Trita Parsi: Israel and Iran: Irresolvable Conflict?
The following is an interview with Dr. Trita Parsi, an Iranian living in Washington. Dr. Parsi is a Middle East specialist at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He wrote his Doctoral thesis on Israeli-Iranian relations under Professor Francis Fukuyama. He is the author of “Treacherous Triangle - The Secret Dealings of Iran, Israel and the United States” (Yale University Press, 2007.) An op-ed by Parsi on Israeli-Iranian relations appeared in the Forward on March 6, 2006.
Dr. Parsi's views are, of course, his own and do not necessarily reflect those of IPF.
What are we to make of President Ahmedinajad 's threats to destroy Israel?
By and large, Ahmadinejad has returned to Iran's venomous rhetoric against Israel of the 1980s for two reasons. On the one hand, he uses this for domestic political reasons to put his rivals in an ideological bind. He is returning to the roots of the revolution which then underlines how much his rivals have departed from some of the original ideas of the revolution. The more Ahmadinejad's rivals try to soften his aggressive rhetoric on Israel, the more they come across as being soft on Israel within Iran's domestic political context.
On the other hand, this has been a calculated move to make Israel an explicit factor in the Iranian nuclear stand-off in order to portray this conflict increasingly as between the Islamic world and Israel and the West. This has a strong appeal on the Arab and Muslim streets, and it's making it much more difficult for Arab governments—particularly the Arab sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf—to take the American side against Iran, even though they are very concerned about Iran's nuclear program, because if they do so, they come across as siding with Israel against an Islamic neighbor.
I don't think we can infer that Ahmadinejad would carry out any of his threats if he could, because the root of his statement has little to do with Israel itself, and secondly, because of Israel's deterrence capabilities. The Iranians are not suicidal, this regime in Tehran would not have survived for 26 years if it was. The Israelis have made it very clear to Iran that due to Israel's second strike capability, Iranian nuclear aggression against Israel would be tantamount to suicide.
Nevertheless, Ahmadinejad's venomous rhetoric – in particular his outrageous statements denying the Holocaust -- has further poisoned the atmosphere and simultaneously – and paradoxically – made negotiations more difficult while making the alternative to negotiations all the more costly.
What is the historical context?
In the 1960s and 70s, Israel and Iran found themselves in what was basically a pragmatic entente – a secret alliance – because they both felt common threats from the USSR and, as non-Arab states in the Middle East, from the pan-Arab nationalist phenomenon. This produced what Prime Minister David Ben Gurion called the "periphery doctrine," Israel's strategy of reaching out to build alliances with non-Arab states like Iran and Turkey.
The Islamic Revolution in Iran changed that. After the revolution, the Iranian regime's anti-Israel rhetoric increased, although during the 1980s that was more or less the extent of its involvement with the Jewish state. Strategically, Iran did not have an interest in getting entangled in a conflict with Israel, which is why Israel at the time felt that Iran could again become an ally of the Jewish state. Tehran was not involved in anti-Israel terrorism or anything other than rhetorical support for Palestinian fundamentalists.
That changed in the 1990s as a result of the major geopolitical shifts in the region. Iraq was defeated, pan-Arabism lost its credibility, and the Soviet Union crumbled. The Middle East evolved into a bipolar system, with Israel on one end and Iran on the other. The Israelis began to perceive Iran as a major threat to its regional interests and vice versa. A major strategic rivalry emerged.
As a result, Israel tried to get the upper hand by using its influence in Washington to isolate Tehran by encouraging sanctions and opposing a US-Iran dialogue. Iran, on the other hand, feared that a successful peace process would result in Tehran’s prolonged isolation. Iran reached out to Palestinian rejectionist groups and supported their violent efforts to thwart the Oslo Accords and the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For Iran, the details of the Israeli-Palestinian plans was a side issue, what they were really concerned about was Shimon Peres’ vision for a “New Middle East” since it could create a Israel-centric Middle East order at the expense of Iran's strategic position.
Doesn't the Iranian nuclear program represent a security – not merely political – threat to Israel?
It does, but I don't think Iran would actually use a nuclear weapon against Israel. The Iranian regime is radical but not irrational; it knows that Israel has second-strike capabilities and would be able to destroy it in response to any attack.
However, there are conventional and political consequences to Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Hezbollah would be able to act with greater impunity on Israel's northern border, and, in the political context, Israel would lose some strategic maneuverability, especially as it relates to unilateral political moves. There is no question that the new military and strategic balance would not favor Israel.
