Ronald Bruce St John: A Savage War of Peace
[Ronald Bruce St John, an analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus (www.fpif.org) has published extensively on Middle Eastern issues for almost three decades. He is the author most recently of the Historical Dictionary of Libya (1991, 1998, 2006) and Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife (2002).]
Early on in the Iraq War, “The Battle of Algiers,” Gillo Pontecorvo's 1965 film about the urban guerrilla struggle between French troops and Algerian nationalists, was favored viewing at both the White House and Pentagon. More recently, Alistair Horne's A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962 has become the read of choice for many U.S. military officers serving in Iraq. In the wake of Abu Ghraib and Haditha, what lessons can be drawn from a French colonial war in North Africa, marked by an unholy marriage of revolutionary violence and state terror, occurring half a century ago?
Savage War
On November 1, 1954, the self-declared Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) or National Liberation Front proclaimed an armed struggle for Algerian independence, launching coordinated attacks against French buildings and personnel throughout Algeria. The ensuing Algerian War lasted from 1954 to 1962; and before it ended, France had committed more than half a million troops to the suppression of the Algerian revolution, an intractable conflict that combined revolutionary war and state terror in brutal fashion.
With the French army left largely to its own devices, torture and other atrocities became widespread, even commonplace. Torture, in particular, was institutionalized by the army. In the process, the senior ranks of the French military grew increasingly disenchanted with its civilian leadership in a manner reminiscent of the retired U.S. generals who called recently for the resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld. Eventually, senior military officers turned on the government and attempted to assassinate President Charles de Gaulle, an episode captured later by film director Fred Zinnemann in “The Day of the Jackal.”
Alistair Horne, a fellow at St. Anthony's College, Oxford, is the author of 19 books, many of which treat French military or political subjects. Published in 1977, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962 was immediately proclaimed by experts from all sides of the political spectrum to be the definitive history of the Algerian war. In rereading the book, the early praise seems justified as Horne does a superb job on detailing the Byzantine intricacies of the conflict with intelligence, style, and grace.
“Class Notes” is an innovative, sometimes provocative, series published by the Washington Post in which journalists visit the classrooms of government officials and Washington insiders teaching the next generation expected to join their ranks. Thomas E. Ricks, a Washington Post staff writer, published an article in the series on April 28, 2006, based on a visit to the School of Advanced Warfighting, Marine Corps University, in Quantico, Virginia. Sitting in on a course entitled “SAW 7202-06: ‘The French Army at War in Algeria, 1954-1962,'” he discovered the French struggle against Algerian rebels had become a hot topic among officers deploying to Iraq.
Reflecting this interest, the present demand for used copies of A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962, now out of print, is so great that the few soft cover copies available on www.alibris.com are selling for up to $265. On www.Amazon.com, a used hardcover edition is offered at $280. I count myself fortunate to have retained a dog-eared old copy, purchased in the late 1970s when I was working in North Africa.
In his Washington Post article, Ricks indicated that the 11 military officers studying Algeria, which included eight marines, one army major, and one officer each from Australia and Italy, looked at the conflict from a variety of perspectives, always with a thought to its similarities and differences with Iraq. For example, both conflicts involved urban terrorism supported by remote desert camps, and both grew very unpopular at home. France deployed a huge conscript army in Algeria while the United States has depended heavily on National Guard and Reserve units, citizen soldiers, in Iraq. On the other hand, France was fighting to remain in Algeria while the United States hopes to withdraw from Iraq as soon as an independent and stable government is in place. The officers also discussed the heavy manpower demands of both conflicts as well as the widespread use of torture in Algeria. Ricks' article was not clear as to what conclusions, if any, were reached by the officers taking the course. ...
Read entire article at Foreign Policy in Focus
Early on in the Iraq War, “The Battle of Algiers,” Gillo Pontecorvo's 1965 film about the urban guerrilla struggle between French troops and Algerian nationalists, was favored viewing at both the White House and Pentagon. More recently, Alistair Horne's A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962 has become the read of choice for many U.S. military officers serving in Iraq. In the wake of Abu Ghraib and Haditha, what lessons can be drawn from a French colonial war in North Africa, marked by an unholy marriage of revolutionary violence and state terror, occurring half a century ago?
Savage War
On November 1, 1954, the self-declared Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) or National Liberation Front proclaimed an armed struggle for Algerian independence, launching coordinated attacks against French buildings and personnel throughout Algeria. The ensuing Algerian War lasted from 1954 to 1962; and before it ended, France had committed more than half a million troops to the suppression of the Algerian revolution, an intractable conflict that combined revolutionary war and state terror in brutal fashion.
With the French army left largely to its own devices, torture and other atrocities became widespread, even commonplace. Torture, in particular, was institutionalized by the army. In the process, the senior ranks of the French military grew increasingly disenchanted with its civilian leadership in a manner reminiscent of the retired U.S. generals who called recently for the resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld. Eventually, senior military officers turned on the government and attempted to assassinate President Charles de Gaulle, an episode captured later by film director Fred Zinnemann in “The Day of the Jackal.”
Alistair Horne, a fellow at St. Anthony's College, Oxford, is the author of 19 books, many of which treat French military or political subjects. Published in 1977, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962 was immediately proclaimed by experts from all sides of the political spectrum to be the definitive history of the Algerian war. In rereading the book, the early praise seems justified as Horne does a superb job on detailing the Byzantine intricacies of the conflict with intelligence, style, and grace.
“Class Notes” is an innovative, sometimes provocative, series published by the Washington Post in which journalists visit the classrooms of government officials and Washington insiders teaching the next generation expected to join their ranks. Thomas E. Ricks, a Washington Post staff writer, published an article in the series on April 28, 2006, based on a visit to the School of Advanced Warfighting, Marine Corps University, in Quantico, Virginia. Sitting in on a course entitled “SAW 7202-06: ‘The French Army at War in Algeria, 1954-1962,'” he discovered the French struggle against Algerian rebels had become a hot topic among officers deploying to Iraq.
Reflecting this interest, the present demand for used copies of A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962, now out of print, is so great that the few soft cover copies available on www.alibris.com are selling for up to $265. On www.Amazon.com, a used hardcover edition is offered at $280. I count myself fortunate to have retained a dog-eared old copy, purchased in the late 1970s when I was working in North Africa.
In his Washington Post article, Ricks indicated that the 11 military officers studying Algeria, which included eight marines, one army major, and one officer each from Australia and Italy, looked at the conflict from a variety of perspectives, always with a thought to its similarities and differences with Iraq. For example, both conflicts involved urban terrorism supported by remote desert camps, and both grew very unpopular at home. France deployed a huge conscript army in Algeria while the United States has depended heavily on National Guard and Reserve units, citizen soldiers, in Iraq. On the other hand, France was fighting to remain in Algeria while the United States hopes to withdraw from Iraq as soon as an independent and stable government is in place. The officers also discussed the heavy manpower demands of both conflicts as well as the widespread use of torture in Algeria. Ricks' article was not clear as to what conclusions, if any, were reached by the officers taking the course. ...