way of a nuclear-free regional utopia. Moreover, as fear of a nuclear Iran intensifies, this language will open the door for Israel's critics in the BBC and like-minded organs in Europe to blame the Jewish state for any threat that Iran may pose to the continent. It could shift the focus of attention at the United Nations from Iran's weapons to those of the one stable democracy in the Middle East--and thereby fragment the coalition of countries seeking to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear arms.
But the clause is not merely bad geopolitical strategy; it is also the height of hypocrisy. Two of the governments that backed the language were Britain and France; and it was only a quarter of a century ago, during the battle over missile deployments in Europe, that those countries found themselves in a situation almost exactly analogous to Israel's role in the Iran debate. The stance taken by London and Paris then was the correct one--and the exact opposite of the position they have forced on Israel now.
Between 1981 and 1983, the United States and the Soviet Union conducted Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force negotiations in Geneva. Throughout this time, Moscow insisted that the nuclear arsenals of Britain and France be included in the balance of forces to be discussed--a proposal that London and Paris adamantly opposed. Including British and French weapons in their calculus allowed the Soviets to claim that a balance of forces existed in Europe even after they had deployed several hundred SS-20s pointed at the western half of the continent. Had British and French weapons been counted in the intermediate range nuclear balance, the Soviets could have proposed to dismantle their SS-20 arsenal if only Britain and France would eliminate their own nuclear deterrents. Aware that the slogan of a "nuclear-free Europe" might lead to demands for their unilateral nuclear disarmament, the British and French governments persistently rejected this Soviet negotiating ploy.
The Soviet strategy was to turn non-nuclear West Germany against Britain and France. And it almost worked. Massive demonstrations in Western Europe opposed the deployment of American medium-range missiles, as did West Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD). But Britain and France held firm, arguing that their own nuclear arsenals were weapons of last resort intended only to deter attacks on their homelands. Besides, they pointed out, their weapons had been deployed long before the SS-20s appeared. While such arguments surprised no one coming from Margaret Thatcher, the French socialist president François Mitterand was even more emphatic: On January 20, 1983, in the midst of a heated West German election fought in large part over the missile question, he stunned the SPD by making these arguments in a memorable speech to the West German parliament--in effect endorsing the conservatives led by Helmut Kohl. Britain and France understood very well that the Soviets might offer to eliminate their SS-20s if Britain and France would give up their nuclear weapons. But they also understood that a nuclear-free Europe of this sort was simply another name for unilateral disarmament; and Thatcher and Mitterand would have none of it. Six weeks after Mitterand spoke in Bonn, Kohl won the West German elections. He pledged to proceed with the Cruise and Pershing 2 deployments if the Soviet Union maintained its SS-20s or refused to conduct negotiations that did not include British and French weapons in Europe's medium-range balance of forces. The Soviet effort to split the Atlantic alliance had failed.
So NATO installed the missiles in West Germany; and, instead of leading to nuclear confrontation, the deployments led to the fall of the hardliners in Moscow, the rise of reformers, and, in 1987, the acceptance by Mikhail Gorbachev of the "zero-zero" option offered by President Reagan. In 1981, when Reagan had first presented that option--a promise not to deploy any American Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles if the Soviets would dismantle their SS-20s--liberals, with the exception of this magazine, greeted his proposal with scorn. Surely, they argued, Reagan's offer was merely a ploy to place American missiles in Europe, for the Soviets would never agree to dismantle their SS-20s. And yet, in 1987, that is exactly what happened. Meanwhile, because America had refused to bargain away the right to self-defense of its allies in London and Paris, the British and French arsenals remained intact.
Fast forward to the present. A country sworn to Israel's destruction is moving towards acquiring nuclear weapons; the anti-Semitism of radical Islam is ascendant in the Muslim world; and Hamas has just won an election in the Palestinian territories. Now, more than ever, Israel needs a strong deterrent against its enemies. At such a moment, the Jewish state's nuclear weapons should be just as much a non-issue as Britain and France wanted their own nuclear arsenals to be during the early 1980s. ...