But I think Iran's nuclear program is aimed more at deterring the United States. The Iranian regime's biggest fear is not of Israel but of the United States.
The United States has recently offered to join its European partners in negotiations with Iran if the Islamic Republic stops enriching uranium. What are the implications of direct United States–Iran negotiations for Israel's security?
First of all, I think the recent developments are very encouraging. If the US is really willing to pursue the negotiations and an agreement can be reached, I think, that could be the best solution, for Israel and Iran.
We don't know exactly what was offered in the package, but if it was offered as a basis for negotiations and not a take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum, there is a chance for real progress. I have no doubt that negotiations are the only way to truly resolve the conflict.
Some in Israel are worried about an Iranian-United States rapprochement. They fear that their security concerns will get lost in the shuffle and the new alliances will work to their disadvantage.
But I believe that United States-Iran negotiations can greatly reduce threats to the Jewish state. For instance, one of Iran's key objectives is to have its sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf recognized and respected by the United States; in return, Iran would be willing to disengage from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This would be a blow to Palestinian terrorists and a victory for the two-state solution. At this point in time, it is through American-Iranian negotiations that Israel will be best able to win concessions from Iran.
Moreover, the absence of talks increases the likelihood that the US-Iran conflict will be settled militarily, and, unlike the US war in Iraq, in the event of war, Israel will not be able to remain on the sidelines. If there is a US attack on Iran, Tehran will seek to draw in Israel into the war in order to expand the conflict and make it more costly for all.
Though we still don't know if direct negotiations are going to take place, I think it's generally understood that the alternatives to negotiations are worse.
Can the Israeli-Palestinian conflict be dealt with without addressing the question of Iran?
We must pay attention to the geopolitical context and geopolitical rivalries that drive the Israeli-Iranian conflict. Though the Israeli-Iranian rivalry is not driven by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the latter cannot be resolved without addressing the former. Both Iran and Israel have the capability to play the role of a spoiler if only one side of this equation is addressed.
The United States must recognize that it can only resolve the US-Iranian conflict through dialogue and negotiations, and in that dialogue, Israel should be given a stake by including Israeli security concerns. So in that sense reaching an understanding with Tehran is an important step in moving forward on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.
What I could see happening is a situation where Israel and Iran would limit the extent of their involvement against each other. There would be a level which they wouldn’t go beyond. For instance, Iran would publicly take the side of Palestinians but would not offer more than rhetorical support, in return for an end to Israeli pressure on Washington to isolate Tehran. That is a situation in which Israeli-Palestinian negotiations could proceed without pressure from Iran.
Read entire article at Israel Policy Forum
Dr. Parsi's views are, of course, his own and do not necessarily reflect those of IPF.
What are we to make of President Ahmedinajad 's threats to destroy Israel?
By and large, Ahmadinejad has returned to Iran's venomous rhetoric against Israel of the 1980s for two reasons. On the one hand, he uses this for domestic political reasons to put his rivals in an ideological bind. He is returning to the roots of the revolution which then underlines how much his rivals have departed from some of the original ideas of the revolution. The more Ahmadinejad's rivals try to soften his aggressive rhetoric on Israel, the more they come across as being soft on Israel within Iran's domestic political context.
On the other hand, this has been a calculated move to make Israel an explicit factor in the Iranian nuclear stand-off in order to portray this conflict increasingly as between the Islamic world and Israel and the West. This has a strong appeal on the Arab and Muslim streets, and it's making it much more difficult for Arab governments—particularly the Arab sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf—to take the American side against Iran, even though they are very concerned about Iran's nuclear program, because if they do so, they come across as siding with Israel against an Islamic neighbor.
I don't think we can infer that Ahmadinejad would carry out any of his threats if he could, because the root of his statement has little to do with Israel itself, and secondly, because of Israel's deterrence capabilities. The Iranians are not suicidal, this regime in Tehran would not have survived for 26 years if it was. The Israelis have made it very clear to Iran that due to Israel's second strike capability, Iranian nuclear aggression against Israel would be tantamount to suicide.
Nevertheless, Ahmadinejad's venomous rhetoric – in particular his outrageous statements denying the Holocaust -- has further poisoned the atmosphere and simultaneously – and paradoxically – made negotiations more difficult while making the alternative to negotiations all the more costly.
What is the historical context?
In the 1960s and 70s, Israel and Iran found themselves in what was basically a pragmatic entente – a secret alliance – because they both felt common threats from the USSR and, as non-Arab states in the Middle East, from the pan-Arab nationalist phenomenon. This produced what Prime Minister David Ben Gurion called the "periphery doctrine," Israel's strategy of reaching out to build alliances with non-Arab states like Iran and Turkey.
