Victor Davis Hanson: Has Bush or the World Changed?
There is as much relief from realists as there is disappointment from neo-Wilsonians over a perceived change in U.S. foreign policy — what Time magazine clumsily dubbed “The End of Cowboy Diplomacy.” It is true that there is now a regrettable new quietism about promoting democracy in the Middle East . And the United States also insists on multiparty talks with the ghoulish regimes in North Korea and Iran , in a fashion that purportedly seems much different from the go-it-alone caricature of 2001/2.
But think hard: Has George Bush, or the world itself, changed in the last five years?
One obvious difference from the first administration is the added nuclear component to the most recent pressing crises. Taking out the Taliban and Saddam Hussein did not involve an immediate threat of nuclear retaliation. Preempting against North Korea does run such risk — and perhaps very soon Iran will too. That requires a different strategy.
The second change from the immediate past is oil. For most of the first administration, the price of petroleum was around $20-$30 a barrel. We are now well into the era of $60-$70, and the threat of constant shortages.
This energy frailty has had two pernicious effects on U.S. foreign policy. Our allies in Europe and Japan now view almost any American initiative with Russia , the Middle East, or Latin America in terms of the potential fallout on their own energy costs and supplies.
In addition, the consuming nations are now providing a windfall of several hundred billion in extra profits to the likes of the House of Saud, the Iranian theocrats, the Gulf Sheikdoms, Hugo Chavez, and Vladimir Putin. Not only are some of these billions recycled in nefarious ways in arms purchases and terrorist subsidies, but also the intrinsic failures of theocracy, autocracy, and neo-Communism are masked by such accidental largess.
Worse still, there is now a growing new relativist standard of international behavior for roguish regimes: The degree to which a non-democratic nation has either oil or nukes — or preferably both — determines its perceived legitimacy. Any individual action the United States now undertakes may spike oil prices, and thus endanger the livelihood of its allies or neutrals while further subsidizing our enemies.
A third difference is the fading memory of September 11 as we reach the fifth anniversary of that mass murder. As the anger of the American people subsides, weariness with the counter-response grows, and the very human desire not to rock the boat permeates national life — especially when we have not had, as predicted, another 9/11. It is hard to keep reminding the American people for five years that we alone must lead the world against the terrorists and their state sponsors.
So part of Mr. Bush’s dilemma derives also from his very success. The audacious removal of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban — coupled with the killing of thousands of Islamic terrorists abroad, together with a revolution in security procedures at home — have combined to prevent another jihadist attack. Now in our complacence, we think our recent safety was almost a natural occurrence rather than the result of national sacrifice and an ordeal that must continue. And, again, such a return to normalcy makes the lonely task of prompting reform in the Middle East seem rather unnecessary, if not irrelevant....
Read entire article at National Review Online
But think hard: Has George Bush, or the world itself, changed in the last five years?
One obvious difference from the first administration is the added nuclear component to the most recent pressing crises. Taking out the Taliban and Saddam Hussein did not involve an immediate threat of nuclear retaliation. Preempting against North Korea does run such risk — and perhaps very soon Iran will too. That requires a different strategy.
The second change from the immediate past is oil. For most of the first administration, the price of petroleum was around $20-$30 a barrel. We are now well into the era of $60-$70, and the threat of constant shortages.
This energy frailty has had two pernicious effects on U.S. foreign policy. Our allies in Europe and Japan now view almost any American initiative with Russia , the Middle East, or Latin America in terms of the potential fallout on their own energy costs and supplies.
In addition, the consuming nations are now providing a windfall of several hundred billion in extra profits to the likes of the House of Saud, the Iranian theocrats, the Gulf Sheikdoms, Hugo Chavez, and Vladimir Putin. Not only are some of these billions recycled in nefarious ways in arms purchases and terrorist subsidies, but also the intrinsic failures of theocracy, autocracy, and neo-Communism are masked by such accidental largess.
Worse still, there is now a growing new relativist standard of international behavior for roguish regimes: The degree to which a non-democratic nation has either oil or nukes — or preferably both — determines its perceived legitimacy. Any individual action the United States now undertakes may spike oil prices, and thus endanger the livelihood of its allies or neutrals while further subsidizing our enemies.
A third difference is the fading memory of September 11 as we reach the fifth anniversary of that mass murder. As the anger of the American people subsides, weariness with the counter-response grows, and the very human desire not to rock the boat permeates national life — especially when we have not had, as predicted, another 9/11. It is hard to keep reminding the American people for five years that we alone must lead the world against the terrorists and their state sponsors.
So part of Mr. Bush’s dilemma derives also from his very success. The audacious removal of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban — coupled with the killing of thousands of Islamic terrorists abroad, together with a revolution in security procedures at home — have combined to prevent another jihadist attack. Now in our complacence, we think our recent safety was almost a natural occurrence rather than the result of national sacrifice and an ordeal that must continue. And, again, such a return to normalcy makes the lonely task of prompting reform in the Middle East seem rather unnecessary, if not irrelevant....