The Islamic Revolution in Iran changed that. After the revolution, the Iranian regime's anti-Israel rhetoric increased, although during the 1980s that was more or less the extent of its involvement with the Jewish state. Strategically, Iran did not have an interest in getting entangled in a conflict with Israel, which is why Israel at the time felt that Iran could again become an ally of the Jewish state. Tehran was not involved in anti-Israel terrorism or anything other than rhetorical support for Palestinian fundamentalists.
That changed in the 1990s as a result of the major geopolitical shifts in the region. Iraq was defeated, pan-Arabism lost its credibility, and the Soviet Union crumbled. The Middle East evolved into a bipolar system, with Israel on one end and Iran on the other. The Israelis began to perceive Iran as a major threat to its regional interests and vice versa. A major strategic rivalry emerged.
As a result, Israel tried to get the upper hand by using its influence in Washington to isolate Tehran by encouraging sanctions and opposing a US-Iran dialogue. Iran, on the other hand, feared that a successful peace process would result in Tehran’s prolonged isolation. Iran reached out to Palestinian rejectionist groups and supported their violent efforts to thwart the Oslo Accords and the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For Iran, the details of the Israeli-Palestinian plans was a side issue, what they were really concerned about was Shimon Peres’ vision for a “New Middle East” since it could create a Israel-centric Middle East order at the expense of Iran's strategic position.
Doesn't the Iranian nuclear program represent a security – not merely political – threat to Israel?
It does, but I don't think Iran would actually use a nuclear weapon against Israel. The Iranian regime is radical but not irrational; it knows that Israel has second-strike capabilities and would be able to destroy it in response to any attack.
However, there are conventional and political consequences to Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Hezbollah would be able to act with greater impunity on Israel's northern border, and, in the political context, Israel would lose some strategic maneuverability, especially as it relates to unilateral political moves. There is no question that the new military and strategic balance would not favor Israel.
But I think Iran's nuclear program is aimed more at deterring the United States. The Iranian regime's biggest fear is not of Israel but of the United States.
The United States has recently offered to join its European partners in negotiations with Iran if the Islamic Republic stops enriching uranium. What are the implications of direct United States–Iran negotiations for Israel's security?
First of all, I think the recent developments are very encouraging. If the US is really willing to pursue the negotiations and an agreement can be reached, I think, that could be the best solution, for Israel and Iran.
We don't know exactly what was offered in the package, but if it was offered as a basis for negotiations and not a take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum, there is a chance for real progress. I have no doubt that negotiations are the only way to truly resolve the conflict.
Some in Israel are worried about an Iranian-United States rapprochement. They fear that their security concerns will get lost in the shuffle and the new alliances will work to their disadvantage.
But I believe that United States-Iran negotiations can greatly reduce threats to the Jewish state. For instance, one of Iran's key objectives is to have its sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf recognized and respected by the United States; in return, Iran would be willing to disengage from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This would be a blow to Palestinian terrorists and a victory for the two-state solution. At this point in time, it is through American-Iranian negotiations that Israel will be best able to win concessions from Iran.
Moreover, the absence of talks increases the likelihood that the US-Iran conflict will be settled militarily, and, unlike the US war in Iraq, in the event of war, Israel will not be able to remain on the sidelines. If there is a US attack on Iran, Tehran will seek to draw in Israel into the war in order to expand the conflict and make it more costly for all.
Though we still don't know if direct negotiations are going to take place, I think it's generally understood that the alternatives to negotiations are worse.
Can the Israeli-Palestinian conflict be dealt with without addressing the question of Iran?
We must pay attention to the geopolitical context and geopolitical rivalries that drive the Israeli-Iranian conflict. Though the Israeli-Iranian rivalry is not driven by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the latter cannot be resolved without addressing the former. Both Iran and Israel have the capability to play the role of a spoiler if only one side of this equation is addressed.
The United States must recognize that it can only resolve the US-Iranian conflict through dialogue and negotiations, and in that dialogue, Israel should be given a stake by including Israeli security concerns. So in that sense reaching an understanding with Tehran is an important step in moving forward on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.
What I could see happening is a situation where Israel and Iran would limit the extent of their involvement against each other. There would be a level which they wouldn’t go beyond. For instance, Iran would publicly take the side of Palestinians but would not offer more than rhetorical support, in return for an end to Israeli pressure on Washington to isolate Tehran. That is a situation in which Israeli-Palestinian negotiations could proceed without pressure from Iran.